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Chapter 1
Introduction
Theories of decision making play a fundamental role in economic theory. Most econom-
ically relevant decisions have to be made in the presence of uncertainty. Uncertainty
pertains to situations in which an agent, called a decision maker, faces the problem
of choosing a course of action. The choice of a course of action, by itself, does not
determine a unique outcome. The decision maker knows which circumstances affect the
outcomes of her actions, but she is incapable of saying which of them she will obtain
with certainty. The standard practice in economics when modeling decision making un-
der uncertainty is to follow the Bayesian approach. In this approach it is assumed that
the decision maker’s subjective beliefs are quantifiable by a unique probability distribu-
tion and that these probabilistic beliefs are used in decision making, typically as a basis
for expected utility maximization. Moreover, the arrival of new information affects the
decision maker’s beliefs, and posterior beliefs are obtained by updating the prior ones
in accordance with Bayes’ rule. The subjective expected utility theory of Savage (1954)
is firmly established as the axiomatic underpinning of the Bayesian paradigm. Savage’s
theory offers an elegant and straightforward tool for modeling not only static and dy-
namic, but also interactive decision problems in the presence of uncertainty. However,
ever since the contributions of Ellsberg (1961) and Aumann (1976) economists began
to acknowledge that the Bayesian approach was too restrictive. Ellsberg pointed to
the limitations of Bayesianism as a descriptive theory, while Aumann questioned the
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explanatory power of asymmetric information within Bayesian frameworks.
In his thought experiments, Daniel Ellsberg (1961) exemplified that Savage’s the-
ory cannot take into account the possibility that probabilities for some events are
known, while for other ones they are not, and that such “ambiguity” may affect the
decision makers’ choice behavior. In particular, Ellsberg observed that most of his
“non-experimental” subjects preferred to bet on events with known probabilities rather
than on ones for which information about their likelihoods is missing. Such behav-
ior, termed ambiguity aversion, has received ample empirical confirmation in recent
years (see Camerer and Weber, 1992). For ambiguity-averse subjects it is impossible
that their choices are based on a single probability distribution. This result implies
that ambiguity-sensitive behavior cannot be modeled by the subjective expected utility
theory of Savage (1954).
In his famous article on “agreeing to disagree”, Robert Aumann (1976) challenged
the role that asymmetric information plays in interactive decision problems. He showed
that, under the assumption of common priors, differences in commonly known decisions
cannot be explained solely by differences in decision makers’ private information. In
particular, if two decision makers share a common probability distribution, and their
posteriors for some event are common knowledge, then these posteriors must coincide,
although they may be conditioned on diverse information. Aumann’s agreement on
posterior beliefs has been extended to posterior expectations by Milgrom (1981) and
Geanakoplos and Sebenius (1983). Based on these extensions, Milgrom and Stokey
(1982) showed that in the absence of heterogeneous prior beliefs asymmetric informa-
tion alone cannot generate any profitable trade opportunities among traders with the
same risk attitudes. These results led to very puzzling consequences for economic the-
ory. Within Bayesian frameworks, neither widely observed gambling behavior nor the
existence of speculation in financial markets can be explained solely on the basis of
asymmetric information. In this thesis I will provide an alternative solution to that
“puzzle”.
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Essentially, the aim of the thesis is to investigate how access to “additional” or
“new” information affects choice behavior under ambiguity. To scrutinize this issue
four topics are suggested and explored by experimental as well as formal methods.
Each topic can be viewed as focusing on a different “aspect” of information that may
be seen as relevant for the decision maker when facing static, dynamic or interactive
decision problems.
The first topic examines the relationship between ambiguity aversion and decision
makers’ attitudes towards objective randomization devices. To cope with the limita-
tions of Bayesianism as pointed out by Ellsberg (1961), several alternatives to Savage’s
subjective expected utility theory have been proposed. The Choquet expected utility
model of Schmeidler (1989), the multiple prior model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989),
as well as the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) are
prominent examples. Many of these alternatives adopt Schmeidler’s notion of ambigu-
ity aversion which states that an ambiguity-averse decision maker should always prefer
random mixtures between two ambiguous bets to each of the involved bet. Existing
explanations for such a preference for mixtures often rely on the idea that access to an
objective randomization device, such as a fair coin, mitigates the problem of lacking
probabilistic information. In the words of Klibanoff (2001a, p.290), randomizing be-
tween two ambiguous bets have “[. . . ] the effect of making the outcomes less subjective
[. . . ]”. However, this explanation is controversial and the logic behind it depends upon
the formal framework used to model uncertainty. When uncertainty is modeled in the
two-stage setting of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), mixtures, indeed, have an intuitive
effect of smoothing expected utilities across states and according to Schmeidler, an
ambiguity-averse decision maker should always be randomization-loving. On the other
hand, when uncertainty is modeled in the one-stage setting of Savage (1954), the effect
of mixtures is not clear at all. Adopting the one-stage setting, Eichberger and Kelsey
(1996b) showed that an ambiguity-averse decision maker with Choquet expected utility
preferences will be randomization-neutral. Motivated by these competing predictions,
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we investigate this issue experimentally. In Chapter 4, we design and implement an
experiment which allows an examination of the relationship between ambiguity and
randomization attitudes.
The second topic focuses on dynamic choice behavior under ambiguity. In dynamic
choice situations, a decision maker is informed sequentially which uncertain event has
occurred. An important question that arises in this context is how preferences are
updated to incorporate the receipt of new information. Many theories of updating pref-
erences assume either dynamic consistency or consequentialism in order to axiomati-
cally underpin the link between prior and posterior preferences. Dynamic consistency
requires that prior choices are respected by updated preferences. According to con-
sequentialism only outcomes that are still possible matter for updated preferences. It
is well-known (see Ghirardato, 2002) that dynamic consistency together with conse-
quentialism satisfied on all events implies that preferences admit subjective expected
utility representation and that updated preferences are obtained by revising the decision
maker’s subjective beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. This result implies that at least one
of these axioms must be relaxed when extending ambiguity models to dynamic choice
situations. An ambiguity-averse (resp. loving) decision maker must violate either dy-
namic consistency or consequentialism, or both. The existing theoretical literature has
not yet reached consensus on which of these axiom is the more plausible assumption. In
Chapter 5, we design a dynamic version of the classical 3-color experiment of Ellsberg
(1961) which allows for differentiation between dynamic consistency and consequential-
ism. To test whether subjects facing ambiguity behave consistent with either of these
two axioms, we conduct the dynamic 3-color experiment.
The third topic explores the link between the dynamic properties of Choquet ex-
pected utility preferences and existing notions of unambiguous events. The idea of
unambiguous events is closely related to the idea of events which support some kind
of probabilistic beliefs. Recently, Nehring (1999) and Zhang (2002) proposed two dif-
ferent notions of unambiguous events. In Chapter 6, we attempt to characterize these
9
two notions of unambiguous events by imposing dynamic properties on Choquet prefer-
ences. When extending ambiguity-sensitive preferences to dynamic frameworks, Sarin
and Wakker (1998a), Epstein and Schneider (2003) as well as Eichberger, Grant, and
Kelsey (2005) showed that both axioms, dynamic consistency and consequentialism, can
be maintained, however, at the cost of constraining the analysis to a fixed collection of
events and by imposing restrictions on subjective beliefs. We follow this approach and
ask whether, for Choquet expected utility preferences, dynamic consistency and con-
sequentialism, constrained to a given collection of events, guarantees that these events
are unambiguous in a peculiar sense and vice versa. The results we obtained allow us
to answer this question in the affirmative.
The fourth topic scrutinizes the role that asymmetric information plays in the con-
text of interactive decision problems a` la Aumann (1976), Geanakoplos and Sebenius
(1983) and Milgrom and Stokey (1982) under ambiguity. Many results on the impossi-
bility of agreeing to disagree have been formulated in Bayesian frameworks. In Chapter
7, we generalize these results in a non-Bayesian setup. It is assumed that decision
makers share a common, but not-necessarily-additive prior, and that their preferences
admit Choquet expected utility representation. In this setting we characterize prop-
erties of decision makers’ private information which are necessary and sufficient for
the impossibility of agreeing to disagree to be true under ambiguity. The results ob-
tained suggest that asymmetric information does matter and can explain differences in
commonly known decisions due to the ambiguous (in a specific sense) character of the
decision makers’ private information. Thus, the existence of gambling behavior and
speculative trade may be attributed to ambiguity of private information.
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 concentrates on Bayesian decision
theory. First, historical roots of modern decision theory are reviewed. The main tenets
of Savage’s (1954) subjective expected utility theory are recalled in static as well as
in dynamic setup. The notions of dynamic consistency and consequentialism are in-
troduced. Chapter 3 starts with an explanation of the limitations of Bayesianism as
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pointed out by Ellsberg (1961). The most widely studied ambiguity models are briefly
described. The chapter ends by presenting two alternative approaches used to define
ambiguity attitudes. In Chapter 4, I report on results from experimental study ex-
amining relationship between ambiguity and randomization attitudes. In Chapter 5,
first, the dynamic version of Ellsberg’s 3-color experiment is introduced. The ten-
sion between dynamic consistency, consequentialism and ambiguity-sensitive behavior
is explained. Finally, the data from the dynamic 3-color experiment is evaluated and
discussed. In Chapters 6 and 7 the analysis is constrained to Schmeidler’s (1989) Cho-
quet expected utility model. For this reason, Chapters 6 starts with the definition of
Choquet expected utility preferences. The notions of unambiguous events in the sense
of Nehring (1999) and Zhang (2002) are introduced. Conditional Choquet preferences
and the most widely used updating rules are defined. In the main part, Nehring’s as
well as Zhang’s unambiguous events are characterized by imposing dynamic properties
on Choquet preferences. In Chapter 7, the interpersonal decision model and the notion
of common knowledge are introduced. Sufficient and necessary conditions are estab-
lished for the well-known agreement theorems to hold under ambiguity. The no-trade
theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) is generalized for Choquet preferences. Finally,
I summarize and conclude in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
Bayesian Decision Theory
2.1 Historical Backgrounds
Modern decision theory as a branch of economic theory is mainly concerned with pro-
viding an axiomatic foundation of rational decision criteria under uncertainty. The
principle of expected utility maximization is one such criterion. Whether this deci-
sion criterion is tenable for any type of uncertain situation has remained a topic of
investigation for a long time.
When explaining economic phenomena, Knight (1921) emphasized distinguishing
between two types of uncertainty: “measurable” and “unmeasurable”. In his formula-
tion, the measurable uncertainty, or simply risk, designates situations in which prob-
abilities are known. That is, they can be deduced a priori or they can be reasonably
approximated by relative frequencies. Games of chance in which outcomes are influ-
enced by a randomizing device such as a fair roulette wheel or a fair coin, as well as
insurance problems, are typical examples of risky situations. By contrast, the unmea-
surable uncertainty, or simply uncertainty, refers to situations in which probabilities are
not precisely known, in the sense that they can neither be calculated in an objective way
nor they can be estimated from past data. Sporting events such as horse races, elections
or most real investments involve such unmeasurable uncertainties. It took almost three
hundred years before the expected utility maximization rule was axiomatically justified
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as a decision criterion for these two types of uncertainty.
Decision theory is as old as the notion of probability itself. The term probability
emerged around 1660 (see Hacking, 1975). Interestingly, the person who is associ-
ated with the concept of probability, Blaise Pascal, also introduced several concepts of
modern decision theory. In his famous “wager”, a thought designed to convince non-
believers in God that they would be better off becoming believers, Pascal invented three
arguments. These arguments were primarily designed to cope with decision problems
in which experience and experimental data are not available. As Pascal said, “we are
in the same epistemological position as someone who is gambling about a coin whose
aleatory properties are unknown”(Hacking, 1975, p.70). His arguments were based on
three decision criteria: first, if one action is better then another no matter which states
of affairs occur, then one should perform a dominating action; second, if there is no
dominating action and probability can be assessed to each state of affairs, then one
should perform an action with highest expectation; third, if the probabilities of various
states of affairs are not known, but instead the set of probability assignments is known,
then one should perform an action of dominating expectation (see Hacking, 1972). How-
ever, even if Pascal’s technical terminology points to modern notions such as subjective
probabilities or expected utility maximization, his arguments are consistent with the
doctrine of gaming and chances which are characteristic at this time. “The only prob-
ability notion which Pascal uses is hazard, and there is no evidence that he interprets
this notion in terms of degrees of belief”(Hacking, 1972, p.190). Nevertheless, it seems
that Pascal was the first person who perceived that the structure of decision problem
in which probabilities are “objectively” know is isomorphic to the decision problem in
which probabilities are unknown.
In the 18th century, mathematicians and philosophers discovered mainly the mathe-
matical aspects of probability theory. Jacob Bernoulli (1713) discovered the law of large
numbers and Thomas Bayes (1763) introduced the idea of Bayesian updating of “prior”
probabilities to “posterior” ones. During this time Daniel Bernoulli (1738/1954) is the
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only one who contributed to decision theory. To solve the famous St. Petersburg para-
dox he suggested using expected utilities of monetary outcomes rather than expected
values when evaluating games of chance with known probabilities.1
After this inauguration, decision theory had been largely neglected until the begin-
ning of 20th century. At this time it became commonplace for philosophers to interpret
scientific theories as axiomatic calculi in which theoretical terms are related to obser-
vations. This conception of scientific theories is an intellectual achievement of Logical
Positivism, the philosophical position developed by the Vienna Circle.2 One of the main
objectives of Logical Positivism was to eliminate metaphysical entities from philosophy
and science. To avoid unverifiable concepts in science, the members of Vienna Circle
advocated rigorous scientific standards. A scientific theory is to be axiomatized in the
language of mathematical logic. Such theory consists of theoretical and observational
terms. The axioms of the theory are formulations of scientific laws, and specify relations
between theoretical terms. Theoretical terms are connected with observational ones by
explicit definitions, called correspondence rules. Correspondence rules have three func-
tions. First, they define explicitly theoretical terms by means of observational terms;
second, they guarantee the “cognitive significance” of theoretical terms; and third, they
specify the admissible experimental procedure for applying a theory to observations (see
Suppe, 1974). For instance, if a correspondence rule defines a numerical quantity such
as “mass” (the theoretical term) as the result of a particular measurement of an object
under particular circumstances (observational terms), this specifies an empirical pro-
cedure for determining mass, that is, defines “mass” in terms of that procedure and
does so in a way such as to guarantee the cognitive significance of the term “mass”.
Therefore, when the theoretical term “mass” is used for physical laws, one knows how
1St. Petersburg paradox is a situation in which a decision maker is willing to pay only a finite (and
rather very small) amount of money to participate in a game with random outcomes, despite the fact
that the expected value of such game is infinite.
2The movement of the Vienna Circle began in 1929 with the publication of the manifesto entitled
“Wissenschaftliche Weltanschaung - Der Wiener Kreis”, edited by Carnap, Neurath and Hahn.
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the physical laws translate to observations. The notion of revealed preferences in eco-
nomics “[. . . ] is evidently an intellectual descendant of Logical Positivism” (Gilboa,
2009, p.60).
In the spirit of Logical Positivism, Ramsey (1926) proposed defining and measuring
probabilities as a decision maker’s subjective willingness to bet on the occurrence of an
event. In his view, a reasonable decision maker will behave as if she had a subjective
probability which guides her decisions, even if probabilities are not part of the descrip-
tion of a decision problem. In Ramsey’s view (1926, p.71) subjective probabilities reflect
“[. . . ] the degree of beliefs [. . . ], which we can express vaguely as the extent to which
we are prepared to act on it”. Consequently, one could look at pairwise choices between
bets in order to measure the strength of belief: “The-old fashion method of measuring
a person’s belief is to propose a bet, and see what are the lowest odds which (s)he will
accept. This method I regard as fundamentally sound” (Ramsey, 1926, p.73). Invoking
the axiomatic approach and taking the existence of utilities as given, Ramsey sketched
the proof of the existence of subjective probabilities. Independently, de Finetti (1937)
also suggested using pairwise comparison of bets to measure degrees of belief. He of-
fered an axiomatization of subjective probabilities in the context of maximization of
expected monetary value (rather than expected utilities). Regarding the interpretation
of probabilities, however, de Finetti had a more radical view than Ramsey. De Finetti
claimed that “all” probabilistic beliefs are purely subjective. Even in the case of games
of chance, where laws of chance can be deduced objectively, he criticized the view that
these laws should be seen as a demonstration of the existence of an objective probabil-
ity distribution. He argued that this “objectivity” might have its reasons in a common
psychological perception of symmetry, which some people regard as reasonable, and
which has nothing at all to do with objective considerations.
In their foundation of game theory, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) offered
an axiomatic derivation of the notion of utility and the expected utility maximization
rule. In their theory, objects of choice are probability distributions over outcomes,
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called lotteries. These probabilities are presupposed to be known in the sense that
they are explicitly incorporated in the description of a decision problem. Von Neumann
and Morgenstern showed that utilities over outcomes can be deduced from observable
choices between such probability distributions. They established a set of simple and
seemingly reasonable axioms imposed on the preferences between lotteries which are
necessary and sufficient for the existence of a utility function over outcomes and for the
expected utility maximization rule. That is, a decision maker, when confronted with
any two lotteries, will choose the one with a higher expected utility. Moreover, such
utility function is unique up to a positive linear transformations, i.e. “cardinal”.
The achievements of Ramsey, de Finetti and von Neumann and Morgenstern cul-
minated in the seminal work of Leonard Savage (1954). He proposed a novel analytical
framework to model decision making under uncertainty without presupposing the ex-
istence of probabilities and utilities. Taking only states of nature and outcomes as
primitives, Savage showed that both utility and probability, together with the expected
utility maximization rule, can be deduced from observable choices among “acts”. In
this general framework, he established a set of axioms imposed on preferences among
acts, which are sufficient and necessary for both the existence of a unique subjective
probability distribution and the existence of a unique (up to a positive linear transfor-
mations) utility function. Moreover, decision makers’ choices are guided by maximizing
subjective expected utility. Thus, Savage showed that his axioms lead to the same rep-
resentation of preferences as in situations in which probabilities are exogenously given.
In other words, the decision problem with known probabilities is isomorphic to the
decision problem with unknown probabilities.
Invoking the axiomatic approach in the dictum of Logical Positivism, the contri-
butions of Ramsey, de Finetti, von Neumann and Morgenstern and Savage guaranteed
that the theoretical terms, such as probability and utility, ware not merely metaphys-
ical entities. They derived these theoretical terms from observable choices, specified a
procedure to measure and interpret them, and thus endowed them with cognitive sig-
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nificance. The axiomatic foundation of the principle of expected utility maximization
under risk and uncertainty had a tremendous impact on economic theory. It allowed
for the formal incorporation of risk and uncertainly into economic theory and the ap-
plication of an important number of results from probability theory. As Machina and
Schmeidler (1992, p. 746) observe, “[. . . ] it is hard to imagine where the theory of
games, the theory of search and the theory of auctions would be without [them]”.
2.2 Subjective Expected Utility Theory
In this section I depict the main components of subjective expected utility theory in the
spirit of Savage (1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963). To model choice behavior
under uncertainty Savage offered an analytical framework consisting of a set of states
of nature Ω, a set of outcomes X, a set of acts F and a binary relation < on the set
F . The set Ω is a collection of mutually exclusive and exhaustive states representing
all possible resolution of uncertainty. In Savage’s words (1954, p.8) the state ω is “[. . . ]
a description of the world, leaving no relevant aspects undescribe”. At ex-ante stage a
decision maker does not know which state is the true one and has no influence upon
the truth of the states. Ex-post exactly one state will be true and all uncertainty will
be resolved. An uncertain event A is a subset of Ω. For all A ⊂ Ω, we denote Ω\A, the
complement of A, by Ac. The set X is a list of all possible consequences of any course
of action that affects the decision maker’s well-being. It captures “[. . . ] everything that
may happen to the decision maker”(Savage, 1954, p. 8). The elements of the set F
represent possible courses of action and are called acts. An act f is a function from
Ω to X, assigning to each state ω the outcome f(ω) ∈ X which would result if ω
would be the true state and f would have been chosen. Since the decision maker is
uncertain about which state is the true one, she is uncertain about which outcome will
result from the chosen act. The binary relation < on F represents the decision maker’s
preferences. The preference relation < is viewed as governing the decision maker’s
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choices. In the behavioristic tradition so ubiquitous in economics under the label of
“revealed preferences”, the preference relation < is partially observable. We can only
observe the choices made by the decision maker. That is, if the act f and g are available
to the decision maker and she chooses f rather than g then we can infer that she prefers
f to g, i.e. f < g.
Savage’s idea is to impose some reasonable axioms on preferences and to show that if
the decision maker’s choices satisfy these axioms then she behaves as a person who pos-
sesses a single probability distribution over states and a utility function over outcomes,
with respect to which she maximizes her subjective expected utility when choosing
among acts. Savage postulated six axioms. Some of them, such as completeness and
transitivity, are familiar. Other ones are technical and deal with different forms of
separability and continuity property of preferences. Nevertheless, one postulate is the
core axiom of Savage’s theory and it merits the definition and a brief discussion. It is
called the Sure-Thing-Principle. It requires that preferences between acts depend solely
on the outcomes in states in which the outcomes of the two acts being compared are
distinct. To state it formally, let us denote by fAg an act which assigns the outcome
f(ω) to any state ω in A and the outcome g(ω) to any state ω in Ac.
Axiom 1 (Sure-Thing-Principle). For any act f, g, h, h′ ∈ F and any event A:
fAh < gAh ⇔ fAh′ < gAh′. (2.1)
The Sure-Thing-Principle is a separability principle which has a practical meaning.
Namely, when making choices between two acts, it is not necessary to consider states
in which these acts yield the same outcomes. To illustrate the rationale behind this
axiom, consider the following choice problem. A decision maker has to choose between
two acts fAh and gAh, where fAh states: “If Horse A wins the race, you will get a trip
to France; if Horse A does not win, you will get a trip to Holland”, and gAh states:
“If Horse A wins the race, you will get a trip to Greece; if Horse A does not win, you
will get a trip to Holland”. These two acts offer the same trip if Horse A does not
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win the race, but different ones if Horse A does win. When facing the choice between
these two acts the decision maker has only to decide whether she prefers the trip to
France or the trip to Greece, regardless of what trip is offered by both acts in case
Horse A does not win. Then, according to the Sure-Thing-Principle the common part
of these two acts, here the trip to Holland, is immaterial for the choice between fAh and
gAh. If the decision maker prefers fAh to gAh, then she also should prefer fAh
′ to gAh′
whatever the trip h′ offered in Ac is, let say to Hawaii or to the moon. Bacharach (1985,
p.168) refers to the Sure-Thing-Principe as a “[. . . ] fundamental principle of rational
decision-making”. Nevertheless, Ellsberg (1961) challenged the descriptive validity of
this axiom (see Section 3.1).
Savage showed that his axioms are sufficient and necessary for the identification of
both a utility function on the set of outcomes and a probability measure on the set of
states that jointly characterize the decision maker’s choices among acts by maximization
of her subjective expected utility. Savage’s theorem can be be expressed as follows. A
preference relation< over F satisfies his six axioms (including the Sure-Thing-Principle)
if and only if there exists a unique probability measure pi : Ω→ [0, 1] and a unique (up
to a positive linear transformation) utility function u : X → R such that for any pair
of acts f, g ∈ F :
f < g ⇔
∫
Ω
u(f(ω)) dpi(ω) ≥
∫
Ω
u(g(ω)) dpi(ω). (2.2)
In this formula, the measure pi represents the decision maker’s beliefs and is interpreted
as a subjective probability distribution over states. The utility index u represents the
decision maker’s tastes, i.e. preferences over outcomes. In particular, when outcomes
are monetary, the curvature of u is a measure of the decision maker’s risk attitude (for
given beliefs). Hence, Savage’s subjective expected utility theory offers an attractive
way to continue working with the expected utility approach even if the probabilities
for uncertain events are unknown. This also means that a decision problem under
uncertainty can be reduced in some sense to a decision problem under risk, with one
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important caveat. Beliefs are purely subjective and consequently two decision makers
may have distinct subjective probability distributions even if they face the same decision
problem.
Two key properties characterizing the subjective expected utility theory merit em-
phasis. First, probabilities assigned to mutually exclusive events are independent of
the act being evaluated. This property is often referred as to “separability of beliefs
from tastes” and it is implied by the Sure-Thing-Principle. Second, utilities assigned
to outcomes are independent of the underlying state of nature. This property can be
labelled as “separability of tastes from states” and has been criticized in a number of
studies, e.g. Karni (1993).
In his original axiomatization, Savage allowed the set of outcomes to be an arbitrary
set at the cost of assuming that the set of states is infinite. Anscombe and Aumann
(1963) showed that if one accepts the existence of a physical (known, objective) random-
ization device such as roulette wheel then derivation of the subjective expected utility
is also possible for a finite state space and with a more parsimonious set of axioms. In
their setting the set of outcomes Z = ∆(X) is taken to be the set of all probability
distributions (or simple lotteries) over some more primitive set of outcomes X with
finite supports, i.e.:
∆(X) =
 p : X → [0, 1] #{x ∈ X | p(x) > 0} <∞,∑
x∈X p(x) = 1
 . (2.3)
In the theory of Anscombe and Aumann objects of choice are “horse-race/roulette-
wheel acts”. An act f is a function from Ω to ∆(X) assigning to any state a simple
lottery. To distinguish Savage’s style acts from Anscombe and Aumann’s ones we use
H to denote the set of acts. Hence, there are two sources of uncertainty. All uncertainty
is resolved sequentially. First, an outcome of the horse races, that is the state ω with
unknown probability, is realized by determining the lottery f(ω) to be played out.
Second, a roulette wheel is spun and the decision maker gets an outcome x with known
probability f(ω)(x). Denote by f(ω)(x) the probability of outcome x ∈ X in state
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ω ∈ Ω induced by the act f . Furthermore, the set ∆(X) is closed under a mixing
operation, and so is the set H. For every f, g ∈ H and any α ∈ [0, 1], a mixture
αf + (1− α)g belongs to H and is performed state by state, that is:
(
αf + (1− α)g)(ω)(x) = αf(ω)(x) + (1− α)g(ω)(x), (2.4)
for all x ∈ X and all ω ∈ Ω. Adapting the independence axiom of von Neumann
and Morgenstern, Anscombe and Aumann showed that their five axioms are sufficient
and necessary for the existence of a unique subjective probability distribution µ and a
unique (up to a positive linear transformation) utility function u such that for any pair
of acts f, g ∈ H:
f < g ⇔
∫
Ω
[∑
x∈X
f(ω)(x)u(x)
]
dµ(ω) ≥
∫
Ω
[∑
x∈X
g(ω)(x)u(x)
]
dµ(ω). (2.5)
In the two-stage setting of Anscombe and Aumann, acts are evaluated by double inte-
gration. First, expectations are taken state by state with respect to known probabilities
(over outcomes) dictated be the act and the states. This yields a function which assigns
an expected utility to each state. In the second stage, an integral of this function is
taken with respect to subjective probabilities for states in which the respective expected
utilities materialize. The two-stage approach of Anscombe and Aumann has been es-
tablished as a convenient setup in which alternative models for decision making under
uncertainty have been developed.
More recently, Wakker (1989b), Nakamura (1990), Gul (1992) and Chew and Karni
(1994) have shown that the subjective expected utility theory can also be derived in
Savage’s setting with a finite set of states by imposing topological restrictions on the
set of outcomes. Sarin and Wakker (1997) simplified the axiomatization further by
showing that the two-stage approach can be reduced to the one-stage approach while
still allowing for a finite state space.
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2.3 Dynamic Decision Problems
The subjective expected utility theory of Savage (1954) offers also an attractive tool for
modeling dynamic decision problems. In dynamic choice situations, a decision maker
receives new information in the form of an event A, and updates her preferences over
acts in view of such information. The central question that arises in this context is
how preferences are updated to incorporate the receipt of new information. Within
Savage’s framework the standard answer is to use Bayesian updating. That is, after
being informed that the event A occurred, the decision maker updates her preferences
by revising her prior beliefs according to Bayes’s rule and by keeping her utility function
unchanged.
There are two arguments used to justify Bayesian updating. The first one is based
on the rationale behind the Sure-Thing-Principle and Savage’s notion of conditional
preferences. The second one relies on the idea of imposing dynamic restrictions on
preferences. To discuss them briefly we limit our attention to events that the decision
maker views as possible, i.e. non-null events. An event A ⊂ Ω is Savage-null if for any
act f, g,∈ F it is true that fAg ∼ g, otherwise it is non-null. Let A′ be a collection of
all non-null events. Before arrival of any information, the decision maker’s preferences
over acts are represented by <, called unconditional (prior) preferences. After being
informed that event A has occurred, the decision maker constructs her conditional
(posterior) preferences over F , represented by <A. Thus, in the dynamic setup the
decision maker is characterized by a class of conditional preferences, {<A}A∈A′ , one for
each possible event. Such conditional preferences are viewed as governing future choice
upon the realization of the event A.
Since conditional preferences govern future choices, it is important to know how
conditional and unconditional preferences are linked to each other. It is a standard
practice to underpin the link behaviorally by means of axioms, which are supposed to
reflect dynamic properties of preferences. Two axioms are cornerstone in the theory of
22
updating preferences. The first one, called consequentialism, concerns only the condi-
tional preference relation. It requires that preferences conditional on a non-null event A
are not affected by outcomes outside of the conditioning event, Ac. Intuitively, once the
decision maker is informed that event A occurred, only the uncertainty about states in
A matters for future choices. The uncertainty about the counterfactual states, i.e. these
in Ac, is immaterial. Formally, whenever two acts f and g assign the same outcomes to
states in Ac, then conditional on Ac, the decision maker should be indifferent between
these two acts. The term consequentialism was introduced by Hammond (1988) in the
presence of risk.3
Axiom 2 (Consequentialism). For any non-null event A and all acts f, g ∈ F ,
f(ω) = g(ω) for each ω ∈ A implies f ∼A g.
The second axiom, called dynamic consistency, links directly conditional and uncondi-
tional preferences. It requires that choices made ex-ante be consistently implemented
in the future. Essentially, dynamic consistency excludes reversals. As Machina (1989,
p.1636-7) writes “[. . . ] behavior [. . . ] will be dynamically inconsistent, in the sense that
[. . . ] actual choice upon arriving at decision node would differ from [. . . ] planned choice
for that node”. Formally, when the decision maker prefers f to g without any infor-
mation regarding A, and f and g assign the same outcomes to states in Ac, she should
also prefer f to g after being informed that A occurred, and vice versa. This require-
ment appears in a number of places in the literature, among others in Machina (1989),
Epstein and LeBreton (1993) and in Ghirardato (2002).
Axiom 3 (Dynamic consistency). For any non-null event A and all acts f, g ∈ F
such that f(ω) = g(ω) for each ω ∈ Ac, f < g if and only if f <A g.
Consequentialism and dynamic consistency are appealing and very useful properties of
preferences. In particular, “[. . . ] they provide the basis for backward induction and
3However, Hammond’s notion is conceptually stronger than Axiom 2.
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dynamic programming, two techniques whose practical importance simply cannot be
overstated” (Siniscalchi, 2009a, p.339).
It is well-known that consequentialism and dynamic consistency are properties in-
herent in Savage’s Sure-Thing-Principle. To illustrate this issue, let us first recall the
notion of conditional preferences proposed by Savage (1954) in his book The Founda-
tions of Statistics. When deriving a “static” version of the Sure-Thing-Principle, Savage
begins with an informal, but in spirit, “dynamic” principle. It is, in essence, this: If a
decision maker prefers some act f to another act g knowing that an event A occurred,
and, if she prefers f to g knowing that an event A did not occur, then she definitely
prefers f to g regardless of whether she knows if A occurred or not. When justifying
this principle Savage (1954, p.22) asked himself: “What technical interpretation can
we attach to the idea that f would be preferred to g, if [A] were known to obtain”.
To answer this question, Savage (1954, p.22) made the following assumption: “Under
any reasonable interpretation, the matter would seem not to depend on the values f
and g assume at states outside of [A]”. Then, one could modify f and g such that, for
instance, they assign the same outcomes to states outside of A, i.e. f(ω) = g(ω) for any
ω ∈ Ac, and as he continues ”[. . . ] f and g are surely to be regarded as equivalent given
Ac; that is, they would be considered equivalent if it were known that A did not obtain”.
This is exactly the idea behind consequentialism. Assuming consequentialism, Savage
derives his conditioning rule as follows. If f and g are modified such that they agree
outside of A and f is preferred to g without knowing that A occurred, then f should
also be preferred to g knowing that A occurred and vice versa. Savage’s conditioning
rule can be expressed formally as follows.4
Definition 1 (Savage’s conditioning rule). For any pair of acts f, g ∈ F and any
non-null event A ∈ A′ there is an act h ∈ F such that:
f <A g if and only if fAh < gAh. (2.6)
4Savage’s conditioning rule has been also suggested for updating more general preferences, see
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993); Ghirardato (2002).
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Furthermore, as Savage argues, the ranking between f and g will not depend on which
of the modification was actually carried out as long the modified acts are the same
outside of A. In other words, we will never find two acts h and h′ such that fAh < gAh
and fAh
′ ≺ gAh′. This is precisely the “static” version of the Sure-Thing-Principle (see
Section 2.2) derived from the “dynamic” principle under the assumption of consequen-
tialism. Equivalently, one could restate the Sure-Thing-Principle dynamically by saying
that the above definition of conditional preferences is well-posed.5
In the light of this argument it is not surprising that consequentialism and dynamic
consistency are properties of preferences characterized by the Sure-Thing-Principle and
vice versa. That is, if we start with prior preferences which respect the Sure-Thing-
Principle and conditional preferences are obtained from the prior ones by applying
Savage’s conditioning rule, then theses conditional preferences satisfy consequentialism
and dynamic consistency. Conversely, if conditional preferences respect consequen-
tialism and dynamic consistency, then prior preferences are consistent with the Sure-
Thing-Principle and conditional preferences are obtained from prior ones by applying
Savage’s conditioning rule. This result has been celebrated as the “folk wisdom” of
decision theory. It was formally proved, among others, by Ghirardato (2002, Lemma
2) in Savage’s framework, and by Siniscalchi (2010, Proposition 1) in a more general
framework, where preferences are defined on decision trees. The following lemma states
the result formally.6
Lemma 1. Let {<A}A∈A′ be the class of complete and transitive conditional prefer-
ences which satisfies consequentialism. Then {<A}A∈A′ satisfies dynamic consistency
if and only if < satisfies the Sure-Thing-Principle, and {<A}A∈A′ satisfies Savage’s
conditioning rule.
Finally, it is well-known (for instance, see Kreps, 1988; Ghirardato, 2002) that if
5This is exactly the restatement of the static Sure-Thing-Principle provided by Savage in the back
cover of the Dover edition of his book.
6Note that Lemma 1 applies to a more general class of preferences than the class of subjective
expected utility preferences.
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prior preferences satisfy Savage’s axioms, i.e. they are represented by maximization of
subjective expected utility with respect to prior probability distribution pi together with
a utility function u, then the conditional preferences <A are obtained from the prior
ones by updating the prior pi according to Bayes’ rule and by maintaining the same
utility function u. That is, the conditional preferences <A are represented as follows:
For all acts f, g ∈ F and any non-null event A:
f <A g ⇔
∫
Ω
u(f(ω)) dpiA(ω) ≥
∫
Ω
u(g(ω)) dpiA(ω), (2.7)
where piA is the Bayesian update of pi conditional on A, i.e.:
piA(B) =
pi(B ∩ A)
pi(A)
for any B ⊂ Ω. (2.8)
Thus, in view of Lemma 1, dynamic consistency and consequentialism offer an equiva-
lent way to justify Bayesian updating. This issue was scrutinized by Ghirardato (2002).
He showed that, if the class of conditional preferences {<A}A∈A′ satisfies all Savage’s ax-
ioms except the Sure-Thing Principle, plus consequentialism and dynamic consistency,
then the prior preference relation < admits subjective expected utility representation
with respect to a unique prior probability distribution pi and a unique (up to a positive
linear transformation) utility function u, and {<A}A∈A′ is a result of Bayesian updating
of <. That is, for any non-null event A, <A is represented as in Equation 2.7 with piA
defined as in Equation 2.8. Conversely, if the prior preference relation < admits subjec-
tive expected utility representation and the class of conditional preferences {<A}A∈A′
is the result of Bayesian updating, then {<A}A∈A′ satisfies dynamic consistency and
consequentialism.
Thus, the subjective expected utility theory of Savage provides a complete theory
of behavior in dynamic decision problems. It underpins Bayesian updating and ensures
that dynamic behavior respect two key properties, dynamic consistency and consequen-
tialism.
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Chapter 3
Non-Bayesian Decision Theory
3.1 Ellsberg’s Experiments
In his famous article titled “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage’s axioms”, Daniel Ells-
berg (1961) questioned the descriptive validity of the subjective expected utility theory.
He exemplified that a special type of uncertainty, called ambiguity, will affect subjects’
choice behavior in a way such that it cannot be explained by Savage’s theory. Ellsberg
associated ambiguity with the lack of information about likelihoods in situations charac-
terized neither by “measurable” nor “unmeasurable” uncertainty. Intuitively, ambiguity
designates situations in which probabilities for some events are known, whereas for other
ones they are not. “What is at issue might be called ambiguity of information, a quality
depending on the amount, type, reliability and ‘unanimity’ of information giving rise
to one’s ‘degree of confidence’ in an estimate of relative likelihoods” (Ellsberg, 1961,
p.657). Following Frisch and Baron (1988), Camerer and Weber (1992, p.330) concep-
tualized further the notion of ambiguity as “[. . . ] uncertainty about probability, created
by missing information that is relevant and could be known”. Ellsberg conjectured that
a majority of subjects facing ambiguity will prefer to bet on events with known proba-
bilities rather than on events for which probabilistic information is missing. To test his
claim he designed two experiments incorporating decision problems under ambiguity.
The first experiment, called the 3-color experiment, involves one urn filled with balls of
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three distinct colors.
3-color Experiment. There is an urn containing 30 balls, 10 of which are known
to be yellow and 20 of which are somehow divided between blue and green, with no
further information on the distribution. One ball will be drawn at random from the urn.
Subjects face two choice situations, I and II, in which they have to choose between bets
paying out 4 or nothing, depending on the color of the randomly drawn ball. In the
first choice situation, I, the subjects are asked to choose between two bets: f1, “You
receive 4 if a yellow ball is drawn and nothing otherwise”; and f2, “You receive 4 if a
blue ball is drawn and nothing otherwise”. Similarly, in the second choice situation, II,
the subjects have to choose one of two following bets: f3, “You receive 4 if a yellow or
green is drawn and nothing otherwise”; or f4, “You receive 4 if a blue or green is drawn
and nothing otherwise. Table 3.1 summarizes the two relevant choice problems in the
3-color experiment of Ellsberg.
Y ellow Blue Green
Choice I
f1 4 0 0
f2 0 4 0
Choice II
f3 4 0 4
f4 0 4 4
Table 3.1: Ellsberg’s 3-color experiment
Denote by Y,B and G the event that the ball drawn is yellow, blue and green, respec-
tively. For the moment, we describe an event to be unambiguous if its probability is
known, i.e. deducible from the available information. Events for which probabilities
are unknown are termed to be ambiguous. According to the available information it is
natural to assume that subjects view the events Y and B ∪ G as unambiguous. The
probabilities for their respective occurrence, one third and two thirds, are known. The
remaining events are ambiguous. For instance, the probabilities for the event B as well
as for the event G are only known to be somewhere between nil and two third. Thus,
the observable choices in the 3-color experiment can be viewed as revealing subjects’
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attitudes towards ambiguity. When considering subjects with strong preferences, there
are four possible patterns of preferences. Of course subjects can also be indifferent be-
tween two alternatives, but then it would not be valid to infer the “ambiguity attitude”
from their choices. Each column in Table 3.2 depicts the chosen bet in each of the two
relevant choice problems.
Ambiguity Attitude
Averse Neutral Loving
Choice I f1 f1 f2 f2
Choice II f4 f3 f4 f3
Table 3.2: Ambiguity attitudes in Ellsberg’s 3-color experiment
The choices depicted in the first and fourth column reflect subjects’ sensitive attitude
towards ambiguity. For instance, consider the first column in which the subjects prefer
f1 to f2 and f4 to f3. The subjects displaying such preferences are called ambiguity-
averse, since they are reluctant to bet on events with unknown probabilities. Conversely,
in the last column, the subjects prefer f2 to f1 and f3 to f4. These subjects are said
to exhibit ambiguity-loving behavior, since they favor to bet on events with unknown
probabilities.
These two patterns of choices are inconsistent with Savage’s Sure-Thing-Principle.
To see this illustrated, consider an ambiguity-averse subject with choices f1 and f4.
In the first choice situation, the subject faces two bets f1 and f2 paying off the same
amount, 0, if the ball drawn is green. On the other hand, in the second choice situation
she faces exactly the same bets labelled f3 and f4, but now with the common payoff
of 4 instead of 0 if in the case the ball drawn is green. According to the Sure-Thing-
Principle these common payoffs should not affect her choices. Preferences between
bets depend only on the payoffs in states in which the payoffs of the two bets being
compared are distinct. Thus, if the subject prefers to bet on yellow rather than on blue
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in the first choice situation then she should consequently make the same choices in the
second situation. But, this is exactly the logic being violated by the ambiguity-averse
subject. She reverses the choices in the second choice situation. One could hypothesize
that, the ambiguity-averse subject cannot decide between f3 and f4 without paying
attention to the common payoff of these two bets. Then, looking on all states in which
the payoff of 4 is possible, she recognizes that bet f3 offers 4 with a probability from
the interval between one third and one, whereas bet f4 pays the same amount with
the exact probability of one third. Since she does not know which probability is the
correct one she decides to choose the bet f4 with known probability of getting 4. Thus,
the subject exhibiting aversion towards ambiguity violates the separability property
inherent in the Sure-Thing-Principle. One explanation for this could be, for instance,
that she perceives the events B and G as complementary in the sense that information
given on their union cannot be further elaborated.
Moreover, for the ambiguity-averse subject there is no probability distribution that
can adequately represent her subjective beliefs. If to the contrary, we assume that
she has a subjective probability distribution pi, then preferring f1 to f2 implies that
she has a higher probability for a yellow ball than for a blue ball to be drawn, i.e.
pi(Y ) > pi(B). But, the fact that she prefers f4 to f3 implies that she assigns a higher
probability to the event blue or green to be be drawn than to the event yellow or
green, i.e. pi(Y ∪ G) < pi(B ∪ G). Thus, by additivity pi(Y ) < pi(B). These two
deductions are contradictory. Choices revealing ambiguity-averse behavior violate not
only the subjective expected utility theory of Savage, but also any other theory based on
probabilistic sophistication in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler (1992, 1995), Grant
(1995) or Chew and Sagi (2006, 2008). According to this theory, subjects’ subjective
beliefs are represented by a unique and additive probability distribution, but preferences
do not need to have expected utility representation.
The second experiment, called 2-color experiment, was originated by Knight (1921).
It involves two urns each of them filled with balls of two possible colors.
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2-color Experiment. There are two urns, K and U, each containing 100 balls. Each
ball is either yellow or white. Urn K contains 50 yellow and 50 white balls. In Urn U
the proportion of yellow and white balls is unknown. One ball will be drawn at random
from each urn. Subjects face four bets paying out 4 or 0, depending on the urn and
the color of the ball drawn: f1, “You receive 4 if a yellow ball is drawn from Urn K
and nothing otherwise”; f2, “You receive 4 if a white ball is drawn from Urn K and
nothing otherwise”; f3, “You receive 4 if a yellow ball is drawn from Urn U and nothing
otherwise”; f4“You receive 4 if a white ball is drawn from Urn U and nothing otherwise”.
In the first choice situation, I, subjects are asked for each urn respectively which color
do they prefer to bet on. In the second choice situation, II, they are asked for each
color respectively which urn do they prefer to bet on. Table 3.3 summarizes the relevant
bets in the 2-color experiment.
Urn K Urn U
Y ellow White Y ellow White
f1 4 0 f3 4 0
f2 0 4 f4 0 4
Table 3.3: Ellsberg’s 2-color experiment
Denote by Y I and W I the event that a randomly drawn ball from Urn I ∈ {K,U} is
yellow and white, respectively. Since the probability for a yellow ball, as well as a white
one, to be drawn from Urn K is known to be one half, the events Y K and WK are
unambiguous. Conversely, the probability for a yellow ball, respectively a white one, to
be drawn from Urn U is only known to be in the interval between nil and one. Thus, the
events Y U and WU and the whole Urn U are purely ambiguous. Again, subjects’ choices
in the 2-color experiment allow us to draw conclusions about their ambiguity attitude.
For instance, as Ellsberg observed, a majority of his “non-experimental” subjects are
indifferent between betting on yellow and on white when facing Urn K and Urn U,
respectively. That is, f1 ∼ f2 and f3 ∼ f4. But, when asked whether they prefer that
the ball be drawn from Urn K or from Urn U for each color separately, they strictly
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prefer the unambiguous Urn U. That is, f1  f3 and f2  f4. Such choices can be
seen as revealing aversion towards ambiguity. Moreover, Ellsberg also observed a small
minority of subjects who prefer a ball to be drawn form Urn U rather than from Urn
K. These subjects seems to be ambiguity-loving. Again, these two pattern of choices
violate the Sure-Thing-Principle and they can not be rationalized by a single probability
distribution (see Gilboa, 2009, Chapter 12).
Ever since the contribution of Ellsberg there has been overwhelming empirical evi-
dence confirming ambiguity-sensitive behavior as a systematic and robust phenomenon.
Camerer and Weber (1992) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature on exper-
imental studies of decision making under ambiguity. They note a number of stylized
facts which emerged from these studies. It is worth mentioning a few of them: “Am-
biguity aversion is found consistently in variants of the Ellsberg problems [. . . ] (fact
1). Ambiguity aversion persists when preference is strict, excluding indifference (fact
2), and when ambiguity is reduced by drawing samples from ambiguous urns (fact 3).
Ambiguity averters have generally not been swayed in experiments that offered writ-
ten arguments against their paradoxical choices (fact 4)” (Camerer and Weber, 1992,
p.340).
As a part of this thesis we also ran the two experiments inspired by Ellsberg (1961).
Our results unequivocally confirm the previous observations. A majority of subjects
exhibit ambiguity-sensitive behavior. In the 2-color experiment conducted to examine
the relationship between ambiguity and randomization attitudes (see Chapter 4) we
observe that: 54.5% of subjects are ambiguity-averse, 11.3% are ambiguity-loving, while
37.5% exhibit neutral attitude towards ambiguity. In the 3-color experiment conducted
to test dynamic choice behavior under ambiguity (see Chapter 5) we find a similar
pattern: 54.8% of subjects prefer to bet on events with known probabilities, 7.4%
prefer to bet on events with unknown probabilities, while 38.1% are ambiguity-neutral.
These observations are true for all subjects with strong preferences.
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3.2 Ambiguity Models
In the wake of strong empirical evidence confirming ambiguity-sensitive behavior, sev-
eral generalizations of Savage’s subjective expected utility theory have been suggested.
These generalizations seek to provide an alternative representation of preferences apt
to explain the Ellsberg-type behavior. The leading idea is to abandon the main tenet
of Bayesianism, namely that subjective beliefs are representable by a single probabil-
ity distribution. When information about probabilities is too scarce, as in Ellsberg’s
experiments, it seems to be more plausible to assume that the decision maker behaves
as though she had many possible priors in mind, rather than a single one. There are
three widely studied approaches adopting this view. They differ from each other with
regard to the notion of subjective beliefs. In the first approach subjective beliefs are
represented by a non-additive prior called a capacity, in the second one, by a set of
priors called multiple priors and in the third one, by a prior over the set of priors called
a second order prior. Note, in these approaches, we discussed below, subjective beliefs
are represented uniquely, but not necessarily by a single prior probability distribution.
Non-Additive Prior. Historically, the first axiomatically sound theory of decision
making under ambiguity is the Choquet expected utility theory developed by Schmeidler
(1989). In this theory subjective beliefs are represented by a capacity. That is, a
normalized and monotone, but non-necessarily-additive, set function. The concept of
capacity generalizes the notion of probability by weakening the additivity property.
The only requirement is that they must satisfy the usual monotonicity property. In
other words, the lack of information about likelihoods hinders the decision maker from
forming beliefs which satisfy all mathematical properties of probabilities. The decision
maker, though, is able to assign weights to uncertain events in such a way that “larger”
events (with respect to set inclusion) are “more likely”. By weakening the separability
property inherent in Savage’s Sure-Thing-Principle, Schmeidler establish a set of axioms
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which are sufficient and necessary for the existence of a unique capacity ν and a unique
(up to a positive linear transformation) utility function u such that for any pair of acts
f, g ∈ F :
f < g ⇔
∫
Ω
u(f(ω)) dν(ω) ≥
∫
Ω
u(g(ω)) dν(ω). (3.1)
In the presence of non-additive beliefs, expected utilities are computed by means of
Choquet integrals, introduced by Gustave Choquet (1954). For this reason this the-
ory is called the theory of Choquet expected utility maximization. In Section 6.1 the
notion of capacities and Choquet integrals is defined and discussed in detail. Within
the Choquet expected utility theory, the decision maker’s attitude towards ambiguity
is mainly captured by the mathematical properties of capacity (see Section 3.3). How-
ever, one issue needs to be clarified. How are subjective beliefs, represented uniquely
by a capacity, linked to the idea of a non-single prior? Roughly speaking, the tech-
nique of Choquet integration provides an answer. The Choquet integral of an act f
with respect to the capacity ν can been written as an expected utility with respect to
an additive probability measure m. However, the probability measure m depends on
the act f being evaluated. More precisely, the measure m depends on how events are
ranked with respect to the attractiveness of their outcomes assigned by the act f . In
other words, the weight ascribed to an event by m depends not only on the event, but
also on how good the outcome yielded by the event under f is in comparison with the
outcomes yielded by the other events. In general, two non-comonotonic acts, i.e. acts
generating distinct ranking position of mutually exclusive events, will be evaluated with
respect to distinct probability measures. Acts generating the same ranking position of
states, so-called comonotonic acts, are evaluated with respect to the same probability
measure. This is the way in which the independence of beliefs from tastes, the key
property of the subjective expected utility theory, is generalized in Schmeidler’s theory.
The separability of beliefs from tastes is respected only among comonotonic acts. One
could term this property, “comonotonic separability of beliefs from tastes”. For these
reasons, the concept of capacities can be seen as a mathematical tool “summarizing”
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all such “rank-dependent” probabilistic scenarios.
Multiple Priors. The second prominent theory known as the maxmin expected utility
theory, or “multiple prior” model, was pioneered by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
This approach relies on the idea that subjective beliefs are represented by a set C of
probability distributions. Intuitively, one can think of each prior in C as describing
a possible probabilistic scenario that the decision maker has in mind. With multiple
priors in mind the decision maker can still compute expected utility of an act as usual,
but now with one expected value per prior. When evaluating the act, the decision
maker considers only the probabilistic scenario in which she gets the lowest expected
utility. To decide between two acts she compares their lowest expected utilities (which
may be obtained with respect to distinct priors) and chooses the one that yields the
maximum, among the lowest, expected utility. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) provided
an axiomatic justification for this decision rule. They established a set of axioms that
are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a unique convex and closed set of
probability measures C and a unique (up to a positive linear transformation) utility
function u such that for any pair of acts f and g:
f < g ⇔ min
pi∈C
∫
Ω
u(f(ω)) dpi(ω) ≥ min
pi∈C
∫
Ω
u(g(ω)) dpi(ω). (3.2)
As in the Savage’s theory, the set C is also purely subjective and represents the decision
maker’s perception of ambiguity. When C = {pi} is a singleton then the decision maker
behaves as a subjective expected utility maximizer with a single prior pi. By taking the
minimum of the set of all possible expected utility values of an act f the decision maker
reveals her reluctance towards ambiguity. The cautious attitude of the decision maker
featured by the multiple priors model is often viewed as the result of a malevolent “Na-
ture” which can influence the occurrence of events to her disadvantage. That is, Nature
chooses a probability pi from the set C with the objective of minimizing her expected
utilities conditional on her choices. Under this view, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rus-
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tichini (2006) extended the multiple prior model by generalizing Nature’s constraint.
In their extension, called theory of variational preferences, the constraint on Nature is
given by a cost function associated with the choice of a particular probability distri-
bution. The cost function is then supposed to capture the decision maker’s attitude
towards ambiguity. In other extensions, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004)
derive the α-maxmin expected utility representation. In this representation an act is
evaluated as a linear combination of maxmin expected utility and maxmax expected
utility in which not the worst, but the best expected utility is considered. The maxmin
expected utility is weighted with a coefficient α ∈ [0, 1] while the maxmax expected util-
ity is weighted with the coefficient 1−α. Both maxmin and maxmax expected utilities
are taken with respect to a set of set of priors C, which is a part of the representation.
That is, the set of priors C and the coefficient α are uniquely defined and may be inter-
preted as ambiguity and ambiguity attitude respectively. For instance, α = 1 indicates
an extreme aversion towards ambiguity (as in the multiple prior model). By contrast,
α = 0 reflects purely ambiguity-loving behavior. Furthermore, modeling α-maxmin
preferences in setups with a finite set of states of nature imposes additional restrictions
on the parameter α. For such setups, Eichberger, Grant, Kelsey, and Koshevoy (2010)
showed that preferences over acts satisfy the axioms of Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and
Marinacci (2004) if and only if α = 0 or α = 1. Thus, within finite setups, α-maxmin
preferences may only exhibit the two extreme attitudes towards ambiguity.
Second Order Prior. The third approach, proposed by Nau (2006) and further de-
veloped by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), is often referred to as the second
order prior model, or the smooth ambiguity model. In this approach the decision pro-
cess is modeled as a two-stage process, however, differently than in the tradition of
Anscombe and Aumann (1963). A decision maker starts with a set of all probabilistic
scenarios captured by the set ∆(Ω).1 In addition to it, she comes up with a probability
1That is, ∆(Ω) =
{
p : Ω→ [0, 1] |∑ω∈Ω p(ω) = 1}.
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distribution µ over the set of priors, called a second order prior. Intuitively, one can
think of the prior µ as describing the probabilistic belief of the decision maker that a
particular probabilistic scenario will occur. For instance, consider the set-up of Ells-
berg’s 3-color experiment described in Section 3.1. The decision maker may think that
the urn has different compositions, each one representing a possible probabilistic sce-
nario. Altogether there are twenty-one possible scenarios (from all 20 balls being blue
to all 20 balls being green). If the decision maker considers all twenty-one scenarios
as possible they will be in the support of her subjective probability distribution µ over
∆(Ω). Furthermore, she can distinguish which of the probabilistic scenarios is subjec-
tively more likely to occur than the other. The decision process can be summed up as
follows. In the first stage a composition of the urn is drawn among a set of hypothetical
compositions according to probability µ. In the second stage, a ball is drawn from the
urn whose composition has been determined by the realisation of µ. Klibanoff, Mari-
nacci, and Mukerji (2005) showed that under the seemingly mild assumption imposed
on preferences over F , the decision maker choices are characterized by the following
decision rule. For any pair of acts f and g, f < g if and only if:∫
∆(Ω)
φ
(∫
Ω
u(f(ω)) dp(ω)
)
dµ(p) ≥
∫
∆(Ω)
φ
(∫
Ω
u(g(ω)) dp(ω)
)
dµ(p), (3.3)
where φ is function from R to R. The function φ expresses the decision maker’s attitude
towards ambiguity. The evaluation of an act f goes as follows. Once the probabilistic
scenario is fixed, the decision maker faces a situation with known probability p and
evaluates the act f by its expected utility. Since there are many possible scenarios, the
decision maker gets a set of expected utilities of f , one for each probabilistic scenario.
Then, instead of taking the minimum of these expected utilities, as the multiple priors
approach does, an expectation of the function φ distorting the expected utilities is
taken. The role of the distortion φ is crucial. If φ is linear then the decision criterion
in Equation (3.3) reduces to the expected utility maximization rule with respect to a
“reduced” probability distribution obtained by the combination of µ and all possible
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p’s. If the distortion φ is not linear, the µ and all p’s cannot be combined to construct
a reduced probability distribution. In this case, the decision maker takes the expected
utility with respect to µ and φ of the expected u-utilities with respect to p’s. A concave
distortion φ reflects aversion towards ambiguity, in the sense that it places larger weights
on lower expected u-utilities. By contrast, a convex distortion φ reflects ambiguity-
loving behavior.
These three prominent models tackle the problem raised by Ellsberg. In particular,
they allow ambiguity and the decision maker’s attitude towards it to play role in decision
making. Nevertheless, they are not immune to criticism. In a recent article Machina
(2009) proposed a counterexample which points out the limitations of the Choquet
expected utility theory of Schmeidler (1989) in the same spirit as Ellsberg’s experiments
point out the limitations of Savage’s theory. He constructed a 4-color experiment and
conjectured that a majority of subjects will exhibit an intuitive pattern of preferences
which cannot be explained by the Choquet expected utility theory. L’Haridon and
Placido (2010) provided experimental evidence which confirms Machina’s conjecture.
Moreover, Baillon, L’Haridon, and Placido (2010) showed that Machina’s paradox poses
difficulties not only for the Choquet expected utility theory, but also for the other
ambiguity models discussed in this section (namely, the multiple priors model, the
variational preferences, the α-maxmin model and the smooth ambiguity model).
3.3 Ambiguity Attitudes
In Section 3.1, we presumed a decision maker to be ambiguity-averse whenever she is
reluctant to bet on events with unknown probabilities. A decision maker who is prone
to bet on such events is called ambiguity-loving. In this section we recall two methods
used in the literature which attempt to operationalize the notion of ambiguity attitudes
in a formal fashion.
Many models incorporating ambiguity-sensitive behavior adopt Schmeidler’s (1989)
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notion. It states that the decision maker is ambiguity-averse if for any two acts she is
indifferent between, she prefers a random mixture between these two acts. The idea
of using randomizing devices in the presence of ambiguity was originally proposed by
Raiffa (1961) in his comment on Ellsberg’s paradox.2 To elucidate the relevant part
of Raiffa’s argument consider again the 2-color experiment by Ellsberg as described in
Section 3.1. A subject who was indifferent between betting on white and on yellow
when facing each urn separately (i.e. f1 ∼ f2 and f3 ∼ f4) was called to be ambiguity-
averse when she strictly preferred to bet on the urn with known proportion of balls
(i.e. f1  f3 and f2  f4). Now, suppose that the subject has access to a fair coin
and she flips this coin to decide on which color to bet. The decision maker declares to
choose f3 if heads appears and f4 otherwise. When evaluating such a strategy, Raiffa
(1961), but also Ellsberg (2001, Chapter 8) in his reply to Raiffa, argued that this
“mixed strategy” yields exactly the same chance of getting 4 or 0 as the unambiguous
bets f1 and f2, namely 50 : 50. For the moment, call this strategy a mixture between
f3 and f4 and denote it by h. The argument of Raiffa is the following: Imagine that
the ball has already been drawn from Urn U, but the subject has not yet seen its
color. If, on the one side, the ball drawn is yellow, then the mixture h offers exactly
a 50 : 50 chance of getting 4 or 0; if heads turns up, the subject chooses f3 and gets
4 when the color of the ball drawn is revealed, and if it is tails she chooses f4 and
gets nothing. Likewise if the ball is white, then h offers again a 50 : 50 chance of
4 or 0; if heads turns up, the subject chooses f3 and gets nothing when the color is
revealed, and if it is tails she chooses f4 and gets 4. Thus, the subject is “guaranteed”
a 50 : 50 chance of 4 or 0 regardless whether the ball drawn is yellow or white. For this
reason, she should be indifferent between h and either unambiguous bets f1 and f2. In
view of this argument, the ambiguity-averse subject should always display a preference
2Raiffa (1961) argued that subjective expected utility is a “normative prescription” to which the
decision maker should aspire. Accordingly, as long there is access to an objective randomizing device
such as a coin, there is no reason to behave in an ambiguity-averse manner.
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for mixtures between bets whose outcomes depend upon the realization of ambiguous
events. Note, an implicit assumption in this argument is the fact that first the ball is
drawn and then the coin is flipped to determine the outcome of h. This is exactly the
same way uncertainty resolves in the two-stage approach of Anscombe and Aumann
(1963). In this setting Schmeidler, formulated his definition of ambiguity aversion. As
mentioned in Section 2.2, in the formal framework of Anscombe and Aumann, objects
of choice are horse-race/roulette-wheel acts, and random mixtures between two such
acts are well-defined. Adapting their framework, the bet f3 (resp. f4) can be seen as a
function assigning a degenerate lottery yielding 4 for sure, if the ball drawn from Urn U
is yellow (resp. white); otherwise, a degenerate lottery yields 0 for sure. Consequently,
the mixture between f3 and f4, based an a coin flip, yields a random mixture between
the two degenerate lotteries ascribed to each color by the respective acts f3 and f4.
That is, the mixture h = (1
2
)f3 + (
1
2
)f4 yields a lottery which pays 4 with a probability
of one half, and 0 with probability of one half given that the ball drawn from Urn U is
yellow; and it yields exactly the same lottery given that the ball drawn from Urn U is
white. Table 3.4 depicts these three acts.
Urn U
Y ellow White
f3 4 0
f4 0 4
h = (1
2
)f3 + (
1
2
)f4 (
1
2
)4 + (1
2
)0 (1
2
)4 + (1
2
)0
Table 3.4: Random mixture in an Anscombe and Aumann setting
Thus, in the setting of Anscombe and Aumann, the mixture αf + (1 − α)g can be
seen as randomization over f and g with known probabilities α and 1−α, respectively.
Under this interpretation, preference for mixtures implies preference for randomization.
Thus, the decision maker is ambiguity-averse in the sense of Schmeidler if she exhibits
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preference for randomization (or is randomization-loving). Conversely, the decision
maker is ambiguity-loving if she dislikes randomization (or is randomization-averse).
Neutrality towards ambiguity is associated with neutrality towards randomization.
Axiom 4 (Ambiguity attitudes). For any f, g ∈ H and any α ∈ (0, 1) a decision
maker with < over H is said to be:
(i) ambiguity-averse if f ∼ g =⇒ αf + (1− α)g < f (or g),
(ii) ambiguity-loving if f ∼ g =⇒ αf + (1− α)g 4 f (or g),
(iii) ambiguity-neutral if both (i) and (ii) hold.
When evaluating acts in the formal setting of Anscombe and Aumann, first, expec-
tations are taken state by state with respect to known probabilities (over outcomes).
This yields a function which assigns an expected utility to each state. In the second
stage, an integral of this function is taken with respect to state for which probabilities
are unknown. Therefore, random mixtures between two acts are often said to have the
effect of “smoothing” utilities of outcomes across states. In the words of Schmeidler
(1989, p.582), ambiguity aversion “[. . . ] means that “smoothing” or averaging utility
distributions makes the decision maker better off”.
In the Choquet expected utility model, ambiguity aversion is mainly described by
the properties of the capacity characterizing the decision maker’s beliefs. Schmeidler
(1989) showed that a decision maker with Choquet expected utility preferences exhibits
ambiguity aversion if and only if her capacity is convex (see Section 6.1). In the maxmin
expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and in its generalization (the
variational preferences of Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini, 2006), the ambiguity
aversion axiom is imposed directly on preferences. Whether the preferences in the
smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) display ambiguity
aversion in the sense of Schmeidler has been hotly debated. While Epstein (2010)
excludes this possibility, Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2009) defend the opposite
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position and argue that the decision maker with a strictly concave function φ will also
exhibit preference for randomization.
The preference for randomization as an expression of ambiguity aversion is less
convincing when one evaluates the mixtures between bets conditional on the realisation
of a random device. Suppose that the ambiguity-averse subject has a linear utility
function and values either of the two bets f3 and f4 at prize 1, due to ambiguity.
Then, if the coin comes up heads the subject chooses f3, which she valued at 1, and
if the coin comes up tails she chooses f4, which has the same value as f3. Ellsberg
(2001, Chapter 8) argues that it is plausible to assume that the subject also values
the equiprobable mixture h between these two bets at the same prize, 1. Even when
the coin flip and the draw of a ball from Urn U is carried out simultaneously it is
not clear at all why the ambiguity-averse subject should assign a higher value to the
random mixture between f3 and f4. This issue was scrutinized by Eichberger and Kelsey
(1996b). They argue that the decision maker with non-additive beliefs will display a
strict preference for randomization in the Anscombe and Aumann framework, but she
will not do so in the setting of Savage. In the setting of Anscombe and Aumann,
the randomizing device is incorporated in the structure of the outcome space. In the
setting of Savage, the set of outcomes is an arbitrary set and does not need to be
closed under convex combinations. Therefore, to model a randomizing device, one
needs, for instance, to expand the original state space by forming a product space.
One ordinate in that space describes all possible realisations of the randomizing device.
Adopting such framework, Eichberger and Kelsey (1996b) showed that the ambiguity-
averse decision maker with convex capacities will never display a strict preference for
randomization. That is, in the 2-color experiment, the ambiguity-averse subject should
be indifferent between all three acts h, f3 and f4. Sarin and Wakker (1992), Ghirardato
(1997) and Klibanoff (2001b) have already observed that the choice of the one-stage
setting of Savage as opposed to the two-stage setting of Anscombe and Aumann may
lead to different predictions regarding Choquet preferences. Sarin and Wakker (1992)
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attribute these differences to distinction between one- and two-stage Choquet integrals,
Ghirardato (1997) to failure of Fubini-theorem, while Klibanoff (2001b) attributes it to
violation of stochastic independence. In the next chapter we explore the relationship
between different randomization and ambiguity attitudes in an experimental study.
Recently, Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) suggested a com-
parative approach to define ambiguity attitudes. In this approach ambiguity attitudes
are defined without requiring the existence of auxiliary concepts such as randomizing
devices. For instance, when defining ambiguity aversion, first a comparative notion
of ambiguity aversion is established, and then an absolute definition is derived. The
comparative definition is based on the following idea: if a subject prefers an unambigu-
ous bet to an ambiguous one, then a more ambiguity-averse subject will do the same.
For the absolute definition, a class of ambiguity-neutral preferences is chosen. Then, a
subject is ambiguity-averse if there is a benchmark preference order in this class such
that the subject is more ambiguity-averse than this benchmark. Epstein (1999) and
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) differ in their assumptions about the benchmark and
what can be regarded as an unambiguous bet. For Epstein, unambiguous bets are bets
for which payoffs depend on exogenously given unambiguous events. That is, events
for which randomness is objectively known (for instance a fair coin, an urn with known
proportion of balls, etc.). Ghirardato and Marinacci consider only constant acts as
unambiguous acts. An act is constant, if it assigns the same outcome to all states of
nature. Let Fua be the set of unambiguous bets. Consider two preference relations
<1 and <2 on F . Then, <2 is said to be more ambiguity-averse than <1, if for any
unambiguous bet h ∈ Fua and any bet e ∈ F :
h <1 (1)e ⇒ h <2 (2)e. (3.4)
Let <B be a benchmark order in a class of ambiguity-neutral preferences. Then, <
is said to be ambiguity-averse if there exists a benchmark preference relation <B such
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that for any h ∈ Fua and any bet e ∈ F :
h <B (B)e ⇒ h < ()e. (3.5)
Conversely, < is said to be ambiguity-loving if there exists a benchmark preference
relation <B such that for any h ∈ Fua and any bet e ∈ F :
h 4B (≺B)e ⇒ h 4 (≺)e. (3.6)
If < is both ambiguity-averse and ambiguity-loving then < is ambiguity-neutral. With
regard to the class of benchmark orders, Epstein (1999) assumes preferences to be prob-
abilistically sophisticated in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler (1992). Ghirardato
and Marinacci (2002) take subjective expected utility preferences in the sense of Savage
(1954) as a benchmark.
In Section 4.2 we apply the comparative approach to derive subjects’ ambiguity atti-
tudes in the 2-color experiment without presupposing that they are indifferent between
betting on white and on yellow when facing each Urn K and Urn U, respectively.
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Chapter 4
Ambiguity and Randomization
Attitudes
In this chapter we examine the relationship between different attitudes towards ambi-
guity and randomization in an experimental study.1 In Section 3.3 we discussed this
relationship from a theoretical point of view and showed that there are different pre-
dictions about randomization attitudes depending on how the randomization device
is modeled. In view of such competing predictions it would be reasonable to look at
real behavior. As Klibanoff (2001b, p.618) writes: “Any discussion of behavior, such
as preference for randomization, that departs from what is considered standard raises
some natural questions. First, descriptively, do actual decision makers behave in this
way? Unfortunately, there are no studies that I am aware of that examine this issue”.
To answer this question, we designed and implemented an experiment suited to study
the relationship between different attitudes towards ambiguity and randomization.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes our
experimental design. In Section 4.2, we formally define randomization and ambiguity
attitudes and derive our main hypotheses. Section 4.3 deals with the implementation.
Section 4.4 presents the results. We conclude in Section 4.5.
1The content of this chapter is based on the article Dominiak and Schnedler (2010).
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4.1 Experimental Design
In order to examine the relationship between ambiguity and randomization attitude,
information about both attitudes from the same subject is required. We elicited the
value of various bets which are based on three random devices. This section describes
the random devices, the bets, and the elicitation mechanism.
4.1.1 Random Devices and Tickets
During the experiment, we use three different random devices: an urn with 20 table
tennis balls of which half were white and the other half yellow (urn with known propor-
tions or short: Urn K), an urn with 20 table tennis balls with an unknown proportion
of yellow and white balls (short: Urn U), and a coin.
Subjects were informed that only white and yellow balls are used in the experiment.
Urn K’s contents were shown to the subjects before the experiment, while Urn U’s
contents were only revealed after the experiment. During the experiment, both urns
were placed on a table in view of the subjects to demonstrate to them that the contents
cannot be manipulated. For similar reasons, the coin was volunteered by one of the
subjects and not by us.
In the experiment bets were called tickets and outcomes were expressed in Taler, our
experimental currency unit. While subjects knew that they would be offered different
tickets involving the three random devices, they did not know which or how many
tickets they would face. In order to later identify subjects who regard the coin as fair,
we introduced the following tickets.
1. Head ticket, h: 100 Taler are paid if the coin lands heads up and nothing
otherwise.
2. Tails ticket, t: 100 Taler are paid if the coin lands tails up and nothing otherwise.
To elicit ambiguity attitude, we ask the subjects to evaluate the following tickets for
Urn K.
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3. White ticket for Urn K, wK : 100 Taler are paid if the ball drawn from Urn K
is white and nothing otherwise.
4. Yellow ticket for Urn K, yK , 100 Taler are paid if the ball drawn from Urn K
is yellow and nothing otherwise.
Ambiguity attitude is then detected by comparing the subject’s certainty equivalent for
these tickets with that of the following similar tickets for Urn U.
5. Yellow ticket for Urn U, yU : 100 Taler are paid if the ball drawn from Urn U
is yellow and nothing otherwise.
6. White ticket for Urn U, wU : 100 Taler are paid if the ball drawn from Urn U
is white and nothing otherwise.
The next ticket involves two random devices: the coin and Urn U. The subject always
receives a ticket for Urn U. Whether this ticket will be yellow or white is determined
by flipping the coin. Since the color of the ticket changes with the outcome of the coin
toss, we use the name chameleon ticket.
7. Chameleon ticket for Urn U, cU : If the coin lands heads up, the subject
receives a yellow ticket for Urn U. If the coin lands tails up the subject receives a
white ticket for Urn U.2
By comparing the certainty equivalent for the chameleon ticket with that of a yellow
or white ticket for Urn U, we can infer whether a subject is randomization-loving.
For our predictions later, it must be possible to identify whether subjects are indif-
ferent between yellow and white tickets on Urn U. This necessitates that subjects are
asked about both tickets, which in principle allows them to hedge against ambiguity.
The danger of hedging against ambiguity is that subjects no longer exhibit ambiguity
2Put differently, the subject receives 100 Taler in two cases: if the coin lands heads up and the ball
drawn from Urn U is yellow and if the coin lands tails up and the ball drawn from Urn U is white. In
the other two cases, the subject receives nothing.
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aversion. We tried to reduce this danger by not informing subjects about the number
and types of bets and switching the order in which tickets are presented for Urn U.
Consequently, subjects do not know that there will be a hedging opportunity when
evaluating the yellow ticket for Urn U. As we will see later, our method was successful
in the sense that the proportion of ambiguity-averse subjects in our experiment is in
line with that of similar experiments.
4.1.2 Eliciting Ticket Values
In order to elicit ticket values, we employ the following procedure. For each ticket,
the subject had to make twenty choices. The first choice was between a ticket and a
payment of 2.5 Taler. The second was between a ticket and a payment of 7.5 Taler
etc. The payments offered to the subject increased in steps of 5 Taler until the last
choice, in which the subject had to choose between a ticket and 97.5 Taler. The point
at which the subject switches from the ticket to the payment then reveals the value of
the ticket to the subject (up to 5 Taler). All of the subject’s choices were implemented
and affected the subject’s payoff. To ensure independence, a separate draw was carried
out for each ticket. The draws took place after all choices were made to avoid wealth
effects.
Many experiments employ less time-consuming and laborious methods of paying
subjects by combining choices over bets with additional randomization (see e.g. Holt
and Laury, 2002; Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964). Such methods have also
been used in experiments on ambiguity. For example, Hey, Lotito, and Maffioletti
(2010) randomly select only one of the subjects’ choices to be payoff-relevant, while
Halevy (2007) employs the mechanism by Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964). In
the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism, the subject receives a ticket and states the
certainty equivalent. Then, a random offer is generated and the subject has to sell the
ticket if the offer exceeds the stated value.
Despite the considerable effort involved, we decided to pay all decisions rather than
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employing a mechanism that relies on additional randomization. We do so for two
reasons. First, as Karni and Safra (1987) point out, a method based on additional ran-
domization, such as the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism, is no longer guaranteed
to elicit the true (subjective) value for subjects who violate the independence axiom.3
Since ambiguity-averse subjects violate the independence axiom and we are interested
in their valuations, we cannot use this mechanism.4
Second, had we introduced another source of randomness, all bets faced by the
subject would have been compounded; none would have been purely based on the three
devices that we are interested in (Urn K, Urn U, coin). By implementing all choices,
we avoid that randomization attitude interacts with other sources of randomness.
4.2 Ambiguity and Randomization Attitude
In this section, we define randomization and ambiguity attitude, relate them to concepts
from the literature, and derive empirical predictions. Let L be the set of tickets faced
by subjects in our experiment. The binary relation < represents subjects preferences
over L. Denote by µ(l) a subject’s certainty equivalent or value of ticket l in L. For
any two tickets k and l in L, we say that subjects weakly prefer k to l, written k < l,
if and only if µ(k) > µ(l).
4.2.1 Empirical Definitions
Comparing the certainty equivalents for the white and yellow ticket for Urn U with
that for the chameleon ticket, we can classify subjects according to their randomization
attitudes. Consider a subject who favors the yellow ticket yU to the white ticket wU for
3A similar observation has been made by Holt (1986). The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism
also fails to elicit true valuations if the compound lottery axiom is violated (Segal, 1988).
4Apart from the theoretical argument, there is empirical evidence that preference reversals in mea-
surements of ambiguity aversion occur when using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism—see
Trautmann, Vieider, and Wakker (2009).
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urn U , i.e., yU < wU . Such a subject is randomization-averse if she values the chameleon
ticket even less than the white ticket wU . Conversely, this subject is randomization-
loving if she values the chameleon ticket even more than the yellow ticket yU . If a
subject values the chameleon ticket weakly more than the white ticket wU but weakly
less than the yellow ticket wU , we say she is randomization-neutral. The next definition
formalizes this idea, where sU and tU stands for the favorite and least favorite ticket on
Urn U.
Definition 2 (Randomization attitude). A subject with sU < tU , where sU , tU ∈
{yU , wU}, is: (i) randomization-averse if sU < tU  cU ,
(ii) randomization-neutral if sU < cU < tU ,
(iii) randomization-loving if cU  sU < tU .
As will become clear later, this definition coincides with the idea of a preference for
convex combinations embodied in Schmeidler’s ambiguity aversion axiom (1989) for
subjects who are indifferent between the yellow and white ticket on Urn U.
Subjects are typically regarded to be ambiguity-averse if they prefer betting on the
urn with known proportions of yellow and white balls. Let us be more precise about this
statement by considering a subject who weakly prefers the yellow to the white ticket
on both urns (yK < wK and yU < wU). Suppose this subject compares her two favorite
tickets (yK and yU) and her two least favorite tickets (wK and wU) across Urn K and
Urn U. Then this subject is ambiguity-averse if she weakly prefers the tickets on Urn
K to those on Urn U for her favorite as well as least favorite tickets and her preference
is strict in at least one case: yK < yU and wK < wU with at least one strict preference
(). Conversely, she is ambiguity-loving if she weakly prefers the tickets based on Urn U
in both cases and strictly in at least one case: yU < yK and wU < wK with at least one
strict preference (). Finally, she is ambiguity-neutral if she either prefers another urn
for her favorite tickets than for her least favorite tickets or if she is indifferent between
urns for the favorite as well as least favorite tickets: yU  yK but wK ≺ wU , or yU  yK
but wK  wU , or yU ∼ yK and wU ∼ wK . The following definition generalizes this
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idea to arbitrary preferences, where qK and rK stands for the favorite and least favorite
ticket on Urn K, and sU and tU for the favorite and least favorite ticket on Urn U. The
defined order is complete: each preference is either ambiguity-averse, ambiguity-loving,
or ambiguity-neutral.
Definition 3 (Ambiguity attitude). A subject with qK < rK and sU < tU , where
qK , rK ∈ {yK , wK} and sU , tU ∈ {yU , wU}, is:
(i) ambiguity-averse if qK < sU and rK < tU with at least one (),
(ii) ambiguity-loving if qK 4 sU and rK 4 tU with at least one (≺),
(iii) ambiguity-neutral otherwise, i.e.,
if qK ∼ sU and rK ∼ tU ,
or qK  sU and rK ≺ tU ,
or qK ≺ sU and rK  tU .
In Section 3.3 we briefly described the comparative approach to define ambiguity at-
titudes proposed by Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002). It can be
shown that the comparative approach yields the above definition of ambiguity attitudes
when the class subjective expected utility preferences is taken as a benchmark and when
bets defined on the urn with known proportions of balls are regarded as unambiguous
bets (see Section 4.6 for the proof).
Proposition 4.1. Given that yellow and white ticket defined on urn K are viewed
as unambiguous, yK , wK ∈ Fua, and taking subjective expected utility preferences as
the benchmark, the two-stage approach yields the definition of ambiguity attitude from
Definition 3.
4.2.2 Predictions
The general definitions allow for any combination of ambiguity and randomization at-
titude. For example, a subject may in principle be ambiguity-neutral but like random-
ization or it may be averse to ambiguity and randomization. This section uses existing
theoretical models to restrict the relationship between ambiguity and randomization
attitude and derive predictions.
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In order to represent ambiguity aversion, a large class of models appeals to Schmei-
dler’s notion (1989) that a mixture between two bets is preferred to each of the bets
itself. In the specific framework used by Schmeidler, bets are mappings from events to
probability distributions over the set of payoffs, so that the convex combination of two
bets, f and g: αf + (1− α)g with α ∈ (0, 1) is well defined. Schmeidler calls a subject
with f < g ambiguity-averse if
αf + (1− α)g < g. (4.1)
Intuitively, smoothing utility across ambiguous events makes an ambiguity-averse sub-
ject better off. In perfect analogy, subjects are ambiguity-loving if αf + (1− α)g 4 f.
For subjects who violate the independence axiom, preferences are strict.
Taking ‘yellow’ and ‘white’ to be events and the probability distribution in each
event to result from the coin flip, the chameleon ticket is a convex combination in the
sense of Schmeidler. The axiom then means that ambiguity-averse subjects strictly
prefer the chameleon ticket, i.e., the mixture of two bets, to the least favorite ticket on
Urn U. Likewise, ambiguity-loving subjects should prefer their favorite ticket on Urn U
to the chameleon ticket.
For subjects who are indifferent between white and yellow on Urn U, yU ∼ wU ,
Schmeidler’s notion fully coincides with our definition of randomization attitude (see
Definition 2). Based on the various models that appeal to this notion in order to explain
ambiguity attitude, we hence predict ambiguity-averse subjects to be randomization-
loving and ambiguity-loving subjects to be randomization-averse (given yU ∼ wU).
Hypothesis 1
For subjects who are indifferent between the yellow and white ticket on Urn U, yU ∼ wU ,
ambiguity and randomization attitude are negatively associated: ambiguity-averse sub-
jects are randomization-loving and vice versa.
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As the null hypothesis, we consider that ambiguity and randomization attitude are not
associated.
If ambiguity aversion is modeled using Choquet expected utility models with con-
vex capacities, the relationship between ambiguity and randomization attitude depends
on whether the randomization device is modeled as part of the consequence space (C-
approach) or as a part of an extended state space (S-approach). Eichberger and Kelsey
(1996b) show that ambiguity-averse decision makers who are indifferent between two
bets based on an uncertain urn, yU ∼ wU , and who regard the randomization device as
fair, h ∼ t, are randomization-loving in the C-approach but are randomization-neutral
in the S-approach. This directly leads to the hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2C
Ambiguity-averse subjects with yU ∼ wU and h ∼ t are randomization-loving.
Hypothesis 2S
Ambiguity-averse subjects with yU ∼ wU and h ∼ t are randomization-neutral.
We test these two alternatives against the null hypothesis that ambiguity-averse sub-
jects with yU ∼ wU and h ∼ t are equally likely to be randomization-neutral and
randomization-loving.
4.3 Implementation
We ran a total of 5 sessions with 90 subjects. All sessions were conducted in the
experimental laboratory at the University of Mannheim in September 2008. Subjects
were primarily students who were randomly recruited from a pool of approximately
1000 subjects using an e-mail recruitment system. Each subject only participated in
one of the sessions. Ticket values were elicited electronically using the software z-tree
(Fischbacher, 2007).
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After the subjects’ arrival at the laboratory, they were randomly seated at the
computer terminals. Instructions were read out loud and ticket types were practically
explained. Then, the subjects were given time to study the instructions (see appendix
for a translation). Finally, they were asked to answer a series of questions to test their
understanding of the instructions. During all this time, subjects could ask the experi-
menters clarifying questions. This part lasted about 30 minutes. It was followed by the
evaluation of the tickets. In order to simplify the input for subjects, we programmed
a slider that allowed them to specify their value for each ticket. The program then
automatically selected choices that were consistent with this ticket value. Using the
slider was not obligatory and a subject could arbitrary alter its choice until he or she
decided to finish evaluation of a specific ticket (see Figure 1 in the appendix for a screen
shot). After the evaluation of tickets, we asked subjects questions about their demo-
graphics and attitudes towards ambiguity. We also gave them some problems to test
their statistics knowledge and cognitive ability. Subjects took about 30 minutes for this
second part. The last and final part required drawing balls and flipping coins in order
to determine payoffs. With 8 types of tickets and twenty choices between ticket and
fixed payment for each type, subjects could obtain up to 160 tickets. This last part
required roughly 30 minutes so that the whole experiment lasted about 90 minutes.
At the end of the experiment, we paid each subject privately in cash. All payoffs
were initially explained in Taler that were later converted using the rate of 100 Taler=10
cents. Subjects earned on average 11.35 Euro.
4.4 Results
Two subjects violated transitivity in their choices, which leaves us with 88 independent
observations. In line with previous experimental studies (see Camerer and Weber, 1992),
many subjects exhibit the Ellsberg paradox: a share of about 55% prefer betting on
the urn with known proportions, while ca. 9% prefer betting on the urn with unknown
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proportions, and roughly 36% are indifferent.
4.4.1 Main findings
In order to formally check Hypothesis 1, we restrict our sample to subjects who value
white and yellow ticket on Urn U equally, so that Schmeidler’s notion of mixture prefer-
ence co-incides with the definition of randomization attitude. Since about a third of the
subjects prefer a ticket of one color on Urn U, the analysis is based on 53 observations.
Result 1. For subjects who value white and yellow tickets on Urn U equally, ambiguity
and randomization attitude are not negatively associated.
From the literature, we expect ambiguity-averse subjects to be randomization-loving
and ambiguity-loving subjects to be randomization-averse. Accordingly, observations
should lie on the diagonal from the top-left to the bottom-right in Table 4.1. While 19
out of the 53 observations exhibit this relationship, about two thirds of the observations
lie off the diagonal. Using Fisher’s exact test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that there is no association at any conventional level (p-value=0.118).5 Moreover, the
number of observations that lie on the other diagonal and are consistent with a positive
relationship is higher (25 out of 53). Accordingly, Goodman and Kruskal’s γ as well
as Kendall’s τb, which can be used to measure the association between the two ordinal
scaled attitudes, are both positive. If there is any tendency to reject independence it is
hence in favor of a positive rather than a negative relationship.
Recall that S- and C-approach lead to diverging predictions about the randomization
attitude of ambiguity-averse subjects, regard the coin as fair, and value white and yellow
ticket on Urn U equally. This concerns 29 subjects in our sample. The C-approach
predicts these subjects to like randomization, while the S-approach predicts them to be
randomization-neutral. The following result is based on the 20 observations that are in
line with one of these predictions.
5Neither Pearson’s χ2 (p-value=0.163) nor the likelihood ratio test (p-value=0.083) are significant.
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Ambiguity Attitude
Averse Neutral Loving Total
Randomization
Loving 6 0 1 7
Attitude
Neutral 17 12 2 31
Averse 12 2 1 15
Total 35 14 4 53
Table 4.1: Ambiguity and randomization attitude for subjects who value white and
yellow ticket on Urn U equally
Result 2. Consider ambiguity-averse subjects who regard the coin as fair and value
the yellow and white ticket on Urn U equally. These subjects are more likely to be
randomization-neutral rather than randomization-loving.
Sixteen of the 20 subjects are randomization-neutral, while four prefer randomization—
see Figure 4.1. The hypothesis that subjects are equally likely to be randomization-
loving or neutral can be rejected at any conventional level (The respective binomial test
has a p-value below 0.01): a significantly larger fraction of subjects is randomization-
neutral.
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Figure 4.1: Randomization attitudes of ambiguity-averse subjects who regard the coin
as fair and value white and yellow ticket on Urn U equally
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This result can be extended to ambiguity-loving subjects, who are supposed to dislike
randomization according to the C-approach and to be randomization-neutral according
to the S-approach. Two ambiguity-loving subjects are randomization-neutral and one
is randomization-averse. Overall, 18 of 23 observations are in line with the S-approach
and only 5 with the C-approach. Again, a uniform distribution of randomization atti-
tudes can be rejected in favor of the predictions consistent with the S-approach at any
conventional level (p-value below 0.01).
4.4.2 Robustness
The theoretical results, which underpin Hypothesis 1 and 2, only apply to subjects with
specific preferences. Consequently, Result 1 and 2 are based on a selected sample of
subjects, which may not only differ by their preferences but by other characteristics.
We check whether any selection on observables has taken place by running two
probit regressions. Hypothesis 1 requires subjects to be indifferent between the yellow
and white ticket on Urn U. This indifference, however, does not seem to be related
to observables: the null hypothesis that no observable affects the probability of being
indifferent cannot be rejected (p-value of the likelihood ratio test: 0.43, see Table 2 in the
appendix). For Hypothesis 2, subjects must additionally regard the coin as fair. This
time there is some indication that observables affect selection (p-value for the likelihood
ratio test: 0.04). More specifically, subjects who correctly compute the probability of
two independently thrown dice (variable: stats knowledge 2) are significantly more
likely to be in the sample (see Table 3 in the appendix). There is, however, no reason
why statistically more literate subjects should be less inclined to prefer randomization.
The subjects on which we test our hypotheses may also differ in unobservable ways
from our full sample. The independence between ambiguity and randomization atti-
tude could, for example, be driven by the fact that subjects who are indifferent between
white and yellow tickets on Urn U systematically differ from other subjects. In order to
refute this idea, we re-examine the relationship between ambiguity and randomization
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attitude without restricting attention to certain preferences. Of course, Hypotheses 1
and 2 no longer apply in this case. If, however, results are similar, we can be confident
that they do not hinge on an alternative explanation such as a general trait to value
tickets equally. Table 4.2 exhibits the attitudes when all subjects are considered. Both
findings are confirmed. First, the null hypothesis that ambiguity aversion and random
preference are unrelated cannot be rejected (p-value of Fisher’s exact test: 0.18). As
before, the data suggests that ambiguity aversion is associated positively with random-
ization aversion. Second, ambiguity-averse subjects tend to be randomization-neutral
rather than randomization-loving and ambiguity-loving subjects are more likely to be
randomization-neutral than to be randomization-averse (p-value for the two-sided bino-
mial test is below 0.01). This robustness of results gives us some confidence that they
are not driven by selection effects.
4.4.3 Other Findings
In addition to these results, which directly relate to our hypotheses, we also want to
report on two additional and unexpected findings.
The first finding concerns randomization- and ambiguity-averse subjects. We ex-
pected to find very few of them because they are not backed by the most prevalent
models of ambiguity-aversion.
Result 3. A non-negligible fraction of ambiguity-averse subjects dislikes randomization.
Of the 48 ambiguity-averse subjects, 14 express a dislike for randomization (see Ta-
ble 4.2). If we restrict attention to subjects for whom behavior can be predicted using
the S- or C-approach because they regard the coin as fair and have no color preference
on Urn U, a similar picture emerges: 9 out of 29 ambiguity-averse subjects prefer the
pure tickets over the mixture—see Figure 4.1. In both cases, the share is statistically
not distinguishable at any conventional level from the naive prediction by someone who
does not know any of these theories and expects randomization aversion to occur in a
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Ambiguity Attitude
Averse Neutral Loving Total
Randomization
Loving 10 2 2 14
Attitude
Neutral 24 23 6 53
Averse 14 5 2 21
Total 48 30 10 88
Table 4.2: Ambiguity and randomization attitude: all subjects
third of the cases. The observed combination of randomization and ambiguity aversion
is puzzling. The respective subjects prefer to know whether the ticket, which they re-
ceive, is white or yellow—although they are indifferent between receiving a white and a
yellow ticket. Possible reasons are that knowing the color has a value in itself to these
subjects, that they assign lower values to tickets when complexity is involved, or that
they dislike the loss of control associated with the coin.6
In order to accommodate the behavior of these subjects, one would need a more
general model which does not exogenously assume a specific relationship between am-
biguity and randomization attitude. Classes of preferences that do not engender such
specific relationship are the source-dependent preferences axiomatized by Chew and Sagi
(2008), the vector expected utility preferences by Siniscalchi (2009b) and the monotonic,
Bernoullian and continuous preferences by Ghirardato and Siniscalchi (2010).
Our second finding is related to a theoretical result by Klibanoff (2001b). Klibanoff
shows that if a randomizing device is stochastically independent and Choquet-expected
utility preferences are modeled in the S-approach, preferences cannot exhibit ambiguity-
aversion. This implies for our context that subjects whose preferences can be modeled
6Keren and Teigen (2008) argue that such decision makers like to maintain control. Dittmann,
Ku¨bler, Maug, and Mechtenberg (2008) find that experimental subjects are willing to pay a premium
for exerting the right to vote even if the probability that this affects the outcome is very low. On
the other hand, Cettolin and Riedl (2008) observe that subjects with incomplete preferences prefer a
random draw when having to decide.
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using the S-approach because they are ambiguity-averse and randomization-neutral
should regard the coin to be correlated with Urn U. In order to test this, we con-
structed a bet in which a ball is drawn from Urn U; the subject then receives a head
ticket if the ball is yellow and its certainty equivalent of a head ticket if the ball is white.
Subjects who view coin and ball draw as independent should attach the same value to
this bet, which we call combination ticket, and a head ticket. We restrict attention to
subjects who regard the coin as fair, value white and yellow tickets on Urn U equally,
and are randomization-neutral. Following Klibanoff’s argument, we expect these sub-
jects to be less likely to attach different values to the combination and head ticket
if they are ambiguity-neutral. Indeed, the respective share of subjects is lower among
ambiguity-neutral subjects (20%) than amongst other ambiguity-averse subjects (31%);
however, the difference is not significant at any conventional level (p-value of one-sided
two-sample test of proportion: 0.26). More surprising, the proportion of all subjects
who value the head ticket more than the combination ticket is 37%. Put differently,
these subjects prefer a head ticket to a mixture of head ticket and its certainty equiva-
lent. While a possible explanation is that subjects regard coin throw and ball draw as
correlated, there is an interesting link between this finding and randomization aversion:
subjects who favor the heads to the combination ticket also tend to favor tickets of a
specific color to the chameleon ticket (Kendall’s τb=0.1966, p-value: 0.0559). A first
tentative conclusion may thus be that both results are driven by the same explanation,
e.g., a contempt for complexity.
4.5 Summary
We started our analysis with the classical observation from the two-color experiment
by Ellsberg (1961): individuals prefer to bet in situations about which they are better
informed. Existing explanations for such behavior often rely on the idea that access
to an objective randomization device mitigates the problem of lacking information.
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Accordingly, ambiguity-averse individuals are supposed to prefer randomization. The
data from our experiment, however, does not support this view: there is no negative
association between ambiguity and randomization attitude. Ambiguity-averse subjects
are more likely to be randomization-neutral than randomization-loving. This behav-
ior can be explained within Choquet-expected utility theory, when the randomization
device is modeled within the Savage setup rather than using the consequence space in
the tradition of Anscombe-Aumann. However, we also observe a considerable number
of ambiguity-averse subjects who exhibit a contempt for randomization. This observa-
tion indicates that for many subjects, the randomization device does not reduce but
enhances the problem of missing information.
4.6 Proof
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Let L be the set of tickets faced by subjects in our exper-
iment and let < be a binary relation that represents subjects’ preferences over F . For
any bet k, l,m ∈ L we write k < {l,m} to denote k < l and k < m. Throughout, we
consider a subject with the following preferences:
qK < rK and sU < tU , (4.2)
where qK , rK ∈ {yK , wK} and sU , tU ∈ {yU , wU}. Let QK , RK ∈ {Y K ,WK} be the
corresponding (unambiguous) events to which subjects assign probabilities pi[Y K ] and
pi[WK ], while , SU , TU ∈ {Y U ,WU} are the ambiguous events.
The preferences of a subjective expected utility maximizer fall into one of the fol-
lowing three sets:
qK ∼B sU <B tU ∼B rK , (4.3)
qK B sU <B tU B rK , (4.4)
sU B qK <B rK B tU . (4.5)
These three sets provide the benchmark preferences. For the proof, we decompose
all preferences into three classes: (i) qK < sU and rK < tU with at least one strict
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preference relation (≺) , (ii) qK 4 sU and rK 4 tU with at least one strict preference
relation (≺), and (iii) qK ∼ sU and rK ∼ tU , or qK  sU and rK ≺ tU , or qK ≺ sU
and rK  tU . We now show that the two-stage approach implies ambiguity-aversion for
the first class (Step 1), ambiguity-love for the second class (Step 2), and ambiguity-
neutrality for the last class (Step 3). These are exactly the ambiguity attitudes from
Definition 3.
Step 1. qK < sU and rK < tU with at least one strict preference relation (). In this
step, we examine two cases: qK ∼ rK and qK  rK .
Case 1: qK ∼ rK . In this case, we obtain:
qK ∼ rK < sU < tU , (4.6)
with at least one strict preference. Take <B as in (4.3) with piB(QK) = pi(QK)
and:
qK ∼B sU ∼B tU ∼B rK . (4.7)
Comparing < from (4.6) with <B as in (4.7), we get:
qK ∼B {rK , sU , tU} ⇒ qK ∼ {rK} < {sU} < {tU},
rK ∼B {qK , sU , tU} ⇒ rK ∼ {qK} < {sU} < {tU},
where at least one of the weak preference is strict in each row. Thus, there exists
<B such that < is more ambiguity-averse then <B according to (3.5). Further-
more, there does not exist <B such that < is more ambiguity-loving then <B.
Case 2: qK  rK . In this case, one of the following can occur:
qK  rK < sU < tU , or (4.8)
qK < sU  rK < tU , (4.9)
with at least one strict preference in each case. As a benchmark, take <B as in
(4.3) with piB(QK) = pi(QK) and: qK ∼B sU B tU ∼B rK . Comparing this <B
with < as in (4.8), we get:
qK ∼B {sU} B {rK , tU} ⇒ qK  {rK , sU , tU},
rK ∼B {tU} ⇒ rK < {sU , tU}.
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Analogously, the comparison with < as in (4.9), yields:
qK ∼B {sU} B {rK , tU} ⇒ qK < {sU} < {rK , tU},
rK ∼B {tU} ⇒ rK  {tU}.
Thus, for preference ordering < as in (4.8) and as in (4.9), there exists <B such
that < is more ambiguity-averse then <B according to (3.5) and again, there is
no such <B for which < is more ambiguity-loving then <B. Summarizing both
cases, we have seen that for qK < sU or rK < tU with at least one strict pref-
erence relation (), < is ambiguity-averse, which coincides with (i) in Definition 3.
Step 2. qK 4 sU and rK 4 tU with at least one strict preference relation (≺). Again,
we consider two cases: qK ∼ rK and qK  rK .
Case 1: qK ∼ rK . In this case, we obtain:
sU < tU < qK ∼ rK , (4.10)
with at least one strict preference. Take <B with piB(QK) = pi(QK) as in (4.3)
such that:
qK ∼B sU ∼B tU ∼B rK . (4.11)
Comparing the respective <B with < from (4.10), we obtain:
qK ∼B {rK , sU , tU} ⇒ qK ∼ {rK} 4 {sU} 4 {tU},
rK ∼B {qK , sU , tU} ⇒ rK ∼ {qK} 4 {sU} 4 {tU},
where at least one of the weak preference is strict in each row. Thus, there exists
<B such that < is more ambiguity-loving then <B and there exist no <B such
that < is more ambiguity-averse then <B. Hence, < is ambiguity-loving according
to (3.6).
Case 2: qK  rK . In this case, one of the following can occur:
sU < tU < qK  rK , or (4.12)
sU < qK  tU < rK , (4.13)
with at least one strict preference in each case. Take <B with piB(QK) = pi(QK)
as in (4.3) such that:
qK ∼B sU B tU ∼B rK . (4.14)
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Comparing this <B with < from (4.12), we obtain:
qK ∼B {sU} ⇒ qK 4 {tU} 4 {sU},
rK ∼B {tU} ≺ {sU , qK} ⇒ rK ≺ {qK , tU , sU}.
Comparing the same benchmark with < from (4.13), we get:
qK ∼B {sU} ⇒ qK 4 {sU},
rK ∼B {tU} ≺ {sU , qK} ⇒ rK 4 {tU} ≺ {qK , sU}.
Thus, in both cases, there exists<B such that< is more ambiguity-loving then<B
and there exists no such <B for which < is more ambiguity-averse then <B. Thus,
we conclude that < is ambiguity-loving according to (3.6). Hence, if qK 4 sU or
rK 4 tU with at least one strict preference relation (≺), then < is ambiguity-
loving, which coincides with (ii) in Definition 3.
Step 3. qK ∼ sU and rK ∼ tU , or qK  sU and rK ≺ tU , or qK ≺ sU and rK  tU .
Suppose now that qK ∼ sU and rK ∼ tU , or qK  sU and rK ≺ tU , or qK ≺ sU
and rK  tU . Then one of the following can occur:
qK ∼ sU < tU ∼ rK , (4.15)
qK  sU < tU  rK , (4.16)
sU  qK < rK  tU . (4.17)
Take <B with piB(QK) = pi(QK) as in (4.3), in (4.4) and in (4.5). Any < as in
(4.15), in (4.16) and in (4.17) is order equivalent with <B as in (4.3), in (4.4) and
in (4.5), respectively. Thus, for any < as in (4.15), in (4.16) and in (4.17) there
exists <B such that both is true: < is more ambiguity-averse than <B and < is
more ambiguity-loving than <B. Therefore, < is ambiguity-neutral according to
(3.5) and (3.6).
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Chapter 5
Dynamic Ellsberg Urn Experiment
In this chapter we explore experimentally dynamic choice behavior under ambiguity.1
In order to apply ambiguity models to dynamic decision problems, a theory of how
to update preferences in the face of new information is needed. Recently, several ap-
proaches for updating ambiguity-sensitive preferences have been proposed. As opposed
to the subjective expected utility theory, in which Bayesian updating is a logical conse-
quence of Savage’s Sure-Thing-Principle, updating of non-expected utility preferences is
rather a complicated task. The reason is the following one: On the one hand, sensitivity
towards ambiguity, as manifested in the Ellsberg-type choices, entails violation of the
Sure-Thing-Principle (see Section 3.1). On the other hand, the Sure-Thing-Principle
is a property of preferences implied by dynamic consistency and consequentialism (see
Lemma 1, Section 2.3). Consequently, if one is interested in a theory of updating
ambiguity-sensitive preferences, then either consequentialism or dynamic consistency
(or both) must be relaxed in some respect. The existing theoretical literature on dy-
namic extensions of subjective ambiguity models has not yet reached consensus on
whether dynamic consistency or consequentialism is the more plausible assumption.
Sarin and Wakker (1998a), Epstein and Schneider (2003) and Eichberger, Grant, and
Kelsey (2005) show that it is possible to maintain both, however, at the cost of con-
straining the analysis to a fixed collection of events and by imposing restrictions on
1The content of this chapter is based on the article Dominiak, Du¨rsch, and Lefort (2010).
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subjective beliefs. Other theories focus on one property. For instance, Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1993), Pires (2002), Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2007) and Siniscalchi
(2010) drop dynamic consistency and maintain consequentialism, whereas Hanany and
Klibanoff (2007) and Eichberger and Kelsey (1996a) advocate dynamic consistency and
drop consequentialism.2 More recently, Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) and Siniscalchi
(2009a) have provided a very insightful discussion on the normative appeal of these
different approaches to dynamic choices under ambiguity. In this chapter we conduct a
dynamic version of the classical 3-color Ellsberg experiment which allows us to differ-
entiate between consequentialism and dynamic consistency and test whether subjects
behave consistently with either of these two properties.
The first experimental evidence on dynamically inconsistent behavior in the presence
of risk was reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). More recently, the properties
of dynamic consistency and consequentialism were tested by Cubitt, Starmer, and Sug-
den (1998) and by Busemeyer, Weg, Barkan, Li, and Ma (2000) in a framework with
exogenously given probability distributions. In the presence of ambiguity, there are two
other contributions which investigate dynamic choice behavior. Cohen, Gilboa, Jaffray,
and Schmeidler (2000) test the Full-Bayesian versus the Maximum-Likelihood updat-
ing rule using a design very similar to ours. However, in contrast to our paper, they
assume that subjects always maintain consequentialism. Maher and Kashima (1997)
run a series of six differently framed Ellsberg urns to test behavior of subjects who dis-
play ambiguity aversion. They use questions similar to those in this study, but do not
test for dynamic consistency or consequentialism (they assume “separability”, which is
close to consequentialism, throughout most of the paper). They also use some strong
implicit assumptions, e.g. Bayesian updating for ambiguity-averse subjects and a very
2There are other approaches relaxing consequentialism. Lehrer (2005) characterizes updating rules
using geometric properties of non-additive conditional expectations. Ozdenoren and Peck (2007) elu-
cidate the concept of dynamic consistency by interpreting the dynamic Ellsberg experiment as a game
against a malevolent nature.
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strong form of ambiguity aversion, when conducting their analysis. Both studies do not
incentivize decisions through payment to subjects. We do incentivize and conduct the
analysis in a model-free setup.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the section, the dynamic extension
of Ellsberg’s 3-color experiment is presented. In Section 5.2 the experimental design is
described. In Section 5.3 the empirical results are presented and discussed. Finally, we
conclude in Section 5.4.
5.1 Dynamic 3-color experiment
In this section we show that it is impossible for ambiguity-sensitive preferences to
satisfy both consequentialism and dynamic consistency on all events. For this purpose
we consider a dynamic version of the classical 3-color Ellsberg. In the dynamic version,
there is an interim stage at which subjects are informed whether or not the ball drawn
is green. Conditional on the revealed information subjects are allowed to update their
preferences. As a mind experiment it was described by Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and
Marinacci (2008) and Siniscalchi (2010).
Dynamic 3-color Experiment. Consider Ellsberg’s 3-color experiment described in
Section 3.1. There are two stages, ex-ante and interim stage. At the ex-ante stage
subject face two choice situations, I and II, with the same information about the com-
position of the urn as it was described initially. At the interim stage subjects face again
two choice problems, III and V I, with an additional information about the outcome of
a random draw from the urn. Bets in the third choice situation, III, are identical to
those in I and bets in the fourth choice problem, IV , are identical to those in II with
one exception, namely that subjects are informed that the randomly drawn ball is not
green, i.e. Y ∪ B. For the sake of completeness we summarize the two relevant choice
problems III and IV in Table 5.1.
Depending on the choices subjects made at ex-ante and interim stage, one can conclude
whether subjects behave consistently with either dynamic consistency or consequen-
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Ball is not Green!
Y ellow Blue Green
Choice III
f1 4 0 0
f2 0 4 0
Choice IV
f3 4 0 4
f4 0 4 4
Table 5.1: Ellsberg’s 3-color experiment
tialism. Table 5.2 depicts implications on dynamic consistency and consequentialism
resulting from choices made ex-ante and choices made on the interim stage. The columns
refer to choices made in the static Ellsberg experiment. Correspondingly, rows refer to
choices made after being informed that the ball drawn is not green.
Ambiguity Attitude
Averse Neutral Loving
(f1; f4) (f1; f3) (f2; f4) (f1; f4)
I
n
te
ri
m
C
h
oi
ce
s
(f1; f4) DC,¬C ¬DC,¬C ¬DC,¬C ¬DC,¬C
(f1; f3) ¬DC,C DC,C ¬DC,C ¬DC,C
(f2; f4) ¬DC,C ¬DC,C DC,C ¬DC,C
(f2; f3) ¬DC,¬C ¬DC,¬C ¬DC,¬C DC,¬C
Table 5.2: Dynamic consistency and consequentialism in the dynamic 3-color experi-
ment
Consider for instance an ambiguity-averse subject (first column with choices (f1; f4)).
At the interim stage there are again four possible patterns of conditional (strict) pref-
erences, Y ∪ B. As we will see some of them respect dynamic consistency, (DC), and
other ones respect consequentialism, (C), but not both.
(DC) Since f1 = f2 and f3 = f4 on the event G and they differ only on states in
the conditional event Y ∪ B, dynamic consistency requires that the conditional
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preferences have to respect the choices made ex-ante, i.e.:
f1  f2 =⇒ f1 Y ∪B f2, and
f4  f3 =⇒ f4 Y ∪B f2.
(C) Since f1 = f3 and f2 = f4 on the event Y ∪ B and they differ only outside
of that event, consequentialism requires that the subject must be conditionally
indifferent between them, i.e. f1 ∼Y ∪B f3 and f2 ∼Y ∪B f4. Furthermore, it
implies that either (i) or (ii) must be true:
(i) f1 Y ∪B f2 =⇒ f3 Y ∪B f4 and vice versa, or
(ii) f1 ≺Y ∪B f2 =⇒ f3 ≺Y ∪B f4 and vice versa.
It can be immediately seen that in the dynamic 3-color experiment the ambiguity-averse
subject must violate either the property of dynamic consistency or consequentialism
(or both). Then, if conditional preferences respect dynamic consistency (first row with
f1; f4) then the property of consequentialism is violated (henceforth ¬C). On the other
hand, if the conditional preferences remain consistent with consequentialism (as in
second and third row with f1; f3 and f2; f4 respectively) then exactly one of the ex-ante
preferences is reversed, what violates dynamic consistency (henceforth ¬DC). Finally,
if conditionally on the event Y ∪B the ambiguity-averse subject reverses both ex-ante
preferences (as in fourth row with f2; f3) then the interim choices are neither consistent
with dynamic consistency nor with consequentialism (henceforth ¬DC and ¬C).
5.2 Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted in December 2008 in Mannheim in the experimental
lab of SFB504. A total of 90 subjects participated in four sessions, with each subject
participating only once. 46 participants were male, 44 female; all but one subject were
students from various majors. Subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner (2004))
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and paid in private and cash directly after the experiment. On average they earned
14.00 Euro in about 60 minutes.
The urn was represented by a bucket with white table tennis balls (with yellow, blue
or green stickers on them). Before making their choices, subjects were shown one ball of
each color, taken from the bucket. So subjects were informed that the urn included at
least one ball of each color. The bucket remained in the room for the whole experiment
and after the drawings were finished, subjects had the opportunity to look at the balls
inside the bucket. After receiving and reading the instructions detailing the complete
experiment, all subjects were handed the decision sheet, on which they marked their
bets.
To implement the choice problem described above, subjects were asked to make 4
decisions. The first two decisions were equivalent to choices I and II in Table 3.1. The
third and forth decision where designed to test the conditional preferences as described
in section three. Choice III was identical to choice I and choice IV identical to choice II,
with one exception: at the end of each question, we added the sentence “if you come to
know that the ball drawn is not green”.3 Dubois and Prade (1994) distinguish between
dynamic choice situations which they call “focusing” and those they call “learning”. In
the terminology of Dubois and Prade, the situation we implement is focusing. utility
maximizer will update according to Bayes rule to express her preferences.
A particular problem in ambiguity related experiments is how to deal with indiffer-
ence. One possible solution is to force subjects to make a choice, the drawback being
that some data points will reflect indifferent subjects, such that inferences from the
Ellsberg decisions could be wrong (e.g. what looks like a preference reversal is not
inconsistent with subjective expected utility theory if the subject was indifferent). On
the other hand, including an explicit indifferent option raises problems in incentivized
experiments: How will the subjects marking indifferent be paid? Choosing any rule,
such as “the experimenter flips a coin” turns the problem into a decision with three
3See the appendix for complete instructions.
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alternatives, the coin flip being one of them. Subjects who prefer the coin flip need not
be identical with those who are indifferent in the original two alternative decision. To
solve this problem, we did not offer an indifferent option. However, additionally to each
decision, subjects were asked to mark “How strong is your liking for the alternative you
choose?” on a scale ranging from 0 (nil) to 5 (very strong).4 We interpret subjects who
marked zero as having no confidence that their choices are better than the alternatives,
that is, as being indifferent. These subjects where paid according to their decisions,
but discarded from the analysis.
When everyone had finished their decisions, subjects took part in a timed 10 minute
statistics and cognitive ability test, with 9 questions in total (3 questions from Shane
Frederick’s cognitive ability test (Frederick, 2005), the Wason selection task (Wason
and Shapiro, 1971) and 5 simple statistics questions). Each correct answer was paid
with 1 Euro. Finally, subjects were asked to answer an unpaid questionnaire which
included demographics.
The draws took place at the end of the experiment. A randomly selected subject
blindly drew a ball for each question. The balls were returned to the bucket after being
shown to all subjects, so that all drawings were with replacement. Regarding question
three and four, the following was stated in the instructions and implemented if needed:
“If the first ball drawn happens to be green, we will continue drawing balls till a non-
green ball is drawn.” After the drawings were done, each subject was paid according
to his/her decisions (each winning bet paid 4 Euro) and answers and the experiment
ended.
4Our question is similar to the one used by Chen, Katuscak, and Ozdenoren (2007). Curley, Young,
and Yates (1989) test three methods to measure ambiguity in an experiment and find that a question
about confidence in the decision performs best.
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5.3 Results
Out of our 90 subjects, 6 marked a confidence of nil for at least one of their choices.
We interpret these subjects as indifferent and drop them from the following analysis
since we are interested in strict preferences, leaving us with 84 data points.5
First, we look at the choices in the first two questions, which replicate the static
Ellsberg experiment. The last row in Table 5.3 shows the proportion of ambiguity-
averse, neutral and loving subjects. We confirm previous observations (see Camerer
and Weber, 1992) that a majority of people are ambiguity-averse in this decision task:
54.8% prefer to bet on colors with known probabilities; 7.1% are ambiguity loving, while
38.1% exhibit ambiguity-neutral behavior.
According to the responses in the third and forth question, we can classify 21 sub-
jects as both dynamically consistent and consequentialist, 44 as not dynamically con-
sistent, but consequentialist, 6 as dynamically consistent but not consequentialist and
13 as neither dynamically consistent, nor consequentialist.6 Taken together, 32.1%
are dynamically consistent, while 77.4% are consequentialist. This difference is highly
significant using a McNemar test. This result does not change when we look only at sub-
jects who are ambiguity-averse or ambiguity-loving according to the first two questions.
The two bold numbers in Table 5.3 highlight subjects who would be classified as
ambiguity-neutral in the static Ellsberg urn, yet who turn out to be not Bayesian
in the dynamic urn. Thus, we find additional violations of subjective expected utility
theory in the dynamic experiment.
5For us, only those subjects are truly indifferent who mark 0 in the confidence question. However,
when we use a wider definition of indifference and also exclude subjects who marked 1 in at least one
of their choices, our results stay qualitatively the same for all results and for the main results in table
5 the significance levels are unchanged as well (or, in one case, even stronger).
6Note that in our experiment, it is not possible for subjects to be ambiguity-averse/loving, dynam-
ically consistent and consequentialist at the same time. Similar, there are no choice combinations that
allow subjects to be ambiguity neutral, dynamically consistent, but not consequentialist.
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Ambiguity Attitude
Averse Neutral Loving Total
DC,C - 21 - 21
¬DC,C 35 3 6 44
DC,¬C 6 - 0 6
¬DC,¬C 5 8 0 13
Total 46 32 6 84
Table 5.3: Distribution of dynamically consistent/consequentialist and ambiguity-
averse/neutral/loving subjects
The results in Table 5.3 suggest that when subjects are not both dynamically consis-
tent and consequentialist, they rather drop dynamic consistency than consequentialism.
However, due to the design of the urn, there are more combinations of choices which
are consequentialist than dynamically consistent.
Random Observed Binomial test
two− sided
All subjects
DC 25% 32% .132
C 50% 77% .000
Non− neutral
DC 25% 12% .024
C 50% 79% .000
Table 5.4: Fraction of dynamically consistent and consequentialist subjects
To check this result for robustness, we list in Table 5.4 the hypothetic distributions
we would expect if all our subjects chose purely randomly and compare them to the ob-
served results. Looking at all subjects, there are more consequentialist and dynamically
consistent choices than under a random distribution. However this result is significant
only for consequentialism. The difference is even more pronounced when we restrict
the analysis to subjects who are non-neutral towards ambiguity. Now significantly less
subjects than under random choice are dynamically consistent, while, still, there are
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significantly more consequentialist ones.
Result 1: More subjects than expected under random choice are consequentialist.
Among the non-neutral subjects, less than expected are dynamically consistent.
Regarding the way subjects update preferences, Dubois and Prade (1994) distinguish
two different approaches, learning and focusing, which coincide in the additive case
thank to the Bayes rule, but need not coincide outside of subjective expected utility.
They consider two different updating rules: Maximum-Likelihood updating and Full-
Bayesian updating.7 Intuitively, in the case of learning, the decision maker learns
something about the composition of the urn. In this case, Dubois and Prade (1994)
argue for the use of the Maximum Likelihood rule. On the other hand, focusing is a
situation in which no information is provided regarding the composition of the urn, as
it is the case in our experiment. Dubois and Prade (1994) argue that in this situation
of focusing the Full-Bayesian rule should be used. In their paper, Cohen, Gilboa,
Jaffray, and Schmeidler (2000) test whether subjects follow the Full-Bayesian or the
Maximum-Likelihood updating rule using a design very similar to ours. The questions
they use are identical to our questions one, two and four. Then, ambiguity averse agents
using the Maximum-Likelihood rule would choose blue in question four and while those
updating according to Full-Bayesian updating would choose yellow. However, Cohen
et al. assume that subjects are consequentialist. We repeat their test using only our
consequentialist subjects. Similar to their results, we find significantly more support for
the Full-Bayesian updating rule (p-value below 0.001, chi square test) among ambiguity-
averse subjects. The result for ambiguity-loving subjects is not significant, very likely
due to the small number of ambiguity-loving subjects in our experiment.
Result 2: More subjects who are ambiguity-averse and consequentialist use the Full-
7Roughly speaking the Full-Bayesian updating rule is a rule where the decision maker updates
all the probabilistic scenarios she has in mind and derives the conditional preference relation from
these updated probabilities. According to the Maximum-Likelihood updating rule the decision maker
updates only the probabilities that maximize the event which has occurred.
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Bayesian updating rule than the Maximum-Likelihood updating rule.
Averse Loving
Full −Bayesian 82.9% 66.7%
Maximum− Likelihood 17.1% 33.3%
Table 5.5: Full-Bayesian vs Maximum-Likelihood
Moreover, we asked all subjects about their confidence in their choices for each question.
Apart from using these responses to discard indifferent subjects from the analysis, it is
also interesting to look at the different levels of confidence for each question. Again,
we start by looking at the first two questions, the static Ellsberg case. As Figure 5.1
Figure 5.1: Confidence and ambiguity attitudes
shows, all subjects are less confident in their second answer compared to the first one.
This difference is significant at the 1% level for ambiguity-averse and ambiguity-neutral
subjects, but not significant for ambiguity loving subjects in a Wilcoxon test. However,
the “amount” of confidence that subjects lose depends on their choices: ambiguity
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averse subjects lose more confidence than ambiguity-neutral ones.8
Result 3: Ambiguity averse subjects report a higher loss of confidence in their second
choice compared to ambiguity-neutral ones.
Next, we turn to confidence levels for all four answers. Figure 5.2 depicts the confidence
levels for subjects depending on their adherence to dynamic consistency and consequen-
tialism. To evaluate the impact of going from a static to a dynamic Ellsberg urn, we look
Figure 5.2: Confidence in the dynamic 3-color experiment
at the difference in average confidence in the first two compared to the last two ques-
tions: confidence loss = (confidence1+ confidence2)− (confidence3+ confidence4).
The first impression that subjects who adhere to the rationality arguments lose less
confidence in the dynamic case is confirmed. As Table 5.6 shows, they have a signif-
8The two-sided p-value of a Mann-Whitney-U-Test on confidence1 − confidence2 comparing
ambiguity-averse with ambiguity-neutral subjects is 0.032. No comparison with ambiguity loving
subjects is significant. In both cases, the insignificant results for ambiguity-loving subjects might be
due to their small number in our experiment.
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icantly lower confidence loss than those subjects who violate one or both properties.
DC,C ¬DC,C DC,¬C ¬DC,¬C
DC,C - - - -
¬DC,C 0.024 - - -
DC,¬C 0.011 0.371 - -
¬DC,¬C 0.000 0.455 0.01 -
Table 5.6: Significance levels from two-sided MW test on updating confidence loss
In a multinomial logistic regression that controls for demographics and subjects’ score
in our cognitive ability questions (see Table 4 in the appendix) we also find significantly
lower confidence for subjects who do not behave according to dynamic consistency and
consequentialism, compared to those who do. Our results for subjects’ confidence can
be explained with the assumption that subjects are more confident in their choice if they
know of a way to rationally argue in favor of that choice. The probabilistic Bayesian
theory is the most mathematically simple and arguably the only one which our subjects
might consciously use in the experiment. We find the highest levels of confidence for
choices two to four exactly for those subjects who behave probabilistic Bayesian. We
do not test this assumption, so other explanations are possible. However, we do not
find an effect of the demographics and the cognitive ability.9
Result 4: Subjects who adhere to both dynamic consistency and consequentialism
loose less confidence in the dynamic choice situation, compared to those who
violate one or both of these properties.
9The variable cognitive ability codes the number of a subject’s correctly answered questions in
questionnaire 1.
77
5.4 Summary
People who display the Ellsberg paradox can not be dynamically consistent and con-
sequentialist at the same time. We conduct a dynamic extension of Ellsberg’s 3-color
experiment and find that, in our setup, significantly more subjects behave in accordance
with consequentialism rather than with dynamic consistency. As such, our results can
be seen as support for theories which retain consequentialism.
We observe that being ambiguity-neutral when facing the static Ellsberg urn does
not necessarily imply that subjects always behave Bayesian. Several subjects who are
classified as ambiguity neutral in the static choice situation can not be described by
subjective expected utility theory in the dynamic extension.
Furthermore, we measure confidence. While all subjects are more confident in
their first choice, ambiguity-neutral subjects lose less confidence in later choices than
ambiguity-averse ones. Similarly, Bayesian subjects lose less confidence compared to
those who violate dynamic consistency or consequentialism.
The dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment provides a tool to test both static and dynamic
properties of decision making under uncertainty. We hope that our results will be
informative for future theoretical work.
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Chapter 6
Dynamic Choquet Preferences and
Unambiguous Events
The objective of this chapter is to explore the link between updating Choquet expected
utility preferences and two existing notions of unambiguous events.1 In particular,
we ask whether, for Choquet expected utility preferences, the property of dynamic
consistency, constrained to a given collection of events, guarantees that its elements
are unambiguous and vice versa. The results we have obtained allow us to answer this
question in the affirmative.
Recently, a number of extensions of Choquet expected utility preferences to dy-
namic decision problems have been proposed (see Sarin and Wakker (1998a), Eich-
berger, Grant, and Kelsey (2005), Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2007)). Here, we
constrain the analysis to some fixed collection of events and characterize properties
of these events on which Choquet preferences respect dynamic consistency and conse-
quentialism. Natural candidates for such events on which both axioms are satisfied are
events which support some kind of probabilistic beliefs, for instance events, with known
probabilities, i.e. Y and B ∪G in the 3-color experiment presented in Section 3.1. The
idea of events characterized by probabilistic beliefs is closely related to the recently sug-
gested notions of unambiguous events by Nehring (1999), Epstein and Zhang (2001),
1The content of this chapter is based on the article Dominiak and Lefort (2011b).
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Zhang (2002) and Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004).
First, we focus on the definition Nehring (1999) provides, since it mimics the de-
sirable separability property of expected utility theory.2 His definition is based on the
idea, which stems from Sarin and Wakker (1998b), to interpret capacities in terms
of rank-dependent probability assignments. According to this interpretation, subjective
probabilities used for evaluating acts depend on the rank ordering of their consequences.
In general, two acts generating distinct ranks are evaluated with respect to different sub-
jective probabilities. Thus, the separability of preferences and beliefs may be achieved
for acts that generate the same rank. Such acts are called comonotonic. In the instance
that the subjective likelihood of an event is unaffected by changing its position, it must
be viewed as unambiguous. Correspondingly, Nehring calls an event unambiguous,
henceforth N-unambiguous, if the subjective probability attached to the event does not
depend on the ranking position of states.
We argue that conditional on N -unambiguous events, the Bayes updating rule for
capacities is the most appropriate updating rule. The reason is twofold. First, because
updating on N -unambiguous events according to the Bayes revision rule is the only way
to retain dynamic consistency. Second, when conditioning on N -unambiguous events,
the Bayesian updating rule coincides with other popular updating rules. These include
the Full-Bayesian updating rule introduced by Jaffray (1992) and all the h-Bayesian
updating rules as axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993). Motivated by this
rationale we show that consequentialist Choquet expected utility preferences satisfy
dynamic consistency on a fixed filtration if and only if the algebra generated by the
smallest elements in the filtration belongs to the algebra generated by N -unambiguous
events. This result on its own may be viewed as an alternative characterization of
2Separability of preferences and beliefs is a key property of expected utility theory. It means that
subjective probabilities assigned to uncertain events are not affected by outcomes that are associ-
ated to these events. This property is also satisfied by the more general class of preferences, called
probabilistically sophisticated preferences axiomatized by Machina and Schmeidler (1992).
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N -unambiguous events in a conditional decision problem.
Furthermore, Nehring (1999) emphasized the restrictiveness of Choquet expected
utility preferences, since the collection of N -unambiguous events must be always an
algebra. However, there may be potentially interesting ambiguity situations, as exem-
plified by Zhang (2002) in his 4-color example, in which the candidates for unambiguous
events form a weaker structure. By departing from the intuition behind Savage’s key
axiom, called the Sure-Thing-Principle, Zhang (2002) suggested a weaker definition
of unambiguous events, henceforth Z-unambiguous. Thus, it is impossible to maintain
dynamic consistency on events that are Z-unambiguous. An illustrative dynamic exten-
sion of the 4-color example is given in Section 5. Adopting an axiom, called conditional
certainty equivalence consistency and constraining the dynamic consistency to partition
measurable acts, we provide a dynamic characterization of Z-unambiguous events in a
conditional decision problem.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1.1 presents the Choquet expected
utility. First, the necessary notation is introduced. In Section 6.1.2, the definitions of
N -unambiguous events and Z-unambiguous events are provided. Section 6.1.3 presents
the main concepts regarding the conditional Choquet preferences. In Section 6.2.1 we
provide a characterization of N -unambiguous events in a conditional decision problem.
Moreover, we make some remarks on the related literature. In Section 6.2.2, we provide
an illustrative example and establish a dynamic characterization of Z-unambiguous
events. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.3.
6.1 Choquet Expected Utility Theory
6.1.1 Static Choquet Preferences
Let Ω a finite set of states of nature. An event A is a subset of Ω. The algebra generated
by Ω is denoted by A. Let X be the set of outcomes. An act f is a function from Ω
to X. For instance, an act f = (A1, x1; . . . ;An, xn) assigns the outcome xj to each
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ω ∈ Aj, j = 1, . . . , n, where A1, . . . , An are events partitioning Ω. Let fAg be an act
that assigns the outcome f(ω) to each ω ∈ A and the outcome g(ω) to each ω ∈ Ac.
An act f that assigns a constant outcome f(ω) = x to each ω ∈ Ω is called a constant
act. Denote the set of all acts by F . In Schmeidler’s (1989) theory subjective beliefs
are represented by capacities.
Definition 4. A capacity ν : A → R is a normalized and monotone set function, i.e.:
(i) ν(∅) = 0, ν(Ω) = 1,
(ii) ν(E) ≤ ν(F ) for any E ⊂ F ⊂ Ω.
Thus, the capacity is not required to be additive, although it must satisfy a monotonicity
property that has natural interpretation in terms of qualitative beliefs: ”larger” events
are ”more likely”. A capacity ν, that satisfies an additional condition (iii) ν(A)+ν(B) ≤
ν(A ∪ B) + ν(A ∩ B) for all A,B ∈ A, is called a convex capacity. In a behavioral
context Schmeidler (1989) showed that convex capacities reflect agents’ aversion to-
wards ambiguity. Moreover, if ν satisfies the condition (iii) with equality then ν is a
probability distribution.
Let < be a preference relation defined on the set of acts F . A decision maker is said
to have Choquet expected utility preferences if there exists a utility function u and a
capacity ν such that for any f, g ∈ F :
f < g ⇔
∫
Ω
u ◦ f dν ≥
∫
Ω
u ◦ g dν. (6.1)
The expectations are taken in the following sense. For a given act f let A1, A2, . . . , An
be a partition ordered from least to most favorable events, i.e. such that u(f(A1)) ≤
u(f(A2)) ≤ · · · ≤ u(f(An)). Then, the Choquet integral of f with respect to a capacity
ν and an utility function u is defined as:∫
Ω
u ◦ f dν = u(f(A1)) +
n∑
i=2
[u(f(Ai))− u(f(Ai−1))] ν(Ai, . . . , An).
Choquet Expected Utility preferences have been justified axiomatically by Schmeidler
(1989), Gilboa (1987) and Sarin and Wakker (1992) for an infinite state space. Im-
posing some richness conditions on the set of outcomes and allowing for a finite state
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space Choquet expected utility preferences has been axiomatized by Wakker (1989a),
Nakamura (1990) and Chew and Karni (1994).
Throughout the chapter we assume that preferences admit Choquet expected utility
representation. Additionally we restrict the set of outcomes X and preferences < on F
by assuming that:
Assumption 1. (Continuity) The utility function u : X → R is continuous.
Assumption 2. (Solvability) For any f ∈ F there exists x ∈ X such that f ∼ x.
Solvability serves as a richness condition on < and X. It is satisfied in all axiomati-
zations of Choquet expected utility theory in finite state space set-up. For instance,
Nakamura (1990) and Chew and Karni (1994) impose it directly on <, while Wakker
(1989b) requires X to be a connected and separable topological space.
6.1.2 Unambiguous Events
This section provides a behavioral characterization of unambiguous events. In the
context of ambiguity it is important to localize events that a decision maker perceive
as unambiguous, i.e. events on which she has some kind of probabilistic beliefs. We
begin with the characterization suggested by Nehring (1999), who interprets capacities
in terms of rank-dependent probability assignments. Let ρ be a bijection ρ : Ω →
{n, . . . , 1}. The mapping ρ expresses the ranking position of states associated with
an act f , i.e. the favorableness of their outcome relative to the outcomes obtained
under other states. Let R be a set of such rankings and let ∆Ω be a set of probability
distributions over Ω. Two ranks ρ and ρ′, for which at most two adjacent states swapped
their ranking position, are said to be neighboring ranks. Formally, we say that ρ is a
neighbor of ranking ρ′, written ρNρ′, if and only if for at most two states ω ∈ Ω,
ρ(ω) = ρ′(ω), and for all ω ∈ Ω, |ρ(ω) − ρ′(ω)| ≤ 1. A mapping m : R → ∆Ω
is called rank-dependent probability assignment if and only if for all ρ, ρ′ ∈ R such
that ρNρ′, and all ω ∈ Ω such that ρ(ω) = ρ′(ω): mρ(ω) = mρ′(ω). For a given
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capacity ν on Ω the rank-dependent probability assignment mρ may be defined as
follows mρ(ω) = ν(ω
′ : ρ(ω′) ≤ ρ(ω))− ν(ω′ : ρ(ω′) < ρ(ω)).3 The mapping mρ may be
interpreted as the marginal capacity contribution of the state ω to all states yielding
better outcomes. The Choquet integral of an act f with respect to ν and u can be
written as the Choquet integral with respect to mρ and∫
Ω
u ◦ f dν =
∫
Ω
u ◦ f dmρ
= u(f(A1)) +
n∑
i=2
[u(f(Ai))− u(f(Ai−1))]mρ(Ai, . . . , An).
By abuse of notation, we denote a measure mρ(f), such that mρ(f)(Ai, . . . , An) =
v(Ai, . . . , An) with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as the rank-dependent probability assignment mρ as-
sociated with an act f . Thus, throughout the paper we write the Choquet expectation
of f , taken with respect the measure mρ(f), as:∫
Ω
u ◦ f dν =
∫
Ω
u ◦ f dmρ(f).
Call a pair of acts f and g comonotonic, if there are no two states ω, ω′ such that
f(ω) < f(ω′)and g(ω) > g(ω′). For any act g, comonotonic with f and measurable
with respect to f , the Choquet integral of g with respect to ν and u is equal to the
expectation of g with respect to mρ(f)and u.
According to this view, Nehring (1999) associates ambiguity of events with their
rank dependence. In particular, he calls an event A unambiguous, henceforth N -
unambiguous, if the probability attached to the event does not depend on the ranking
position of A.
Definition 5. Fix an event A ∈ A. A is N-unambiguous if mρ(A) = ν(A) for all
ρ ∈ R, otherwise A is N-ambiguous.
Let AUN be the set of all N -unambiguous events. Nehring (1999) proves that for any
capacity ν the set AUN is an algebra. Moreover, any capacity ν is always additively
3Nehring (1999) showed that there is a one-to-one relation between capacities and rank-dependent
probability assignments, mρ. In his definition the superscript ν is used form
ν
ρ. We drop it for notational
simplicity.
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separable across its unambiguous events. That is, let A ∈ AUN be a N -unambiguous
event, then for all B ∈ A:
ν(B) = ν(B ∩ A) + ν(B ∩ Ac). (6.2)
An alternative way to characterizeN -unambiguous events is to use Savage’s Sure-Thing-
Principle. However, since the Sure-Thing-Principle, applied to the whole algebra of
events A, implies that beliefs are probabilistic, we have to constrain its domain to some
events. Thus, we say that the Sure-Thing-Principle holds at A and Ac if: (i) For any
f, g, h, h
′ ∈ F :
fAh < gAh ⇔ fAh′ < gAh′, (6.3)
and (ii) The condition (i) is also satisfied if A is everywhere replaced by Ac. The
Sure-Thing-Principle constrained to A and Ac guarantees that the ranking of pairs
of acts remains unchanged whatever the common parts are. Thus, an event A is N -
unambiguous if and only if the Sure-Thing-Principle holds at A and Ac.
Proposition 6.1. Fix an event A ∈ A. The following two statements are equivalent:
i) A is N-unambiguous, i.e. A ∈ AUN .
ii) The Sure-Thing-Principle at A and Ac is satisfied.
Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) provide the behavioral counterpart to
N -unambiguous events in a different setup, assuming a convex structure on the set of
consequences. In particular, an event A is N -unambiguous if for any x, x′ ∈ X bets of
the form xAx
′ cannot not be used for hedging other acts. According to their Proposition
10 all such bets (called crisp acts) are evaluated with respect to the same probability
distribution. Thus, the measure of an event A, mρ(xAx′)(A), is independent of the rank
ρ, meaning that A is N -unambiguous event.
Zhang (2002) suggested an alternative definition of unambiguous events by weak-
ening the Sure-Thing-Principle. He calls an event A to be unambiguous, henceforth
Z-unambiguous, if replacing a constant outcome x outside of A by any other constant
outcome x′ does not change the ranking of the pair of acts being compared.
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Definition 6. Fix an event A ∈ A. A is Z-unambiguous if: (i) For any f, g ∈ F and
for any outcome x, x
′ ∈ X
fAx < gAx ⇔ fAx′ < gAx′
and (ii) The condition (i) is also satisfied if A is everywhere replaced by Ac. Otherwise
A is Z-ambiguous.
Let AUZ be the collection of all Z -unambiguous events. In terms of capacities Zhang
(2002) showed that A ∈ AUZ if and only if for all B ∈ A such that B ⊂ Ac:
ν(A ∪B) = ν(A) + ν(B). (6.4)
Thus, the additive separability property of ν is satisfied only on subevents of their
unambiguous complements. It is worth to mention that AUN ⊂ AUN , since AUZ does not
need to be an algebra. It is a λ-system, a collection of events that contains Ω and that
is closed under complements and disjoint unions, but not under intersections.4
6.1.3 Updating Choquet Preferences
We limit our attention to updating on events that the decision maker views as possible
to occur, i.e. non-null events. An event A ∈ A is non-null if ν(A) > 0.5 As time
progresses the decision maker is informed that the true state of the nature ω is an
element of an event A, i.e. ω ∈ A. A natural way to model information is by means
of event trees represented by a filtration. We assume that time is discrete, finite and
goes over the index set T = {0, . . . , T}. Let Pt be a partition of the state space Ω.
A filtration P = {Pt}t∈T is a collection of partitions such that P0 = {Ω}, any Pt+1
is finer than Pt for all t < T , and PT = {{ω} : ω ∈ Ω}. A filtration is given and
4For more general preferences than Choquet preferences Kopylov (2007) showed that AUZ is weaker
than originally claimed λ- systems, it is a mosaic. A mosaic is a collection of events closed under
complements but not under all disjoint unions.
5When an event A is either N -unambiguous or Z-unambiguous this definition of null events is
equivalent to the stronger notion, A is null if ν(A ∪B) = ν(B) for any B ∈ A.
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fixed throughout. Let AP be the algebra generated by the smallest elements of a given
filtration P .
At the ex-ante stage, t = 0, the decision maker formulates a complete contingent plan
of action. When no information is given, the relation < represents the decision maker’s
unconditional preferences, that is < is equivalent to <Ω. At any interim stage, t < T ,
the decision maker faces new information and has a chance to review the contingent
plan for the remaining time periods. We denote by <A the Choquet expected utility
preferences over F conditional on A ∈ Pt, i.e. for all f, g ∈ F ,
f <A g ⇔
∫
Ω
u ◦ fdνA ≥
∫
Ω
u ◦ gdνA
with νA a capacity conditional onA. In the conditional decision problem the information
available at time of the single choice is finer then just the knowledge of Ω. In the spirit
of Ghirardato (2002) we reduce conditional decision problems to static ones.
Throughout the chapter, we assume that preferences satisfy consequentialism (see
Axiom 2 in Section 2.3). To underpin the link between conditional and unconditional
preferences we consider two axioms, dynamic consistency and conditional certainty
equivalent consistency. Dynamic consistency has been already defined and discussed in
Section 2.3 (see Axiom 3).
The second property, called conditional certainty equivalent consistency, is adopted
from Pires (2002).6 This property is a weaker version of dynamic consistency. It states:
if and only if conditional on a non-null event A, the decision maker is indifferent between
the act f and the constant payment x, then the unconditional preferences should also
express indifference between the outcome x and the act fAx, which agrees with the act
f on A and otherwise assigns the constant outcome x.
Axiom 5 (Conditional certainty equivalent consistency). For any non-null A ∈ A any
outcome x ∈ X and any f ∈ F , f ∼A x ⇔ fAx ∼ x.
6In her paper Pires (2002) axiomatizes the Full-Bayesian updating rule for the multiple prior pref-
erences of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
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At the interim stage, the revealed information is taken into account by updating
the decision maker’s subjective beliefs. For Choquet expected utility preferences, there
are several ways of defining the conditional capacity νA. The most common updating
rules used to revise capacities are: the Bayes updating rule, the Maximum-Likelihood
updating rule and the Full-Bayesian updating rule. For the sake of completeness, we
recall the respective definitions.
Definition 7. Let ν be a capacity on Ω and let A ⊂ Ω. If A is observed and B ⊂ A,
then:
i) the Bayes updating rule (B) is given by
νA(B) =
ν(B ∩ A)
ν(A)
,
ii) the Maximum-Likelihood updating rule (ML) is given by
νMLA (B) =
ν((B ∩ A) ∪ Ac)− ν(Ac)
1− ν(Ac) ,
ii) the Full-Bayesian updating rule (FB) is given by
νFBA (B) =
ν(B)
1− ν(B ∪ Ac) + ν(B ∩ A) .
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) characterize behaviorally the Maximum-Likelihood
updating rule, introduced by Dempster (1968) and Shafer (1976). Eichberger, Grant,
and Kelsey (2007) provide an axiomatic characterization of the Full-Bayesian updating
rule for Choquet expected utility preferences. Moreover, the Maximum-Likelihood and
the Bayes updating rule belong to the class of so called h-Bayesian updating rules
introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993).
Definition 8 (h-Bayesian updating rule). There is an act h ∈ F such that for all
f, g ∈ F and all A ∈ A, f <A g ⇔ fAh < gAh.
When preferences admit a Choquet expected utility representation then for the
Maximum-Likelihood (or pessimistic) updating rule, the act h = x∗ is a constant act
yielding the most preferred outcome in X. That is, under the Maximum-Likelihood
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updating rule, the conditionally null event, Ac, is associated with the best outcome
possible. For the Bayes (or optimistic) updating rule the act h = x∗ is a constant act
associating the worst possible outcome in X (note that w.l.o.g. we suppose that such x∗
and x∗ exist). According to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) the decision maker exhibits
“happiness” that an event A occurred and decisions are made as if she were always
in “the best of all possible worlds” (happiness comes from the fact that the event Ac,
which did not occur, was associated by the decision maker with the worst outcomes).
All the h-Bayesian updating rules satisfy consequentialism but not necessarily dynamic
consistency.
6.2 Dynamic Characterization of Unambiguous Events
6.2.1 N-Unambiguous Events
The objective of this section is to establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for
Choquet expected utility preferences to be dynamically consistent on events in a fixed
filtration. We begin by looking for an appropriate updating rule on the filtration P
made up of N -unambiguous events, i.e. AP ⊂ AUN . It turns out that the Bayes revision
rule for capacities is the only way to ensure dynamic consistency on the filtration P ,
whose elements are N -unambiguous events. Moreover, when the conditional event is N -
unambiguous, then the property of conditional certainty equivalent consistency implies
that beliefs are revised according to the Bayes updating rule. These observations are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6.2. Let ν be a capacity on Ω and let A ∈ AUN be a N-unambiguous event,
then the following three statements are equivalent:
i) Conditional certainty equivalent consistency is satisfied.
ii) The capacity ν is updated according to Bayes updating rule.
iii) Dynamic consistency is satisfied.
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Remark 6.1. Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2008) provide a similar result
for a larger class of preferences than the class of Choquet expected utility preferences,
the invariant biseparable preferences. However, the properties that they obtain are not
available for all acts but only for acts which are unambiguous (i.e. acts measurable with
respect to the unambiguous partition).
As next we state that the Full-Bayesian updating rule and all the h-Bayesian up-
dating rules coincide with the Bayes revision rule when the conditional event A belongs
to the algebra generated by N -unambiguous events, i.e. A ∈ AUN .
Proposition 6.3. Let ν be a capacity on Ω and let A ∈ AUN be a N-unambiguous event,
then the Full-Bayesian updating rule and all the h-Bayesian updating rules coincide with
the Bayes updating rule.
Now we are ready to state our first theorem. It claims that Choquet expected
utility preferences satisfy dynamic consistency on events in a fixed filtration if and
only if the algebra generated by the events from that filtration belongs to the algebra
generated by N -unambiguous events. Intuitively, Choquet expected utility preferences
respect dynamic consistency on a fixed collection of events, which are not affected by
ambiguity.
Theorem 6.1. Let P = {Pt}t∈T be a fixed filtration on Ω and let AP be an algebra
generated by P. If the decision maker has Choquet expected utility preferences then the
following conditions are equivalent:
i) The decision maker is dynamically consistent with respect to P.
ii) AP belongs to AUN and ν is updated according to the Bayes updating rule.
Some remarks regarding the theorem and the related literature are in order.
Remark 6.2. Our result extends the theorem of Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2005),
which is true only for convex capacities, to all capacities. Then, for a capacity ν being
convex, the additivity on A ∈ A, i.e. ν(Ac) + ν(A) = 1, is equivalent to A being N-
unambiguous. The proof relies on their Lemma 2.1 stating that if ν(Ac) + ν(A) = 1,
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then for any B ∈ A, ν(B) = ν(Ac ∩B) + ν(A ∩B). Instead of assuming the Bayesian
updating rule as in Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2005) we show that it is actually
the only way to retain the property of dynamic consistency.
Remark 6.3. Sarin and Wakker (1998a) show in their Theorem 3.2 that dynamic con-
sistency is equivalent to the additivity of the Choquet functional. Our theorem strength-
ens this result by showing that dynamic consistency on fixed filtration actually implies
that the algebra generated by this filtration belongs to the algebra of N-unambiguous
events and vice versa.
6.2.2 Z-Unambiguous Events
We begin this section by presenting the 4-color experiment, suggested by Zhang (2002),
and extend it to a dynamic framework. In particular it illustrates that conditionally
on a Z-unambiguous event (which is not N -unambiguous) it is impossible that a con-
sequentialist decision maker satisfies the property of dynamic consistency.
Example 6.1. Consider an urn containing 100 balls. The color of each ball may be
black (B), red (R), gray (G) or white (W). The decision maker is supposed to rank six
acts, f, f ′, g, g′, h, h′ ∈ F , which are defined as below. At the ex-ante stage (t = 0) the
decision maker is told that that the sum of black and red balls is 50 and the sum of black
and gray is also 50. At interim stage (t = 1) one ball is drawn at random from the urn
and the decision maker is informed the event {B,R} occurred.
Suppose that at the ex-ante stage (t = 0) the decision maker is ambiguity averse and
displays the following pattern of preferences:
f =

1 if ω ∈ B
100 if ω ∈ R
0 if ω ∈ G
0 if ω ∈ W
 

100 if ω ∈ B
0 if ω ∈ R
0 if ω ∈ G
0 if ω ∈ W
 = f
′
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g =

1 if ω ∈ B
100 if ω ∈ R
100 if ω ∈ G
0 if ω ∈ W
 ≺

100 if ω ∈ B
0 if ω ∈ R
100 if ω ∈ G
0 if ω ∈ W
 = g
′
h =

1 if ω ∈ B
100 if ω ∈ R
100 if ω ∈ G
100 if ω ∈ W
 

100 if ω ∈ B
0 if ω ∈ R
100 if ω ∈ G
100 if ω ∈ W
 = h
′
The decision maker prefers f to f ′ and she also prefers h and h′, because the chance
of getting 100 by choosing f is the same as by choosing f ′, but also with additional
chance of getting 1 under f . The same way of reasoning holds for the preference relation
between the act h and the act h′. Furthermore, the decision maker prefers g′ to g. Choos-
ing the act g′ leads to the payment of 100 with probability of one half, since the probability
of the event {B,G} is known to be one half, whereas the act g pays 100 only with prob-
ability in the range between null and one half. Moreover, changing the outcome on the
event {G,W} in the pair of acts {f, f ′} and {h, h′} leaves the preference relation between
these acts unchanged. Thus, the event {B,R} is Z-unambiguous. In particular the col-
lection of all Z-unambiguous events, AUZ = {∅, {B,R}, {G,W}, {B,G}, {R,W},Ω}, is
not an algebra, since it is not closed under intersections. However, as mentioned before,
it is a λ-system.
Consider now the filtration P = {P0,P1}, with P0 = Ω and P1 = {{B,R}, {G,W}}.
At the interim stage (t = 1) the decision maker is informed that the event {B,R}
occurred. Since all acts a, b ∈ {f, g, h} and all acts a′, b′ ∈ {f ′, g′, h′} are the same on the
event {B,R}, a = b and a′ = b′, and differ only outside of that event, consequentialism
requires that a ∼{B,R} b and a′ ∼{B,R} b′ and furthermore a {B,R} a′ (or a ≺{B,R} a′
respectively). But this is possible only by reversing the conditional preference relation
between g and g′. Thus, it is impossible for the ambiguity-averse decision maker to
respect dynamic consistency on the fixed filtration P made up of Z-unambiguous events.
We maintain dynamic consistency for all acts measurable with respect to the filtra-
tion P . That is for all f ∈ F such that for any x ∈ X, f−1(x) ∈ P . Denote by FP
92
the set of all acts measurable with respect to the filtration P . We say that an event
A ∈ A is P measurable if the indicator function of A is measurable with respect to the
filtration P .
Axiom 6 (P-Dynamic Consistency). For any non-null event A ∈ A which is P mea-
surable and for any f, g ∈ FP , f ∼A g ⇔ fAg ∼ g.
In the same spirit as forN -unambiguous events, we look for the most natural revision
rule to update capacities conditionally on Z-unambiguous events. According to the next
result, applying the Bayes revision rule is the only way to ensure that the conditional
certainty equivalent consistency and the P-dynamic consistency are satisfied.
Proposition 6.4. Let ν be a capacity on Ω and let A ∈ AUZ be a Z-unambiguous event,
then the following two statements are equivalent:
i) The capacity ν is updated according to the Bayes updating rule.
ii) Conditional certainty equivalent consistency and P-dynamic consistency are satis-
fied.
Next we show that conditional on Z-unambiguous events the Bayes revision rule
coincides with all the h-Bayesian updating rules, whenever h is a constant act, and
with the Full-Bayesian updating rule.
Proposition 6.5. Let ν be a capacity on Ω and let A ∈ AUZ be an Z-unambiguous
event, then the Full-Bayesian updating rule and all the h-Bayesian updating rules, with
h = x for some x ∈ X, coincide with the Bayes updating rule.
In the following, we assume that the finest partition in P contains at least three
elements. Then we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for Z-unambiguous
events in a conditional decision problem.
Theorem 6.2. Let P = {Pt}t∈T be a fixed filtration on Ω. If a decision maker has
Choquet expected utility preferences then the following conditions are equivalent:
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i) Conditional certainty equivalent consistency and P-dynamic consistency are satisfied
on P.
ii) AP belongs to AUZ and ν is updated according to the Bayes updating rule.
Remark 6.4. If conditional certainty equivalent consistency is satisfied but not P-
dynamic consistency, then the event fails to be Z-unambiguous. When updated accord-
ing to the Full-Bayes updating rule, the capacities known as -contamination respect
conditional certainty equivalent consistency. For a characterization of capacities which
satisfies the conditional certainty equivalent consistency on all events see Eichberger,
Grant, and Lefort (2010).
Remark 6.5. This characterization of Z-unambiguous events through conditional cer-
tainty equivalent consistency is a specific property of Choquet expected utility prefer-
ences. For instance when preferences admit the multiple prior representation, then ac-
cording to the result of Pires (2002) conditional certainty equivalent consistency holds
on all events whenever the Full-Bayesian updating rule is used.
6.3 Summary
In this chapter the notion of unambiguous events is related to conditional decision
problems. We consider a consequentialist decision maker with Choquet expected utility
preferences. We look for a fixed collection of events on which the decision maker respects
dynamic consistency. It turns out that dynamic consistency satisfied on a fixed filtration
guarantees that its elements are N -unambiguous events. The converse is also true,
when the capacity is updated according to the Bayes updating rule. As an implication,
the decision maker will in general violate dynamic consistency on events which are Z-
unambiguous (but not N -unambiguous). However, when the fixed filtration is made
up of Z-unambiguous events, the decision makers’s preferences respect an axiom called
conditional certainty equivalence consistency and dynamic consistency constrained to
partition measurable acts.
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On the one side, the tight structure of Choquet expected utility models can be seen
as a drawback of these models. On the other, side it allows to characterize sharply
the usual dynamic properties of preferences from the static point of view. We hope
that these results on their own may give some new insights into the nature of dynamic
Choquet expected utility preferences and may also contribute to the existing debate
regarding the suitable notion of unambiguous events.
6.4 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 6.1. First we show that i) ⇒ ii) is true. Let A be a N -
unambiguous event. Suppose that there are four acts f, f ′, g, g′ ∈ F such that fAg <
f ′Ag, but fAg
′ ≺ f ′Ag′. By computing the Choquet expectations of fAg we get∫
Ω
u ◦ (fAg) dν = u(x1) +
n∑
j=2
[u(xj)− u(xj−1)]ν(Aj, . . . , An)
= u(x1)(ν(A) + ν(A
c))
+
n∑
j=2
[u(xj)− u(xj−1)](ν((Aj, . . . , An) ∩ A) + ν((Aj, . . . , An) ∩ Ac))
=
∫
A
u ◦ f dν +
∫
Ac
u ◦ g dν.
Furthermore, after computing the Choquet expectations of f ′Ag, fAg
′, and f ′Ag
′ we
obtain ∫
A
u ◦ f dν ≥
∫
A
u ◦ f ′ dν,
and ∫
A
u ◦ f dν <
∫
A
u ◦ f ′ dν.
Thus, we get a contradiction.
Now, we show that ii)⇒ i) is true.
Step 1. Fix an event A ∈ A. For any act f ∈ F take an outcome x ∈ X such that
fAx ∼ x. Let mρ(fAx) be a rank-dependent probability assignment for rank ρ
generated by fAx. Hence,
∫
Ω
u ◦ (fAx) dν =
∫
Ω
u ◦ (fAx) dmρ(fAx). Take any
y ∈ X such that fAx and fAy are comonotonic. By the Sure-Thing-Principle we
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have fAy ∼ xAy. After computing the Choquet integral we obtain∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(fAx) + u(x)mρ(fAx)(Ac) = u(x),
thus, ∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(fAx) = u(x)mρ(fAx)(A).
Furthermore, whenever u(x) < u(y) we have
u(x)mρ(fAx)(A) + u(y)mρ(fAx)(A
c) = u(y)ν(Ac) + u(x)(1− ν(Ac)).
By continuity of u there are infinitely many such outcomes y and therefore we get
ν(Ac) = mρ(fAx)(A
c).
Let now B ∈ A be an event such that B = {ω|f(ω)  x}, then
mρ(fAx)(A
c) = ν(Ac ∪B)− ν(B)
and
ν(Ac) = ν(Ac ∪B)− ν(B).
This holds for any B ∈ A such that B ∩ Ac = ∅. Since the Sure-Thing-Principle
is satisfied at Ac as well, then
ν(A) = ν(A ∪ C)− ν(C)
for any C ∈ A such that A ∩ C = ∅.
Step 2. For any x, z ∈ X such that u(x) < u(z), there exists y ∈ X with u(x) <
u(y) < u(z) such that fAg ∼ f ′Ag where the acts fAg and f ′Ag are defined as
follows
fAg =

z if ω ∈ A ∩B
x if ω ∈ A ∩Bc
x if ω ∈ Ac
 and f ′Ag =

y if ω ∈ A ∩B
y if ω ∈ A ∩Bc
x if ω ∈ Ac
 .
By the Sure-Thing-Principle fAg ∼ f ′Ag ⇒ fAh ∼ f ′Ah for any fAh and f ′Ah
defined as
96
fAh =

z if ω ∈ A ∩B
x if ω ∈ A ∩Bc
z if ω ∈ Ac ∩B
x if ω ∈ Ac ∩Bc
 and f
′
Ah =

y if ω ∈ A ∩B
y if ω ∈ A ∩Bc
z if ω ∈ Ac ∩B
x if ω ∈ Ac ∩Bc
 .
Now by computing the Choquet integrals, we get
fAg = u(x)(1− ν(A ∩B)) + u(z)ν(A ∩B)
f ′Ag = u(x)(1− ν(A)) + u(y)ν(A)
fAh = u(x)(1− ν(B)) + u(z)ν(B)
f ′Ah = u(x)(1− ν(A ∪ (Ac ∩B))) + u(y)(ν(A ∪ (Ac ∩B))− ν(Ac ∩B))
+u(z)ν(Ac ∩B).
Since fAg ∼ f ′Ag we obtain
u(x)(1− ν(A ∩B)) + u(z)ν(A ∩B) = u(x)(1− ν(A)) + u(y)ν(A)
u(x)(ν(A)− ν(A ∩B)) = u(y)ν(A)− u(z)ν(A ∩B).
From Step 1 we have ν(A) = ν(A ∪ (Ac ∩ B))− ν(Ac ∩ B) and since fAh ∼ f ′Ah
we obtain
u(x)(ν(A ∪ (Ac ∩B))− ν(B)) = u(y)ν(A)− u(z)(ν(Ac ∩B)− ν(B)).
Since this equation is true for any x, z ∈ X, then ν(B) = ν(B ∩ A) + ν(B ∩ Ac)
for any B ∈ A and we conclude that A is a N -unambiguous event, i.e. A ∈ AUN .
Proof of Proposition 6.2. i)⇒ ii) Let us suppose that conditional certainty equiv-
alent consistency is satisfied. Let f = yBx be a simple bet with u(x) < u(y). By
solvability, there is z ∈ X such that f ∼A z. Thus, by conditional certainty equivalent
consistency, we have fAz ∼ z. After rearranging terms, we get
u(z) = u(x)(1− νA(B)) + u(y)νA(B)
u(z) = u(x)(1− ν(Ac ∪B)) + u(z)(ν(Ac ∪ (B ∩ A))− ν(B)) + u(y)ν(B ∩ A).
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Thus,
u(z) =
u(x)(1− ν(Ac ∪B)) + u(y)ν(A ∩B)
1− ν(Ac ∪B) + ν(A ∩B) .
Since A is a N -unambiguous event, then by the property of additive separability, we
get 1 − ν(Ac ∪ B) + ν(B) = 1 − ν(Ac) − ν(A ∩ B) + ν(A ∩ B) = ν(A). Thus, for any
outcomes x, y ∈ X such that u(x) < u(y) the following is true
u(z) =
u(x)(1− ν(Ac ∪B)) + u(y)ν(A ∩B)
ν(A)
= u(x)(1− νA(B)) + u(y)νA(B).
Therefore, we have
νA(B) =
ν(A ∩B)
ν(A)
.
ii)⇒ iii) Now, suppose that the capacity ν is updated according to the Bayes updating
rule. Let the events A and B be N -unambiguous. Consider acts f, g ∈ F with the
following conditional preference relation: f ≺A g and f ≺B g. By computing the
conditional Choquet expected utilities we get∫
Ω
u ◦ fdνA = u(x1) +
n∑
j=2
[u(xj)− u(xj−1)]νA(Aj, . . . , An)
= u(x1) +
n∑
j=2
[u(xj)− u(xj−1)]ν((Aj, . . . , An) ∩ A)
ν(A)
,
∫
Ω
u ◦ fdνA∪B = u(x1) +
n∑
j=2
[u(xj)− u(xj−1)]νA∪B(Aj, . . . , An)
= u(x1) +
n∑
j=2
[u(xj)− u(xj−1)]ν((Aj, . . . , An) ∩ (A ∪B))
ν(A ∪B) .
Since the eventA∪B isN -unambiguous we have ν((Aj, . . . , An)∩(A∪B)) = ν((Aj, . . . , An)∩
A) + ν((Aj, . . . , An)∩B) for any j = 2, . . . , n. Hence, the conditional Choquet integral∫
Ω
u ◦ fdνA∪B is proportional to the sum of
∫
Ω
u ◦ fdνA and
∫
Ω
u ◦ fdνB. Therefore, we
obtain f ≺A∪B g.
iii)⇒ i) Dynamic consistency directly implies conditional certainty equivalent con-
sistency.
Proof of Proposition 6.3. Consider the Full-Bayesian updating rule,
νFBA (B) =
ν(A ∩B)
1− ν(Ac ∪B) + ν(A ∩B) .
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Since the conditional event A is N -unambiguous, ν(Ac ∪ B) = ν(Ac) + ν(A ∩ B) and
ν(Ac) + ν(A) = 1, therefore we have
νFBA (B) =
ν(A ∩B)
ν(A)
.
Consider now the Maximum-Likelihood updating rule,
νMLA (B) =
ν((A ∩B) ∪ Ac)− ν(Ac)
ν(A)
.
Since A is a N -unambiguous event, ν((A∩B)∪Ac)−ν(Ac) = ν(A∩B)+ν(Ac)−ν(Ac),
therefore we have
νMLA (B) =
ν(A ∩B)
ν(A)
.
Since A is N -unambiguous event, then for any f ∈ F we get∫
Ω
u ◦ fdν = u(x1) +
n∑
j=2
[u(xj)− u(xj−1)]ν(Aj, . . . , An)
= u(x1)(ν(A) + ν(A
c))
+
n∑
j=2
[u(xj)− u(xj−1)](ν((Aj, . . . , An) ∩ A) + ν((Aj, . . . , An) ∩ Ac))
=
∫
A
u ◦ f dν +
∫
Ac
u ◦ f dν.
Thus, by definition of the h-Bayesian updating rules: f A g iff fAh  gAh. For a N -
unambiguous event this is equivalent to
∫
A
u ◦ f dν ≤ ∫
A
u ◦ g dν which is independent
of h. So all the h-Bayesian updating rules coincide when the conditional event A is
N -unambiguous.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. i) ⇒ ii) Let A ∈ A be an event on which dynamic con-
sistency is satisfied. It is well known (see Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci
(2008)) that dynamic consistency implies that the utility functions u and uA are the
same up to an affine transformation. Let f = (A1, x1; . . . ;An, xn) be an act such that
u(xi) < u(xi+1) with 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1. The Choquet expectation of f is taken with respect
to a rank-dependent probability assignment mρ(f) with rank ρ given the act f , i.e.∫
Ω
u ◦ f dν =
∫
Ω
u ◦ f dmρ(f).
By solvability, there is an outcome x ∈ X such that f ∼A x. Without loss of generality,
we assume that f does not take the value x, i.e. x 6= xi with i = 1, . . . , n. Consider acts
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fAy for any y ∈ X. Let mρ(fAy) be a rank-dependent probability assignment associated
with the act g. Let ν be a capacity such that ν(A) + ν(Ac) = 1 and let νA be a
conditional capacity given A. In the first step we prove that
1
ν(A)
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(fAy) =
∫
A
u ◦ f dνA.
In the second step, it is shown that for any act f ∈ F
1
ν(A)
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(f) =
∫
A
u ◦ f dνA.
In the third step we conclude that that mρ(f)(A) = ν(A) for any act f ∈ F . Thus, for
any ranking position of states, that is for all ranks ρ ∈ R, mρ(A) = ν(A) and therefore
A is a N -unambiguous event.
Step 1. Since f ∼A x, by dynamic consistency we get fAy ∼ xA for any y ∈ X.
i) Let y be an outcome such that u(y) < u(x). Since
∫
Ω
u◦g dν = ∫
Ω
u◦ (fAy) dmρ(fAy)
we have∫
A
u ◦ fdmρ(fAy) + u(y)mρ(fAy)(Ac) = u(y)(1− ν(A)) + u(x)ν(A).
This equality is true for any such outcome y for which the ranking ρ given the
act fAy and the ranking ρ
′ given the act xAy are the same, i.e. ρ = ρ′. Thus, we
get the following equality u(y)mρ(fAy)(A
c) = u(y)(1− ν(A)), which implies that
mρ(fAy)(A) = v(A). (1)
Therefore, we conclude that
∫
A
u ◦ fdmρ(fAy) = u(x)mρ(fAy)(A).
ii) Let y∗ be an outcome such that u(x) < u(y∗). Again, since
∫
Ω
u ◦ (fAy∗) dν =∫
Ω
u ◦ (fAy∗) dmρ(fAy∗) we have∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(fAy∗) + u(y∗)mρ(fAy∗)(Ac) = u(y∗)(1− ν(A)) + u(x)ν(A).
This equality is true for all outcomes y∗ which keep the same ranking. Namely,
the rank ρ associated with the act fAy
∗ and the rank ρ′ associated with the act
xAy
∗ are the same, i.e. ρ(ω) = ρ′(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. So we have the equality
u(y∗)mρ(fAy∗)(A
c) = u(y∗)ν(Ac), which implies that
mρ(fAy∗)(A
c) = ν(Ac). (2)
Therefore, we have
∫
A
u ◦ fdmρ(fAy∗) = u(x)(1− ν(Ac)).
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iii) Consider now an act fAx. Let mρ(fAx) be a rank-dependent probability assignment
with rank ρ given the act fAx. Since the act f does not take the value x, there is
an outcome y ∈ X such that u(y) = u(x)− and there is an outcome y∗ ∈ X such
that u(y∗) = u(x)+ and such that the act fAy and the act fAy∗ are comonotonic
acts. This is possible by continuity of u. By applying (1) and (2) to mρ(fAx)
we can deduce that mρ(fAx)(A) = ν(A) and mρ(fAx)(A
c) = ν(Ac) and therefore
ν(A) + ν(Ac) = 1.
Thus, for any outcome y ∈ X and for any rank-dependent probability assignment
mρ(fAy) with rank ρ given the act fAy we have
u(x) =
1
v(A)
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(fAy) =
∫
A
u ◦ f dvA.
Step 2. Since f ∼A x, dynamic consistency implies that f ∼ xAf . Let mρ(xAf) be a
rank-dependent probability assignment for a rank ρ given the act xAf . Thus, we
have∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(f) +
∫
Ac
u ◦ f dmρ(f) =
∫
Ac
u ◦ f dmρ(xAf) + u(x)mρ(xAf)(A).
Let us consider an act f ∗ ∈ F such that f(ω) = f ∗(ω) for any ω ∈ A, but
f(ω) 6= f ∗(ω) for at least one ω ∈ Ac. Moreover, let f ∗ be comonotonic with f
and let xAf be comonotonic with xAf
∗. According to dynamic consistency we
have fAf
∗ ∼ xAf ∗. Therefore, we obtain the following equality∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(f) +
∫
Ac
u ◦ f ∗ dmρ(f) =
∫
Ac
u ◦ f ∗ dmρ(xAf) + u(x)mρ(xAf)(Ac),
which implies that
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(f) = u(x)mρ(xAf)(A). Since dynamic consistency
is satisfied on the event A, it is also satisfied on the complementary event Ac.
Thus, applying Step 1 to Ac we get mρ(xAf)(A) = ν(A).
Step 3. From Step 2 we have
u(x) =
1
v(A)
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(f).
From Step 1 we have for any y ∈ X
u(x) =
1
v(A)
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(fAy).
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Therefore, we have for any y ∈ X∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(f) =
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(fAy).
Let us consider an act g that is f measurable and comonotonic with the act f .
Then,
∫
Ω
u◦f dmρ(f) =
∫
Ω
u◦ g dmρ(g). For any outcome y∗ there is an outcome y
such that gAy
∗ is fAy measurable and comonotonic with the act fAy. By applying
the same way of reasoning for act g as for act f in Step 1 and in Step 2 we obtain∫
A
u ◦ g dmρ(g) =
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(f) =
∫
A
u ◦ g dmρ(gay∗) =
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(fAy).
This implies that on the algebra on A generated by f we obtain mρ(f) = mρ(fAy).
From Step 1 we have that ν(A) = mρ(fAy)(A). Therefore, we get ν(A) = mρ(f)(A)
for any act f ∈ F .
ii)⇒ i) See Proposition 5.1. ii) ⇒ iii).
Proof of Proposition 6.4. i) ⇒ ii) P-Dynamic Consistency follows directly: the
capacity on the filtration constructed from Z-unambiguous events is additive. Applying
the Bayes updating rule on it ensures dynamic consistency for filtration measurable
acts. f ∼A x ⇔ fAx ∼ x is satisfied if the updating rule is h-Bayesian with h = x.
In Proposition 6.2. we prove that all the h-Bayesian updating rules with h constant
coincide on Z-unambiguous events. Since the Bayes updating rule corresponds to h-
Bayesian updating rule with h = x, such that x is the worst possible outcome in X,
the property of conditional certainty equivalent consistency holds on Z-unambiguous
events, when applying this updating rule.
ii)⇒ i) Let us suppose that conditional certainty equivalent consistency is satisfied.
Let f = yBx be a simple bet with u(x) < u(y). By solvability there is z ∈ X such that
f ∼A z. Thus, by conditional certainty equivalent consistency we have fAz ∼ z. After
some computations we get
u(z) = u(x)(1− νA(B)) + u(y)νA(B)
u(z) = u(x)(1− ν(Ac ∪B)) + u(z)(ν(Ac ∪ (B ∩ A))− ν(B)) + u(y)ν(B ∩ A).
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Thus,
u(z) =
u(x)(1− ν(Ac ∪B)) + u(y)ν(A ∩B)
1− ν(Ac ∪B) + ν(A ∩B) .
Since A is a Z-unambiguous event, then by the characterization of Z-unambiguous
events, we get 1− ν(Ac ∪B) + ν(B) = 1− ν(Ac)− ν(A∩B) + ν(A∩B) = ν(E). Thus,
for any outcomes x, y ∈ X such that u(x) < u(y) the following is true:
u(z) =
u(x)(1− ν(Ac ∪B)) + u(y)ν(A ∩B)
ν(A)
= u(x)(1− νA(B)) + u(y)νA(B).
Therefore, we have
νA(B) =
ν(A ∩B)
ν(A)
.
Proof of Proposition 6.5. From the definition of Z-unambiguous events it follows
directly that all the h-Bayesian updating rules with h being constant act coincide with
the Bayes updating rule. If A is observed and B ⊂ A then the Full-Bayesian updating
rule is given by
νFBA (B) =
ν(B)
1− ν(B ∪ Ac) + ν(B ∩ A) .
Since A is Z-unambiguous then v(A ∪ Ec) = v(A) + v(Ec). Thus,
νFBA (B) =
ν(B)
ν(A)
.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. (i) ⇒ (ii). Let P be the fixed filtration and Aj the atoms of
this filtration with 1 ≤ j ≤ n. From Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2007) we know that
conditional certainty equivalent consistency guarantees that the same utility index u is
used for conditional and unconditional preference relation. Let f = (A1, x1; . . . ;An, xn)
be a P-measurable act such that u(xj) < u(xj+1) with 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1. The Choquet
expectation of f is taken with respect to a rank-dependent probability assignment mρ(f)
associated with the act f , i.e.∫
Ω
u ◦ f dν =
∫
Ω
u ◦ f dmρ(f).
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Let us assume that Aci , with i 6= 1 and i 6= n, has occurred. In the first Step we show
that
1
mρ(f)(Aci)
∫
Aci
u ◦ f dmρ(f) =
∫
Aci
u ◦ f dvAci .
Step 1. By solvability there is an outcome y ∈ X such that f ∼Aci y. As next we con-
struct an act g that is comonotonic with the act f . The construction is conducted
as follows. If u(y) ≤ u(xi−1), we define g on Aci as g = z on An with z ∈ X and
g = f otherwise. By choosing z properly, that is, such that u(z) > u(xn), we
obtain g such that g ∼Aci x with u(xi−1) < u(x) < u(xi+1). By continuity of u
this is possible. On the other hand, if u(xi+1) ≤ u(y) we define another act g by
decreasing x1, such that g ∼Aci x with u(xi−1) < u(x) < u(xi+1). Then the acts
f and g are comonotonic, because g is different of f only on the lowest value of
f , and this lowest value of g can only be lower than the lowest value of f , or the
highest value of f , and this highest value of g can only be higher than the highest
value of f . Therefore, we get∫
Aci
u ◦ g dvAci =
∫
Aci
u ◦ g mρ(g),
where mρ(g) is the rank-dependent probability assignment associated with the act
g. Now, we apply conditional certainty equivalent consistency and get gAcix ∼ x.
Since u(xi−1) < u(x) < u(xi+1), the act f and the act gAcix are comonotonic. Thus,
their Choquet integrals are computed with respect to the same measure mρ(f),
namely
∫
Ω
u ◦ (gAcix) dv =
∫
Ω
u ◦ (gAcix) dmρ(f). Thus, we have
∫
Ω
u ◦ (gAcix) dv =
u(x). Therefore, we get
u(x) =
∫
Aci
u ◦ g dmρ(f) +mρ(f)(Ai)u(x).
Finally, we obtain
u(x) =
1
mρ(f)(Aci)
∫
Aci
u ◦ g dmρ(f) =
∫
Aci
u ◦ g dvAci ,
which is also true for the act f
1
mρ(f)(Aci)
∫
Aci
u ◦ f dmρ(f) =
∫
Aci
u ◦ f dvAci .
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Step 2. We show that the above result is true for any possible permutation of the
indexes {2, . . . , n − 1} of the atoms {A2, . . . , An−1}. That is for any such P-
measurable act f ∗ the rank-dependent probability assignment mρ(f∗) associated
with the act f ∗ is independent of the ranking position of the event Ai provided that
i 6= 1 and i 6= n. Consider an act f ∗ = (A1, x∗1; . . . ;An, x∗n) such that f ∗ ∼Aci y for
some outcome y ∈ X and such that u(xi) is between u(x∗j) and u(x∗j+1). Consider
also an another act f ∗∗ = (A1, x∗∗1 ; . . . ;An, x
∗∗
n ) with different rearrangements of
atoms, such that u(xi) is between u(x
∗∗
j ) and u(x
∗∗
j+1) and such that f
∗∗ ∼Aci y.
Let mρ(f∗) and mρ(f∗∗) be a rank-dependent probability assignment associated
with the act f ∗, respectively with f ∗∗. By applying Step 1 we obtain
1
mρ(f∗)(Aci)
∫
Aci
u ◦ f dmρ(f∗) = 1
mρ(f∗∗)(Aci)
∫
Aci
u ◦ f dmρ(f∗∗). (1)
Now, we can vary the values of x∗1 and x
∗∗
1 , equality (1) remains true, provided
that f ∗ and f ∗∗ have still the same certainty equivalent conditional on the Aci , i.e.
there is some z such that f ∗ ∼Aci z and f ∗∗ ∼Aci z. Thus, it must be true that
mρ(f∗)(A
c
i) = mρ(f∗∗)(A
c
i). Then, we have
mρ(f∗)(A
c
i) = 1−mρ(f∗)(Ai) = 1− v(Ai ∪ A∗j+1, . . . , An) + v(A∗j+1, . . . , An), (2)
and
mρ(f∗∗)(A
c
i) = 1−mρ(f∗∗)(Ai) = 1− v(Ai ∪A∗∗j+1, . . . , An) + v(A∗∗j+1, . . . , An). (3)
Equations (2) and (3) lead to the following
v(Ai ∪A∗j+1, . . . , An)− v(A∗j+1, . . . , An) = v(Ai ∪A∗∗j+1, . . . , An)− v(A∗∗j+1, . . . , An).
The last equation is true for any f . Let Ai = E with i 6= 1 and i 6= n. Moreover, let
F = (A∗j+1, . . . , An) and letG = (A
∗∗
j+1, . . . , An). The left hand side of the equation
is true if (Ai∪A∗j+1, . . . , An)−(A∗j+1, . . . , An) 6= 1, i.e. v(F ) 6= 0 and v(F ∪E) 6= 1.
The right hand side of the equation is true if (Ai∪A∗∗j+1, . . . , An)−(A∗∗j+1, . . . , An) 6=
1, i.e. v(G) 6= 0 and v(G ∪ E) 6= 1. Thus, we get
v(F ∪ E)− v(F ) = v(G ∪ E)− v(G).
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Step 3. Since P-dynamic consistency holds on the algebra generated by the filtration
P the capacity ν is additive on this algebra.
Case 1. There exists an event F ∈ P such that v(F ) 6= 0 and v(F ∪ E) 6= 1.
Thus, by additivity of v on P we get v(F ∪ E) − v(F ) = v(E). Then from the
result in Step 1 we conclude that v(A ∪ E) = v(A) + v(E) for all A ⊂ Ec.
Case 2. Suppose that there exists no such event F and then let us assume at least
three atoms in P . There exists E ′ and E ′′ in P such that E = E ′ ∪ E ′′ and the
complements of E ′ and E ′′ are not atoms in P . Therefore, we can apply case 1
to them obtaining
ν(F ∪ E)− ν(F ) = ν(F ∪ E ′ ∪ E ′′)− ν(F ∪ E ′) + ν(F ∪ E ′)− ν(F )
= ν(E ′) + ν(E ′′)
= ν(E).
Therefore, we have v(A ∪ E) = v(A) + v(E) for all A ⊂ Ec.
By applying Step 1, Step 2 and Step 3 to the complementary event, Ec, we can conclude
that E and Ec are Z-unambiguous events.
(ii) ⇒ (i). The converse follows immediately from the Proposition 6.4.
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Chapter 7
“Agreeing to Disagree” Type
Results Under Ambiguity
In this chapter we apply Schmeidler’s (1989) Choquet expected utility theory to inter-
personal decision problems.1 There is a finite group of agents. Each agent is charac-
terized by her private information represented by a partition over a finite set of states
of nature. The agents share identical prior beliefs over states. Conditional on her
private information, each agent generates her posterior beliefs by updating the prior
ones. These posterior beliefs are used by the agents as the basis for making individual
decisions. An interesting question that arises here is, which role does asymmetric infor-
mation play in the context of interpersonal decision problems? In particular, suppose
that at some state the agents make distinct decisions which are common knowledge
among them. That is, each agent knows the decisions of the other agents, and each
agent knows that each agent knows the decisions of the other agents, . . . , and so on,
ad infinitum. Can asymmetric information alone explain the differences in agent’s de-
cisions? Surprisingly, within Bayesian frameworks, the answer is “No”. This negative
answer is due to Aumann’s (1976) celebrated result, known as Agreement Theorem.
Aumann showed that, if two agents share a common additive probability distribution,
and their posteriors for some event are common knowledge, then these posteriors must
1The content of this chapter is based on the article Dominiak and Lefort (2011a).
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coincide, despite the fact that they may be conditioned on diverse information. Au-
mann’s impossibility of “agreeing to disagree” in posterior beliefs has been extended by
Geanakoplos and Sebenius (1983) to posterior expectations, and by Bacharach (1985)
to actions maximizing conditional expectation. Following this line of research, Milgrom
(1981) and Milgrom and Stokey (1982) established an even more puzzling result. In a
simple exchange economy under uncertainty, they showed that differences in traders’
private information alone cannot generate any profitable trade opportunities. That is,
given an ex-ante Pareto-efficient allocation, after the receipt of private information,
there will be no transaction with the property that it is common knowledge among the
traders (with the same risk attitudes) that each of them is willing to carry it out. This
result is often interpreted as establishing the impossibility of “speculative” trade. To
paraphrase Werlang (1989, p.83): “Their result is a problem for the theory of specula-
tive markets: asymmetric information alone cannot be responsible for the existence of
large stock exchanges. A very important research project in the finance literature is to
find where Milgrom-Stokey’s model departs from reality. It is a point that is crucial for
the understanding of the very complex speculative markets we see nowadays”. In this
chapter we pursue Werlang’s desiderata.
Aumann’s Agreement Theorem as well as Milgrom-Stokey’s no-trade theorem rely
on two main assumptions which can be questioned. It is assumed that the traders
share common prior beliefs and that the priors are represented by additive probability
distribution. Morris (1994) advocated weakening the “commonness” assumption, while
still assuming that the traders are subjective expected utility maximizers. Essentially,
he identified which types of heterogeneous prior beliefs will lead to speculative trade in
the presence of asymmetric information. Here, we suggest an alternative approach. We
maintain the assumption of common priors, but weaken the “additivity” requirement
by allowing the traders to be Choquet expected utility maximizers. We assume that the
agents share a common-but-not-necessarily-additive prior beliefs which are represented
by a capacity. Each agent incorporates the receipt of new information by updating
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the prior capacity conditional on her private information. The posterior capacities are
used as a basis for individual decisions. Our objective is to characterize the properties
of events in each agent’s information partition which guarantee that disagreement in
commonly known decisions is impossible. In turns out that, whenever each agent’s
information partition is made up of unambiguous events in the sense of Nehring (1999),
then it is impossible that they disagree on their commonly known decisions, whatever
these decisions are, whether posterior capacities or conditional Choquet expectations.
Conversely, an agreement in conditional expectations, but not in posterior beliefs, im-
plies that each agent’s private information consists of Nehring-unambiguous events.
Based on these results, we can generalize the no-trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey
(1982) in the context of ambiguity. It is shown that, whenever each agent’s informa-
tion partition is made up of Nehring-unambiguous events there will be no-trade among
Choquet expected utility maximizers. The results obtained suggest that within non-
Bayesian frameworks asymmetric information does matter and can explain differences
in commonly known decisions. In particular, the existence of gambling behavior and
speculative trade may be attributed to differences in agents’ private and ambiguous
information.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.1.1, the partitional
information structure is introduced and the notion of common knowledge is presented.
In Section 7.1.2, we define an interpersonal decision model. In Section 7.2, sufficient as
well as necessary conditions are established for agreement theorems to be true in the
presence of ambiguity. In Section 7.3, Milgrom-Stokey’s no-trade theorem is generalized
for Choquet expected utility preferences.
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7.1 Preliminaries
7.1.1 Knowledge Structure
We consider a finite set Ω of states. An event E is a subset of Ω. Let A = 2Ω be the
set of all subsets of Ω. For any E ⊂ Ω we denote Ω \ E, the complement of E, by Ec.
There is a finite group of agents I indexed by i = 1, . . . , N . Each agent i is endowed
with a partition Pi of Ω, which represents i’s private information in the following sense.
If the true state is ω, then i is informed of the atom Pi(ω) of Pi to which ω belongs.
Intuitively, Pi(ω) is the set of all states that agent i considers possible at ω. In other
words: if the true state is ω, then the agent i does not know that, but knows only that
the true state is a member of Pi(ω) containing ω. Given this information structure
it is said that the agent i knows an event E at ω if Pi(ω) ⊂ E. The event that i
knows E, denoted by KiE, is a set of all states in which i knows E. Thus, an operator
Ki : A → A, defined as:
KiE = {ω ∈ Ω : Pi(ω) ⊂ E}. (7.1)
is called i’s knowledge operator. An event E is common knowledge at a state ω if
everyone knows E at ω, everyone knows that everyone knows E at ω, and so on, ad
infinitum. The event that everyone knows an event E is captured by an operator
K1 : A → A defined as:
K1 = K1E ∩ · · · ∩KnE =
N⋂
i=1
KiE. (7.2)
A common knowledge operator CK : A → A is defined as an infinite application of the
operator K1, i.e.:
CKE = K1E ∩K1K1E ∩K1K1K1K1E · · · =
∞⋂
m=1
Km(E). (7.3)
Then, E is commonly known at ω if ω ∈ CKE. The concept of common knowledge
can be expressed equivalently in the following way. Let M = ∧Ni=1Pi be the meet (i.e.
finest common coarsening) and J = ∨Ni=1Pi the joint (i.e. coarsest common refinement)
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of all agents’ partitions. Denote byM(ω) the member ofM that contains ω. Then, E
is commonly known at ω if and only ifM(ω) ⊂ E (see Aumann, 1976; Milgrom, 1981).
7.1.2 Interpersonal Decision Model
Let X be a set of outcomes. In this chapter we refer to mappings f : Ω → X as
actions. Let F be a set of all actions. For any f1, f2, . . . , fn ∈ F denote by f =
(f1, E1; f2, E2; . . . ; fn, En) an action that assigns the outcome f(ω) = fj(ω) to any state
ω in Ej where the collection of events E1, E2, . . . , En form a partition of Ω. An action
f = xEy that assigns the same outcome f(ω) = x to all states in E and f(ω) = y to all
states in Ec, is called a bet. If the true state is ω, each agent makes a decision. Let D be
a non-empty set of possible decisions. Decisions are determined by i’s decision function
di : Ω → D which is a function of i’s private information, i.e. di(ω) = di(Pi(ω)). A
collection I = (I,Ω,F , (Pi, di)i∈I) where I is the set of agents, Ω the set of states, F
the set of actions, (Pi)i∈I the agents’ information partitions, and (di)i∈I the agents’
decision functions is called an interpersonal decision model. An interpersonal decision
model I can be viewed as a formal setup to study the role of common knowledge and
of private information in interactive decision problems.
Essentially, an Agreement Theorem states that if at some state agents’ decisions are
common knowledge then they must be the same the same. For a given interpersonal
decision problem I let Di(ξi) = {ω : d(Pi(ω)) = ξi} be the event that the agent i makes
a decision ξi. We say that at some state ω the agents’ decisions are commonly known
among them (or common knowledge) if and only ifM(ω∗) ⊆ D1(ξ1)∩· · ·∩DI(ξI). The
impossibility of “agreeing to disagree” on commonly known decisions can be stated
formally as follows.
Agreement Theorem. Let I be an interpersonal decision model and let Di(ξi) = {ω :
d(Pi(ω)) = ξi} be the event that the agent i makes a decision ξi. If at some state ω∗ the
event
⋂
i∈I
Di(ξi) is common knowledge, i.e. M(ω∗) ⊂
⋂
i∈I
Di(ξi), then ξ1 = ξ2 = · · · = ξN .
Many famous Agreement Theorems have been formulated within a Bayesian framework.
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That is, it is assumed that agents share a common prior probability distribution pi over
Ω, where pi(Pi(ω)) > 0 for any ω and all i ∈ I. If the true state is ω, then the agent
i is informed of the atom Pi(ω) of her partition Pi to which ω belongs and revises the
prior pi given Pi(ω) according to Bayes’ rule. The posterior probability pi(· | Pi(ω)) is
then used as a basis for agents’ decisions. Usually, the decision function d(·) is either:
i) a conditional probability (posterior belief) for some event E in A:
di(ω) = pi(E | Pi(ω)), (7.4)
or ii) a conditional expectation (posterior expectation) of some action f in F :
di(ω) =
∫
Ω
u ◦ f dpi(· | Pi(ω)). (7.5)
For a given set of feasible actions B ⊂ F the decision function di(·) may also be
defined as a mapping, choosing an action f maximizing conditional expectations from
the feasible set B. When the decision function di(·) is defined as a conditional probability
(7.4) and the Agreement Theorem holds, we designate this situation as an Agreement
in Beliefs. When the decision function di(·) is defined as a conditional expectation (7.5)
and the Agreement Theorem holds, we term this situation an Agreement in Expectations.
Under the common prior assumption, an Agreement in Beliefs was proved by Aumann
(1976) and Bacharach (1985), and an Agreement in Expectations by Milgrom (1981),
Geanakoplos and Sebenius (1983), Bacharach (1985) and Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1990). All “agreeing to disagree” type results established within Bayesian setting are
referred to as probabilistic Agreement Theorems. In the next section we extend these
results to non-Bayesian setups in which agents’ subjective beliefs are represented by a
common-but-non-necessarily-additive prior distribution.
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7.2 Agreement Theorems under Ambiguity
7.2.1 Sufficient Condition
Throughout our study we consider an interpersonal decision model I with a finite
group of agents. Each agent is endowed with Choquet expected utility preferences.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the agents share a common capacity distribution ν on
the state space Ω where ν(Pi(ω)) > 0 for all states ω ∈ Ω and for all i ∈ I. If the
true state is ω, each agent i revises the prior capacity ν given her private information
Pi(ω) by applying one of the possible updating rules (see Section 6.1.3). Again, the
updated capacity ν(· | Pi(ω)) serve as a basis for agents’ decisions. As in the Bayesian
framework we mainly consider two types of decision functions:
i) a conditional capacity for some event E ∈ A,
di(ω) = ν(E | Pi(ω)), (7.6)
or ii) a conditional Choquet expectation for some action f ∈ F ,
di(ω) =
∫
Ω
u ◦ f dν(· | Pi(ω)). (7.7)
In the existing non-Bayesian extensions of probabilistic Agreement Theorems, estab-
lished by, among others Cave (1983) and Bacharach (1985), the nature of agents’ sub-
jective beliefs is inessential and the decision function may be an arbitrary function.
To guarantee that the Agreement Theorem holds it is required, that agents are ”like-
minded”, i.e. they would make the same decisions if they had the same information,
and that the decision function d(·) satisfies the Sure-Thing-Condition (STC).
(STC). The decision function di satisfies the Sure-Thing Condition if and only if, for
any partition E1, . . . , En of Ω it is true that:
di(E1) = · · · = di(En) = ξi ⇒ d(
n⋃
j=1
Ej) = ξi. (7.8)
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Let E1, . . . , En be a partition of Ω. The Sure-Thing-Condition requires that, if an
agent i makes the same decision ξi knowing which of the mutually exclusive events
Ej has occurred, then she also should make the same decision ξi without knowing
which one occurred, i.e. E1∪ . . .∪En. Bacharach (1985) refers to the condition (7.8) as
a“[. . . ] fundamental principle of rational decision-making”. Cave (1983) and Bacharach
(1985) showed that if the agents follow the same decision function satisfying the Sure-
Thing-Condition then the Agreement Theorem holds. Note, in the class of probabilistic
models, decision functions such as conditional probabilities, conditional expectations, as
well as actions maximizing conditional expectations, satisfy the Sure-Thing-Condition
on any partition. In non-probabilistic models, however, the decision function may
satisfy the Sure-Thing-Condition on some fixed partitions, but not on others.
For this reason our first objective is to fix a partition and to look at properties of
events of that partition which are sufficient for a decision function d(·) to satisfy the
Sure-Thing-Condition on it. It turns out that the decision function di(·), defined as
a conditional capacity or a conditional Choquet expectation or an action maximizing
conditional expectations, satisfies the Sure-Thing-Condition on partitions made up of
N -unambiguous events. This condition on its own is a sufficient condition for Agree-
ment Theorem to hold under ambiguity. That is, if each agent i’s private information is
represented by a partition Pi made up of N -unambiguous events, then the agents can-
not disagree on their commonly known decisions, whatever these decisions are: whether
conditional capacities, conditional Choquet expectations or actions maximizing condi-
tional Choquet expectations. In other words, the unambiguous character of agents’
private information precludes the possibility of agreeing to disagree on their decisions
despite the fact that these decisions are based on diverse information. In view of this
result, it seems that asymmetries in private information do matter and that they can ex-
plain differences in agents’ commonly known decisions due to ambiguity of their private
information. This result is formally stated and proved in Theorem 1.
Theorem 7.1. Let ν be a common capacity distribution on Ω and let AUN ⊂ A be a
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collection of N-unambiguous events. Let P i1, . . . , P
i
k, . . . , P
i
K be the events in i’s partition
Pi. If P ik ∈ AUN for all k = 1, . . . , K and all agents i ∈ I, then the following statements
are true:
(i) Agreement in Beliefs holds,
(ii) Agreement in Expectations holds.
How strong is the sufficiency condition in Theorem 7.1? In particular, suppose that
we adapt a weaker notion of unambiguous events, for instance, the one proposed by
Zhang (2002). Is the claim still true that a disagreement in commonly known decisions
is impossible? Example 7.1 answers this question negatively. Even a small departure
from Nehring’s notion of unambiguous events may create disagreement opportunities.
That is, if for an agent i her information partition Pi is made up of Z-unambiguous
events, which are not N -unambiguous, then her decision function may violate the Sure-
Thing-Condition on Pi. Consequently, we may construct information partitions for
other agents and find a state in which agents’ decisions are common knowledge and
do not coincide after all. Example 7.1 demonstrates a possibility of a disagreement
on posterior beliefs among two agents, where one agent is endowed with information
partition consisting of Z-unambiguous events.
Example 7.1 (Disagreement in Beliefs). Consider an interpersonal decision model I
with two agents I = {A,B}, called Anna and Bob, the set of states Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4},
the set of decisions D = [0, 1] and the decision function defined as in (7.6). Let PA =
{{ω1, ω2}, {ω3, ω4}} and PB = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4} be the agents’ information partitions.
Anna and Bob face the following capacity distribution on A:
ν(ωj) =
1
10
, for any j = 1, . . . , 4,
ν(ωj, ωk) =
1
2
, for any j + k 6= 5,
ν(ωj, ωk) = α, for any j + k = 5 where α ∈ [ 110 ; 12),
ν(ωj, ωk, ωl) =
6
10
, for any j, k, l = 1, . . . , 4.
Note, all events {ωj, ωk} with j + k 6= 5 are Z-unambiguous, but not N-unambiguous.
To see this, consider the event {ω1, ω2} and its complement {ω3, ω4}. On this par-
tition the capacity sums up to one. Now, if these events were N-unambiguous, then
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according to the additive separability property (6.2) the capacity for the event {ω1, ω3}
were ν(ω1, ω3) = ν(ω1) + ν(ω3) =
1
5
, but not 1
2
. One can verify that the capacity
ν satisfies the additive separability property (6.4) only on subevents of its unambigu-
ous complements. For instance, ν(ω1, ω2, ω3) = ν(ω1, ω2) + ν(ω3) =
6
10
. Accordingly,
AUZ = {∅, {ω1, ω2}, {ω3, ω4}, {ω1, ω3}, {ω2, ω4},Ω} is the collection of Z-unambiguous
events.
Therefore, Anna’s partition is made up of Z-unambiguous events which are not N-
unambiguous. Consider the event E = {ω1, ω3}. At any state Anna and Bob announce
their posterior beliefs for the occurrence of E given their private information. Given
Bob’s private information he announces dB(ω) = ν(E | PB(ω)) = 12 at any state ω ∈ Ω.
Anna has finer information than Bob and therefore her decision equals the conditional
capacity, i.e. dA(ω) = ν(E | PA(ω)) = 15 for all ω ∈ Ω. Note, Anna’s decision function
dA(·) violates the Sure-Thing Condition on her partition. Furthermore, since M = Ω,
the event that Anna’s decision is 1
5
and that Bob’s decision is 1
2
is commonly known at
any state. That is, M(ω) = DA(15) ∩ DB(12) = Ω for all ω ∈ Ω. But, these decisions
are in fact not the same. This shows that, if for one agent her private information is
made up of Z-unambiguous events, which are not N-unambiguous, than the Sure-Thing
Condition is violated and it is possible that the agents end up agreeing to disagree after
all!
Suppose now Anna’s partition PA = {{ω1, ω2}, {ω3, ω4}} were made up of N-unambiguous
events. In this case, the capacity for the event E must be equal to 1
5
due to the additive
separability property (6.2). Now, 1
5
is Bob’s decision which he announces in all states.
Therefore, agents decisions are commonly known at any state and in fact they are the
same. Thus, when agents’ private information is made up of N-unambiguous events it
is impossible for them to agree to disagree on their posterior capacities.
7.2.2 Agreement Theorem - The Converse Result
In this section we address the following issue. Suppose that agents’ decisions satisfy
the Sure-Thing Condition on their information partitions and that the agents cannot
disagree on their commonly known decisions. Can we infer something about the nature
of agents’ private information? In principle, the answer is “yes”. However, what we may
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infer observing an agreement depends on the type of decisions on which agents agree to
agree. There are situations in which Agreement in Beliefs is present and nothing can
be said about the nature of agents’ private information. Example 7.2 illustrates this
point. We consider an interpersonal decision model I in which agents’ decisions are
posterior capacities for some event E. Then, it is possible to find a common capacity
distribution and an updating rule such that the conditional capacities for E satisfy
the Sure-Thing-Condition on their private information partitions, and such that at
some state Agreement in Beliefs holds, but agents’ partitions are neither made up of
N -unambiguous, nor of Z-unambiguous events.
Example 7.2. Consider the interpersonal decision model I as it was described in Ex-
ample 7.1. Suppose now, Anna and Bob face the following capacity distribution on
A:
ν(ωj) =
1
9
, ν(ωj, ωk) =
1
3
, ν(ωj, ωk, ωl) =
4
9
,
where j, k, l ∈ {1, . . . , 4} are distinct indexes. Consider the event E = {ωj, ωk} where
j+k = 5. Suppose that at any state agents announce posterior capacities for E. To esti-
mate their posteriors, the agents apply the Bayesian updating rule given their private in-
formation. Note that the Bayesian update coincides here with the Maximum-Likelihood
and the Full-Bayesian update. Then, given Anna’s information her announcement is
1
3
at any state, i.e. dA(ω,B) = ν(E | PA(ω)) = 13 for all ω. Given Bobs’s informa-
tion, his announcement is also 1
3
at any state, i.e. dB(ω,B) = ν(E | PB(ω)) = 13 for
all ω. Anna’s as well as Bobs’s decision function satisfy the Sure-Thing-Condition on
their individual partitions. Thus, it is impossible that at some state agents’ posteriors
for the event E are commonly known and not the same. However, this Agreement in
Beliefs does not indicate that Anna’s or Bob’s private information is in some sense
unambiguous. Events in Anna’s partition are made up neither of N-unambiguous, nor
of Z-unambiguous events. On Anna’s partition the capacity ν does not even add up to
one.
Such examples for Agreement in Beliefs can be constructed easily when one constrains
the analysis to a particular class of capacities. For instance, in Dominiak and Lefort
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(2010) we consider the class of neo-additive capacities axiomatized by Chateauneuf,
Eichberger, and Grant (2007).2 We characterize the family of updating rules for neo-
additive capacities which are necessary and sufficient for Aumann’s Agreement Theorem
to hold in the context of such beliefs. The neo-additive capacities, by construction, are
not suitable to model unambiguous events, neither in the sense of Nehring (1999) nor
in the one of Zhang (2002). This observation provides an additional argument for the
claim that an Agreement in Beliefs is too “weak” to infer something about the nature
of agents’ private information.
Furthermore, it turns out that if at some state ω it impossible that the agents agree
to disagree on conditional capacities for some event E then it is also impossible at
ω that they agree to disagree on conditional Choquet expectations of binary actions
defined on the event E. A binary action or bet b = xEy is a function which assigns
the constant outcome f(ω) = x ∈ X to each state ω in E and the constant outcome
f(ω) = y ∈ X to each ω in Ec. The next proposition states this observation formally.
Proposition 7.1. Let ν be a common capacity distribution ν on Ω. Let Pi be i’s
information partition and let di(·) be i’s conditional capacity for some event E ∈ A.
Suppose that at some state ω∗ Agreement in Beliefs holds for E. Consider a bet b = xEy
defined on the event E with x, y ∈ X. Let d˜i be i’s conditional Choquet expectation of
b. Then, Agreement in Expectations holds at ω∗ for b.
Thus, knowing that agents cannot agree to disagree on expectations for some bet,
nothing can be said about the nature of events representing their private information.
Then, in the view of Example 7.2 we may find a common capacity distribution and an
updating rule such that for some event E an Agreement in Beliefs holds. According to
Proposition 7.1, agents will also reach an Agreement in Expectations for bets on the
2A neo-additive capacity ν is defined as follows: for any ∅ 6⊆ E 6⊆ Ω, ν(E) = δα + (1 − δ)pi(E),
where pi is a probability measure with support equal to Ω, and α, δ ∈ [0, 1] are parameters. A neo-
additive capacity describes situations in which an agent behaves as if she had an additive probability
distribution, but she doubts whether this distribution is the correct one. The parameter 1−δ measures
the agent’s confidence in pi. The parameter α can be viewed as reflecting the agent’s ambiguity attitude.
118
event E and the agents’ partitions will neither be made up of N -unambiguous, nor of
Z-unambiguous events.
For this reason we constrain our attention to the whole set of possible actions F
and ask again whether it is possible to infer something about the nature of events in an
agent’s partition knowing that the agents reached Agreement in Expectations for more
general action f . Theorem 7.2 answers this question in the affirmative. Agreement in
Expectations for an action implies that agents’ information partitions are made up of
N -unambiguous events.
Theorem 7.2. Let ν be a common capacity distribution on Ω. Let A′ be a sub-algebra
of A. Let di(·) be the Choquet conditional expectation for some action f in F . If for any
information partition Pi = P i1, . . . , P ik, . . . , P iK such that P ik ∈ A′ for all k = 1, . . . , K
and all agents i ∈ I, di(·) satisfies the Sure-Thing-Condition on Pi, then A′ is the
algebra made up of N-unambiguous events.
7.3 Speculative Trade under Ambiguity
In this section the no-trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) is generalized within
the class of Choquet expected utility preferences. In the view of the aforementioned
results, we are able to characterize the properties of agents’ private information which
are sufficient to guarantee that asymmetric information alone cannot generate any prof-
itable trade opportunities under ambiguity.
We interpret an interpersonal decision model I as a pure exchange economy with
as a single commodity. That is, let X = R+ be the commodity space and call elements
of F contingent consumption bundles. An allocation a is a family a = [a1, . . . , aN ]
where each ai ∈ F represents i’s contingent consumption bundle. An initial allocation
is denoted by e = [e1, . . . , eN ], where each ei ∈ F is referred to as i’s endowment.
As in the previous sections, it is assumed that the agents share an identical capacity
distribution ν on A. Moreover, each agent i is characterized by her preferences over
F which are supposed to admit Choquet expected utility representation, an initial
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endowment ei ∈ A, and her private information Pi. A trade t = [t1, . . . , tN ] is an N -
tuple of functions ti : Ω → R. If the true state is ω, ti(ω) corresponds to i’s net trade
of the single commodity. We say that the trade t is feasible, if:
N∑
i=1
ti(ω) ≤ 0 ∀ ω ∈ Ω,
ei(ω) + ti(ω) ≥ 0 ∀ ω ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ I.
(7.9)
An initial allocation e is called ex-ante efficient if there does not exist a feasible trade
t such that at ex-ante stage each agent i prefers the contingent consumption bundle
ei + ti to her endowment ei, i.e.:∫
Ω
u ◦ (ei + ti) dν ≥
∫
Ω
u ◦ ei dν ∀i ∈ I. (7.10)
Suppose that the agents trade to an ex-ante efficient allocation e before any information
is revealed. After the receipt of private information the market is reopened and the
agents have the chance to reallocate the initial allocation e through a feasible trade t.
That is, when the true state is ω, each agent i observes Pi(ω) and then the feasible
trade t is proposed. We call the feasible trade t acceptable at ω (or weakly preferable
to a zero trade) if each agent i prefers the contingent consumption bundle ei + ti to her
endowment ei given Pi(ω), i.e.:∫
Ω
u ◦ (ei + ti) dν(· | Pi(ω)) ≥
∫
Ω
u ◦ ei dν(· | Pi(ω)). (7.11)
In Bayesian frameworks, where all uncertainty is quantifiable by a common additive
probability distribution, the receipt of private information can not create any incentives
to re-trade an ex-ante efficient allocation, even though the information the agents receive
may be distinct. What are the conditions on agents private information which are
sufficient to ensure that the no-trade theorem still holds in the presence of common, but
non-additive priors? It turns out that as long as agents’ information partitions are made
up of N -unambiguous events, at interim stage the agents will not find it advantageous
to re-trade an initially efficient allocation. In other words, when each agent’s private
information is free from ambiguity it is impossible that purely speculative trade occurs
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only due to differences in their private information. This result is stated in the following
theorem.
Corollary 7.1 (No-Trade Theorem). Let ν be a common capacity distribution on Ω
and let AUN ∈ A be a collection of N-unambiguous events. Let P i1, . . . , P ik, . . . , P iK be
the events in i’s partition Pi. Suppose that P ik ∈ AUN for all k = 1, . . . , K and for all
agents i ∈ I. Suppose the initial allocation e = [e1, . . . , eN ] is ex-ante efficient. Let
t = [t1, . . . , tN ] be a trade proposed at interim stage. If it is common knowledge at ω
∗
that t is feasible and acceptable, then t1(ω
∗) = . . . = tN(ω∗) = 0.
Corollary 7.1 provides an intuitive explanation for the existence of speculative trade.
As was already stipulated by Knight (1921), it is the presence of ambiguity, or what he
called “unmeasurable uncertainty”, that generates profitable trade opportunities. When
agents’ private information is ambiguous, then, conditional on different information
agents may expect gains from re-trading an initially efficient allocation. Example 7.3
illustrates how gains from trade may occur even when one agent’s private information
partition is made up of Z-unambiguous events, which are not N -unambiguous.
Example 7.3. Let X = R+ be the set of outcomes. Consider an interpersonal decision
model I with the set of contingent consumption bundles F = {a | a : Ω→ R+} and the
same information structure and the same capacity distribution as in Example 7.1. Let
e = [eA = (2, 0, 2, 0), eB = (1, 2, 1, 0)] be the initial allocation. Suppose Anna and Bob
are risk neutral. By computing the Choquet expectations of eA and eB with respect to u
and ν for both agents, we get:∫
u ◦ eA dν = 21
2
+ 0[1− 1
2
] = 1. (7.12)
∫
u ◦ eB dν = 2 1
10
+ 1[
6
10
− 1
10
] + 0[1− 6
10
] =
7
10
, (7.13)
At ex-ante stage there is no feasible trade t that would make both agents better off. In
fact, the contingent consumption bundle eA makes Bob better off, but any feasible trade
would make Anna worse off. Hence, e is ex-ante efficient. Now, let ω1 be the true state.
Because of Bob’s information at ω1, i.e. PB(ω1) = Ω, his evaluation of eA and eB does
not change. Given Anna’s information at ω1, i.e. PA(ω1) = {ω1, ω2}, she updates her
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preferences by taking into account the conditional capacities ν(ω1 | PA(ω1)) = ν(ω2 |
PA(ω1)) = 210 and calculates the conditional Choquet expectations of eA and eB:∫
u ◦ eA dν(· | PA(ω1)) = 2 2
10
+ 0[1− 2
10
] =
4
10
. (7.14)∫
u ◦ eB dν(· | PA(ω1)) = 2 2
10
+ 1[1− 2
10
] =
12
10
, (7.15)
Now, consider the trade t := [tA = (−1, 2,−1, 0), tB = (1,−2, 1, 0)] proposed at the
interim stage. Note, since eA+tA = eB and eB+tB = eA the trade t is feasible. By (7.14)
and (7.15) Anna prefers eB to eA and by (7.12) and (7.13) Bob prefers eA to eB making
the trade t acceptable at ω1. At ω1 it is commonly known between Anna and Bob that
the trade t is feasible and acceptable and t is not the null-trade. The events in Anna’s
partition are Z-unambiguous, but not N-unambiguous; due to this fact differences in
agents’ private information matter and make a profitable trade possible.
A few remarks with regard to the related literature are in order. Close to our ap-
proach are the contributions of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) and Dow, Madrigal,
and Werlang (1990). Their results are obtained without constraining the analysis to
a particular class of ambiguity-sensitive preferences. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990)
argued that Milgrom-Stokey’s result is valid for any theory of decision making under
uncertainty as long as preferences satisfy dynamic consistency. Dow, Madrigal, and
Werlang (1990) showed that the no-trade theorem is true if and only if preferences
are representable by a state-additive utility function. Corollary 7.1 can be viewed as
characterizing those properties of events in information partitions on which dynamic
consistency as well as state-additivity of Choquet preferences are satisfied. Then, if
a fixed partition is made up of N -unambiguous events, then Choquet expected utility
preferences respect dynamic consistency on that partition (see Section 6.2.1). Further-
more, Choquet preferences respect dynamic consistency on a fixed partition if and only
if the Choquet integral satisfies the additivity property constrained to that partition
(see Sarin and Wakker, 1998a). In two other related works, Ma (2002) and Halevy
(2004) attempt to establish sufficient condition for the no-trade theorem to be true for
the class of preferences violating consequentialism in some respect.
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7.4 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 7.1. First we show that (ii) is true.
Step 1 Consider an agent i ∈ I. Let P1, . . . , Pk, . . . , PK be the events in the agent i’s
partition Pi. That is Pi(ω) = Pi(ω′) for all states ω, ω′ ∈ Pk. Suppose that the
i’s information partition Pi is made up off N -unambiguous events, i.e. Pk ∈ AUN
for any k = 1, . . . , K. Fix an action f ∈ F . Let di be the Choquet decision
rule defined as in (7.7). Furthermore, we assume that the agent i computes the
posterior capacity ν(· | Pk) conditional on Pk by applying Bayes’ rule. This as-
sumption is reasonable, since all other updating rules, among others those defined
in Section 6.1.3, coincide with Bayes’ rule when conditioning on partitions made
up off N -unambiguous events (see Proposition 6.3). Suppose that for any index
k = 1, . . . , K the conditional Choquet expectation of f given Pk is equal to ξ:
di(P1) = . . . di(Pk) = . . . = di(PK) = ξ, (7.16)
where:
di(Pk) =
∫
Ω
u ◦ f dν(· | Pk)
=
n−1∑
j=1
[u(xj)− u(xj+1)] ν(E1, . . . , Ej ∩ Pk)
ν(Pk)
= ξ.
By the additive separability condition (6.2) of N -unambiguous events the Choquet
expected value of f with respect to the prior capacity ν can be written as:∫
Ω
u ◦ f dν =
n∑
k=1
∫
Pk
u ◦ f dν. (7.17)
Thus, we obtain:∫
Ω
u ◦ f dν(·) =
n∑
k=1
ν(Pk)
∫
Pk
u ◦ f dν(· | Pk) =
n∑
k=1
ν(Pk) ξ = ξ.
Therefore, di(
K⋃
j=1
Pj) = ξ shows that the Choquet conditional expectations of
f satisfy the Sure-Thing-Condition on partitions made up off N -unambiguous
events.
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Step 2 Fix an agent i. Let Di(ξi) = {ω : d(Pi(ω)) = ξi} be the event that the i’s de-
cision is ξi. Suppose at some state ω
∗ the event
⋂
i∈I
Di(xi) is common knowledge,
i.e. M(ω∗) ⊆ ⋂
i∈I
Di(xi). Denote by Q =M(ω∗) the member of M that contains
ω∗. Let Q1, . . . , Ql, . . . , QL be events in i’s partition Pi such that Q =
L⋃
l=1
Ql. By
assumption,M(ω∗) ⊆ Di(ξi) and di(Pi(ω)) = ξi for any ω ∈ Ql with l = 1, . . . , L.
Furthermore, since each event Ql is N -unambiguous the decision function di(·)
satisfies the Sure-Thing-Condition by Step 1. Thus, di(Q) = ξi. The same argu-
ment is true for any agent j ∈ I \ {i}. That is, dj(Q) = ξj. Thus, ξ1 = . . . = ξN .
The fact that the Sure-Thing-Principle is sufficient for Agreement Theorem to be
true has been proved, among others, by Bacharach (1985, Theorem 3, p.182).
Proof of Proposition 7.1. Fix an event E. Let Di(αi) = {ω : ν(E | Pi(ω)) = αi} be
the event that i’s conditional capacity of E is αi. Suppose that at some state ω
∗ the
agents reached Agreement in Beliefs. That is, the event
⋂
i∈I
Di(αi) is common knowledge
at ω∗ and agents’ conditional capacities for E are the same, α1 = . . . = αN .
For any x, y ∈ X such that x  y let b = xEy be a bet. Fix an agent i. Let
P1, . . . , Pk, . . . , Pn be events in i’s information partition Pi. Let di(Pk) be the i’s
conditional Choquet expectation of b given Pk. Suppose that di(Pk) = βi for any
k = 1, . . . , K, i.e.:
di(P
i
k) =
∫
Ω
u ◦ b dν(· | Pk)
= [u(x)− u(y)]ν(E | P ik) + u(y)
= βi,
Rearranging the above equation we get for any k = 1, . . . , n:
ν(E | P ik) =
β − u(y)
u(x)− u(y)
= αi.
Thus, since Agreement in Beliefs holds it follows that:
ν(E |
K⋃
k=1
Pk) =
β − u(y)
u(x)− u(y)
= αi.
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Therefore:
di(
K⋃
k=1
P ik) =
∫
Ω
u ◦ b dν(·)
= [u(x)− u(y)]ν(E) + u(y)
= βi.
Let Di(βi) = {ω : d(Pi(ω)) = βi} be the event that i’s conditional Choquet expecta-
tion of b is βi. Since the Sure-Thing Condition holds, the event
⋂
i∈I
Di(βi) is common
knowledge at ω∗ and in fact β1 = . . . = βN . Therefore, we conclude that an Agreement
in Beliefs implies an Agreement in Expectations for binary actions.
Proof of Theorem 7.2. Let A′ be a sub-algebra of A. In Step 1 we show that for
any event E ∈ A′ and all events F,G ∈ A such that ∅ 6⊆ F,G 6⊆ Ec, the capacity ν has
the following property:
ν(E ∪G)− ν(G) = ν(E ∪ F )− ν(F ). (7.18)
In Step 2 it is shown that for any event E ∈ A′ the capacity ν is separable among all
subevents of Ec, i.e. for any F ⊂ Ec:
ν(E) = ν(E ∪ F )− ν(F ) = 1− ν(Ec). (7.19)
Step 1. Let A1, A2, A3 ∈ A be a collection of disjoint events partitioning the event
Ec. Consider an action f = (x1A1, x2A2, x3A3) with outcomes x1, x2, x3 ∈ X such
that x1 < x2 < x3. Suppose that the Choquet expected utility of f conditional
on Ec equals x, i.e.:
f ∼Ec x. (7.20)
By computing the conditional Choquet expectation of f we get:∫
u ◦ f dν(· | Ec) = u(x1)
[
1− ν(A2, A3 | Ec)
]
+ u(x2)
[
ν(A2, A3 | Ec)− ν(A3 | Ec)
]
+ u(x3) ν(A3 | Ec) = x. (7.21)
Now, consider an action g = fEcx. By the assumption (7.20) the conditional Cho-
quet expectation of g satisfies the Sure-Thing-Condition on the partition E,Ec,
i.e.: ∫
u ◦ g dν(· | Ec) = x , and
∫
u ◦ g dν(· | E) = x
125
implies ∫
u ◦ g dν(· | Ω) = x. (7.22)
When computing the unconditional Choquet integral (7.22) of g with respect to
ν we consider two cases. In Case 1 we consider any x such that x2 < x < x3. In
Case 2, we consider any x such that x1 < x < x2.
Case 1. For any x such that x2 < x < x3 the unconditional Choquet integral of g
yields:∫
u ◦ g dν = u(x1)
[
1− ν(A2, E,A3)
]
+ u(x2)
[
ν(A2, E,A3)− ν(E,A3)
]
+ u(x)
[
ν(E,A3)− ν(A3)
]
+ u(x3) ν(A3)
= x. (7.23)
Solving Equation (7.23) for x we get:∫
u ◦ g dν(· | E) = 1
1− ν(E,A3) + ν(A3)
{
u(x1)
[
1− ν(A2, E,A3)
]
+ u(x2)
[
ν(A2, E,A3)− ν(E,A3)
]
+ u(x3) ν(A3)
}
= x. (7.24)
Equation (7.24) is true for any x1, x2, x3 such that x1 < x2 < x3 and any g = fEcx
with x such that x2 < x < x3. Thus, when fixing the values x1, x2 and varying
the value of x3 we get from Equation (7.21) and (7.24):
ν(A3 | E) = ν(A3)
1− ν(E,A3) + ν(A3) (7.25)
Case 2. For x such that x1 < x < x2 computing the unconditional Choquet
integral of g yields:∫
u ◦ g dν = u(x1)
[
1− ν(E,A2, A3)
]
+ u(x)
[
ν(E,A2, A3)− ν(A2, A3)
]
+ u(x2)
[
ν(A2, A3)− ν(A3)
]
+ u(x3) ν(A3)
= x. (7.26)
Solving the above Equation (7.26) for x′′ we get:∫
u ◦ g dν(· | E) = 1
1− ν(E,A2, A3) + ν(A2, A3)
{
u(x1)
[
1− ν(E,A2, A3)
]
+ u(x2)
[
ν(E,A2, A3)− ν(A2, A3)
]
+ u(x3) ν(A3)
}
= x. (7.27)
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Again, Equation (7.27) is true for any x1, x2, x3 such that x1 < x2 < x3 and any
g = fEcx with x such that x1 < x < x2. Thus, when fixing the values x1, x2 and
varying the value of x3 we get from Equations (7.21) and (7.27):
ν(A3 | E) = ν(A3)
1− ν(E,A2, A3) + ν(A2, A3) . (7.28)
From Equations (7.25) and (7.28) we conclude that:
ν(E,A3)− ν(A3) = ν(E,A2, A3)− ν(A2, A3). (7.29)
Now, we repeat the same argument for an action h = (y1A1, y2A2, y3A3) with out-
comes y1, y2, y3 ∈ X such that y1 < y3 < y2. Suppose that h ∼Ec y and construct
an action k = hEcy. By construction, the conditional Choquet expectation of k
satisfies the Sure-Thing-Condition on the partition E,Ec. After having consid-
ered two cases, Case 1 in which y is such that y3 < y < y2 and in Case 2 in which
y is such that y1 < y < y3, we conclude:
ν(E,A2)− ν(A2) = ν(E,A2, A3)− ν(A2, A3). (7.30)
From Equation (7.29) and Equation 7.30 it follows then that:
ν(E,A2)− ν(A2) = ν(E,A3)− ν(A3). (7.31)
Therefore, it is true that for any event E ∈ A′ for all events F,G ∈ A such that
∅ 6⊆ F,G 6⊆ Ec:
ν(E ∪G)− ν(G) = ν(E ∪ F )− ν(F ). (7.32)
Step 2. Let A1, A2 ∈ A be two disjoint events partitioning the event E and A3, A4 ∈ A
two events partitioning Ec. Consider an action f = (x1A1, x2A2, x3A3, x4A4)
with outcomes x1, x2, x3, x4 ∈ X such that x1 < x3 < x4 < x2. Suppose the
conditional Choquet expectation of f satisfies the Sure-Thing-Condition on the
partition E,Ec, i.e.:∫
u ◦ f dν(· | Ec) = x and
∫
u ◦ f dν(· | E) = x
implies ∫
u ◦ f dν(· | Ω) = x. (7.33)
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By computing the respective conditional Choquet integrals of f we have:∫
u ◦ f dν(· | E) = x1
[
1− ν(A2 | E)
]
+ x2 ν(A2 | E) = x, (7.34)∫
u ◦ f dν(· | Ec) = x3
[
1− ν(A4 | Ec)
]
+ x4 ν(A4 | Ec) = x. (7.35)
The unconditional Choquet integrals of f is:∫
u ◦ f dν = x1
[
1− ν(A3, A4, A2)
]
+ x3
[
ν(A3, A4, A2)− ν(A4, A2)
]
+ x4
[
ν(A4, A2)− ν(A2)
]
+ x2 ν(A2). (7.36)
From Step 1 and Equation (7.34) we obtain the following equation:
x1
[
1− ν(A3, A4, A2)
]
+ x4 ν(A4) = x
[
1− ν(A4, A3, A2) + ν(A4)
]
, (7.37)
and thus:
x1
[
1− ν(A3, A4, A2)
]
+ x
[
ν(A4, A3, A2)− ν(A4)
]
+ x4 ν(A4) = x. (7.38)
From Equation (7.36) and (7.38) we get:
x2
[
ν(A3, A4, A2)−ν(A3, A4)
]
+x3
[
ν(A3, A4)−ν(A4)
]
= x
[
ν(A3, A4, A2)−ν(A4)
]
.
(7.39)
and thus:
x2
[
ν(A3, A4, A2)− ν(A3, A4)
]
[
ν(A3, A4, A2)− ν(A4)
] + x3
[
ν(A4, A2)− ν(A4)
]
[
ν(A3, A4, A2)− ν(A4)
] = x. (7.40)
Recall, in Equation (7.35) we had:
x3
[
1− ν(A4 | Ec)
]
+ x4 ν(A4 | Ec) = x, (7.41)
Therefore, for any x3, x4 ∈ X such that x3 < x4 we have:
ν(A4 | Ec) = ν(A4, A2)− ν(A4)
ν(A3, A4, A2)− ν(A4) , (7.42)
and
1− ν(A4 | Ec) = ν(A3, A4, A2)− ν(A3, A4)
ν(A3, A4, A2)− ν(A4) . (7.43)
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Now, let us consider an action g = (x1A1, x2A2, x3A3, x4A4) with outcomes x1,
x2, x3, x4 ∈ X such that x1 < x4 < x3 < x2. The same argument as above leads
to the conclusion that:
1− ν(A3 | Ec) = ν(A3, A4, A2)− ν(A3, A4)
ν(A3, A4, A2)− ν(A4) . (7.44)
After applying Step 1 to the partition A4, A
c
4 we get:
ν(A3, A4, A2)− ν(A3, A2) = ν(A4, A2)− ν(A2). (7.45)
Thus, by Equation (7.42), (7.44) and (7.45) we have:
ν(A4 | Ec) = 1− ν(A3 | Ec). (7.46)
After applying Step 1 to the partition E,Ec we get:
ν(A4 | Ec) = ν(A4)
1 + ν(A4)− ν(A4, E) , (7.47)
and
ν(A3 | Ec) = ν(A3)
1 + ν(A3)− ν(A3, E) . (7.48)
Thus, by Equation (7.46), (7.47) and (7.48) we obtain:
ν(A4)
1 + ν(A4)− ν(A4, E) =
1− ν(A3, E)
1 + ν(A3)− ν(A3, E) , (7.49)
From Step 1 we know that:
ν(A4, E)− ν(A4) = ν(A3, E)− ν(A3). (7.50)
and therefore:
ν(A4) + ν(A4, E) = 1, (7.51)
ν(A4) + ν(A
c
4) = 1. (7.52)
Step 3. Let A1, A2, A3 ∈ A be events partitioning the event E and Let A4, A5 ∈ A be
events partitioning the complementary event Ec. By applying the argument from
Step 1 when deriving the updating rule we obtain:
ν(A2, A3 | E)−ν(A3 | E) = ν(A2, A3)
1 + ν(A2, A3)− ν(Ec, A2, A3)−
ν(A2)
1 + ν(A2)− ν(Ec, A2) .
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From the property of the capacity ν derived in Step 1 we get:
ν(A2, A3 | E)− ν(A3 | E) = ν(A2, A3)− ν(A2)
1 + ν(A1)− ν(Ec, A1) . (7.53)
Furthermore, from Step 2 we get:
ν(A2, A3 | E) = ν(A2, A3, A4)− ν(A4)
ν(A1, A2, A3, A4)− ν(A4) , (7.54)
ν(A3 | E) = ν(A2, A4)− ν(A4)
ν(A1, A2, A3, A4)− ν(A4) . (7.55)
Some computations yield:
ν(A2, A3 | E)− ν(A3 | E) = ν(A2, A3, A4)− ν(A4)
ν(A1, A2, A3, A4)− ν(A2, A4) , (7.56)
=
ν(A2, A3)− ν(A3)
ν(A1, A2, A3, A4)− ν(A4) , (7.57)
=
ν(A2, A3)− ν(A3)
1 + ν(A1)− ν(Ec, A4) . (7.58)
and thus:
ν(A1, A2, A3, A4)− ν(A4) = 1 + ν(A1)− ν(Ec, A4). (7.59)
Again, from Step 1 and 2 we get the following equality:
ν(A1 | E) = ν(A1, A4)− ν(A4)
ν(A1, A2, A3, A4)− ν(A4) =
ν(A1)
1 + ν(A1)− ν(Ec, A4) . (7.60)
By Equation (7.59) the denominators are the same and thus:
ν(A1) = ν(A1, A4)− ν(A4), (7.61)
and the capacity ν is updated according to Bayes’ rule, i.e.:
ν(A1 | E) = ν(A1)
ν(E)
. (7.62)
Step 4. Fix an event E ∈ A′ and let A ∈ A be an event such that E ∩ A 6= ∅ and
Ec ∩ A 6= ∅. Suppose that:
ν(A | E) = α, (7.63)
ν(A | Ec) = β < α. (7.64)
Let x be an outcome for which Choquet conditional expectation of the action
f = xA0 is equal to α, i.e.:∫
u ◦ f dν(· | Ec) = x ν(A | Ec),
= α. (7.65)
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Now, consider an action g = (x,Ec∩A; 1, E∩A; 0). Suppose the conditional Cho-
quet expectation of g satisfies the Sure-Thing-Condition on the partition E,Ec,
i.e.: ∫
u ◦ g dν(· | Ec) = α and
∫
u ◦ g dν(· | E) = α
implies ∫
u ◦ g dν(· | Ω) = α. (7.66)
The unconditional Choquet expectation of g is:∫
u ◦ g dν = 1
[
ν(A)− ν(A ∩ Ec)
]
+ xν(A ∩ Ec),
= α. (7.67)
From Step 3 we know that the updating rule is Bayes’ rule:
ν(A | Ec) = ν(E
c ∩ A)
ν(Ec)
,
and thus:
x ν(A | Ec) = α ν(Ec). (7.68)
From Equation (7.67) and (7.68) we have:∫
u ◦ g dν = 1
[
ν(A)− ν(A ∩ Ec)
]
+ α ν(Ec),
= α. (7.69)
From Equation (7.68) and Step 2 we obtain:∫
u ◦ g dν = 1
[
ν(A)− ν(A ∩ Ec)
]
= α(1− ν(Ec)),
= α ν(E). (7.70)
Thus we have:
ν(A)− ν(A ∩ Ec)
ν(E)
=
ν(A ∩ E)
ν(E)
= x, (7.71)
showing that E is N -unambiguous event, that is for any A ∈ A the capacity ν is
additive separable:
ν(A) = = ν(A ∩ Ec) + ν(A ∩ E). (7.72)
Proof of Corollary 7.1. Follows directly from Theorem 6.1 and 7.2
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
The goal of this thesis is to examine how new information affects choice behavior under
ambiguity. We focused on static, dynamic, and interpersonal decision problems. Our
first experimental results unequivocally confirm that ambiguity-sensitive behavior is a
robust phenomenon. In each of the two Ellsberg experiments, run as a part of this thesis,
we observed that fifty percent of subjects exhibit ambiguity-averse behavior and about
ten percent of subjects are ambiguity-loving. Neither of these two attitudes towards
ambiguity can be modeled by the subjective expected utility theory of Savage (1954).
To accommodate ambiguity-sensitive behavior, several alternatives to Savage’s theory
have been proposed in the literature. However, to make these alternatives attractive for
economic applications it is important to know first how well they perform descriptively,
and second, which economic facts can they explain in contrast to the orthodox expected
utility theory.
Our first investigation concerned static decision problems. We tested the descriptive
validity of the widely accepted methodology used to formalize the notion of different
ambiguity attitudes, namely, that ambiguity-averse subjects are randomization-loving,
while ambiguity-loving subjects are randomization-averse. Our experimental data do
not support this view. Ambiguity-averse subjects are more likely to be randomization-
neutral rather than randomization-loving. This behavior can be explained by Choquet
expected utility theory within Savage’s framework when the randomization device is
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modeled as part of an extended state space, but not in the Anscombe-Aumann frame-
work. Furthermore, we also observe a considerable number of ambiguity-averse subjects
who exhibit a contempt for randomization. These observations suggest that ambiguity
models which do not exogenously assume a specific relationship between ambiguity and
randomization attitudes would be better suited to describe real behavior in the presence
of ambiguity.
Next, we focused on dynamic decision problems. In a dynamic version of the classi-
cal 3-color experiment of Ellsberg (1961) we tested whether subjects behave consistently
with either dynamic consistency or consequentialism. We find that more subjects act in
line with consequentialism rather than with dynamic consistency and that this result is
even stronger among ambiguity-averse subjects. This evidence can be seen as support
for theories of updating ambiguity-sensitive preferences which maintain consequential-
ism and relax dynamic consistency. This approach is pursued, for instance, to justify
behaviorally the Full-Bayesian updating rule for the Choquet expected utility prefer-
ences by Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2007) and for the maxmin expected utility
preferences by Pires (2002). Furthermore, we find additional violation of the subjective
expected utility theory in the dynamic experiment. Several subjects who are classified
as ambiguity-neutral in the static choice situation do not exhibit Bayesian behavior in
the dynamic extension. They violate either dynamic consistency or consequentialism.
Therefore, the dynamic version of the 3-color experiment can also be seen as a tool to
test Bayesianism and to make the observation from static experiment more robust.
In the second part we continued to study dynamic choice problems, but constrained
our attention to the class of Choquet expected utility preferences. We argued that this
class of preferences has a very attractive feature. Namely, it is possible to characterize
dynamic properties of Choquet preferences from a static point of view by constraining
the analysis to a fixed collection of events. Assuming consequentialism, we showed
that Choquet expected utility preferences respect dynamic consistence on a fixed col-
lection of events if and only if these events are unambiguous in the sense of Nehring
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(1999). Accordingly, one can apply the same techniques used in expected utility theory
to solve optimization problems, e.g. backward induction and dynamic programming,
presupposed that the events in a fixed decision tree are Nehring-unambiguous events.
In the last part of this thesis we applied the Choquet expected utility theory to
interpersonal decision problems. We showed that for this class of models asymmetric
information matters and can explain differences in commonly known decisions. Under
the common capacity assumption it was shown that whenever agents’ private informa-
tion partitions are made up of unambiguous events in the sense of Nehring (1999) then
it is impossible that the agents disagree on commonly known decisions, whatever these
decisions are, whether conditional beliefs or conditional expectations. Consequently,
the possibility of speculative trade is precluded only if private information is made up
of unambiguous events in this peculiar sense. Even a small departure from that no-
tion of unambiguous events creates profitable trade opportunities due to differences in
agents’ private and ambiguous information. The presence of ambiguity offers an intu-
itive explanation for the existence of gambling behavior and of speculative trade. This
explanation seems to be less radical than the heterogeneous priors approach of Morris
(1994).
Our experimental results strengthen the evidence that subjects facing ambiguity
behave in a manner inconsistent with Bayesianism. Non-Bayesian decision theory offers
attractive tools to incorporate such behavior into economic theory. I argue that the
Choquet expected utility theory is a particularly interesting and promising approach.
First, the Choquet expected utility theory makes accurate predictions with regards
to ambiguity and randomization attitudes. Second, it allows for characterization of
dynamic properties of preferences from static point of view. Finally, Choquet expected
utility theory makes it possible to gain new insights into the role that ambiguity plays in
economic decisions. One such insight is that differences in private information matter
due to ambiguity and can explain, unlike the subjective expected utility theory, the
existence of purely speculative behavior.
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Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! These instructions are the same for all participants. During the 
experiment, we ask you to remain silent and not to talk with other participants. Please switch 
off your mobile phones and leave them switched off until the end of the experiment. If you 
have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimentators will come to you.
Aim and structure of the experiment
This experiment is about decisions under uncertainty. You will be presented with different 
tickets and asked to value these tickets. To do so, you get a choice between the ticket and 
different fix payments. There are no „right“ or „wrong“ answers. Only your preferences count. 
Depending on your preferences, it may well be that you find this easy. Respond truthfully 
whether you prefer the ticket or the fix payment because these alternatives are real and not 
only hypothetical. So, if you decide for a ticket, you will actually get this ticket. If you decide 
for a fix payment, you will receive this payment.
Throughout the experiment, Taler are used as a currency unit, which are later converted at a 
rate of 100 Talern = 10 Cent. The amount will be rounded up to full cents and paid out. The 
deciscions of other participants have no effect on your payoff.
Uncertainty
Three sources of uncertainty play a role for  the tickets.
● A coin will be thrown and the payoff depends on whether it shows tails or heads up. 
We will ask you or another participant to lend us the coin.
● A Ball will be drawn from a bucket and the payoff depends on whether the ball is 
yellow or white. There are two buckets. In both buckets there are 20 table tennis balls. 
We only use table tennis balls that are either white or yellow.
○ Bucket H: Half of the balls is white, the other is yellow.
○ Bucket U: It is not known how many of the balls are white and how many are 
yellow.
This is the only difference between bucket H and bucket U.
There are the following simple tickets:
Coin tickets
● Head ticket: A head ticket pays 100 Taler if the coin lands heads up and nothing else.
● Tail ticket: A tail ticket pays 100 Taler if the coin lands tails up and nothing else.
Color tickets
● White ticket: A white ticket pays 100 Taler if the drawn ball is white and nothing else.
● Yellow ticket: A yellow ticket pays 100 Taler if the drawn ball is yellow and nothing 
else.
● Chameleon ticket: The color of the chameleon ticket is determined by a coin throw.
○ If the coin lands heads up, the chameleon ticket becomes a yellow ticket.
○ If the coin lands tails up, the chameleon ticket becomes a white ticket.
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For color tickets, it will be specified to which bucket they apply: H or U. A yellow ticket for 
bucket U thus means that a ball is drawn from the bucket with unknown proportions and that 
100 Taler are paid if this ball is yellow..
Apart from these tickets there will be other variations that you will get to know during the 
experiment.
Decitions and the value of tickets
For each ticket there will be a set of questions. For example:
Head ticket Fix payment of ...
Question 1 (  ) ...68 Taler (    )
Question 2 (  ) ...96 Taler (    )
For Question 1 you have to decide between a head ticket or a fix payment of 68 Taler. For 
Question 2 between a head ticket and 96 Taler.
For each question concerning the same color ticket, a new ball will be drawn; already drawn 
balls are replaced. For each question concerning a coin ticket, the coin is thrown. All draws are 
hence completely independent of each other. Your payoff is hence maximized if you answer 
according to the value of the ticket.
If for example the ticket is worth 80 Taler to you, then you should prefer the ticket to a fix 
payment of 68 Taler (otherwise you lose 12 Taler). If you have the choice between the ticket 
and 96 Talern, you should choose 96 Taler (otherwise you lose sixteen Taler).
Input assistant
The close relationship between the value of a ticket and your decisions is used by the program 
to facilitate the input. You have the possibility to directly specify the value of a ticket in steps 
of 5 Taler using a slider. The program then automatically marks the corresponding decisions. 
If you want to you can change these decisions. The program then adjusts the value of the 
ticket. Note that the value of the ticket cannot always be computed. For example, if you select 
a fix payment of 58 Taler rather than the ticket but also choose the ticket rather than a fix 
payment of 63 Taler, this means that the ticket is worth less than 58 Taler to you but also more 
than 63 Taler. In this case, it is impossible to determine the value of the ticket to you.
Sequence
The experiment starts with a few problems, which should help you to acquaint yourself with 
the different types of questions. Moreover, we want to ensure that you have not misunderstood 
the instructions. Decisions during this part do not affect your payoffs. After the understanding 
part, the main part of the experiment begins. The decision during this part are for real. They 
hence affect your payoffs. Finally, we ask you some general questions. Altogether the 
experiment will take 90 minutes. You have enough time for your answers since the draws only 
start if all participants are ready.
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Figure 1: Valuation screen for head ticket (in German)
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Variable name Dummy variables which take the value one if...
no color preference subject indifferent between white and yellow ticket for Urn U
coin fair subject regards coin as fair
male subject male
economics student subject studies economics
business student subject studies business administration
stats knowledge 1 Prob(10-sided fair dice shows 2 or less) computed correctly
stats knowledge 2 Prob(two 10-sided fair dice show two ones) computed correctly
stats knowledge 3 Prob(10-sided fair dice shows 4| even number)* computed correctly
stats knowledge 4 Prob(10-sided fair dice shows 4| odd number) computed correctly
stats knowledge 5 average payoff of two bets, one which pays 100 in case of even
the other pays 100 in case of odd computed correctly
cognitive ability 1 correct answer to... A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat
costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
cognitive ability 2 correct answer to... 5 machines need 5 min to produce 5 pieces.
How long do 100 machines need to produce 100 pieces?
cognitive ability 3 correct answer to... A lake is covered by sea roses. The covered
surface doubles every day. If 48 days are needed until the lake is
entirely covered, how long does it take until half the lake is covered?
Variable name Subjective agreement with following statements
on a scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree)
superstition There are unlucky numbers.
god God is important in my life.
religion Religion gives me strength and support.
fate What one achieves in life depends on fate and luck.
* Prob(A|B) denotes the conditional probability of event A to occur after the occurrence of B.
Table 1: Variable definitions
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Table 2: Selection on observables: Hypothesis 1
Dependent variable: No color preference on Urn U (yU ∼ wU)
Variable Coefficient Stand. Error p− value
male 0.150 0.116 0.196
economics student -0.214 0.194 0.271
business student 0.188 0.130 0.147
stats knowledge 1 -0.021 0.181 0.906
stats knowledge 2 0.143 0.131 0.275
stats knowledge 3 0.243 0.146 0.094
stats knowledge 4 -0.124 0.177 0.480
stats knowledge 5 -0.046 0.143 0.747
cognitive ability1 -0.108 0.131 0.409
cognitive ability2 -0.009 0.140 0.947
cognitive ability3 0.022 0.150 0.883
superstitious -0.017 0.042 0.681
god 0.083 0.069 0.222
religion -0.104 0.072 0.144
fate -0.004 0.038 0.923
Number of Obs. = 88
Log likelihood = -51.495
Prob > χ2 = 0.43
Pseudo R2 = 0.129
Significance levels:*(5%), **(2%), ***(1%)
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Table 3: Selection on observables: Hypothesis 2
Dependent variable: fair coin (t ∼ h) and no color preference (yU ∼ wU)
Variable Coefficient Stand. Error p− value
male 0.067 0.125 0.593
economics student -0.252 0.188 0.180
business student 0.183 0.144 0.205
reference group: other fields of study (mostly: teaching, law, languages)
stats knowledge 1 0.028 0.214 0.895
stats knowledge 2 0.293* 0.131 0.025
stats knowledge 3 0.189 0.157 0.228
stats knowledge 4 -0.320 0.189 0.090
stats knowledge 5 -0.027 0.162 0.869
cognitive ability1 -0.094 0.138 0.493
cognitive ability2 0.131 0.144 0.364
cognitive ability3 0.204 0.150 0.175
superstitious -0.006 0.047 0.899
god 0.050 0.073 0.492
religion -0.064 0.076 0.401
fate -0.041 0.040 0.305
Number of Obs. = 88
Log likelihood = -48.160
Prob > χ2 = 0.042
Pseudo R2 = 0.210
Significance levels:*(5%), **(2%), ***(1%)
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All instructions translated from German. Original instructions are available from the authors 
upon request.  
 
Instructions 
 
 
Welcome to our Experiment! Please read these instructions carefully. The instruction 
is identical for all participants. During the entire experiment, we want to ask you to be 
quiet and not to talk with the other participants. Please turn your mobile phone off 
and keep it turned off till the end of the experiment. If you have any questions, please 
raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you. 
 
 
Goal of the experiment 
 
This experiment includes decisions under uncertainty. In the decision phase, there 
are no “right” or “wrong” decisions. Only your personal preferences count. Depending 
on your preferences, it could well be that the decision will be very easy for you. The 
alternatives are real and not only hypothetical. Every participant will be privately paid 
in cash. The decisions of the other participants have no influence on your payment. 
 
 
Structure of the experiment 
 
At the start of the experiment, we will answer questions regarding the instructions. 
Afterwards we start the decision phase. Decisions in this phase are real. They do 
have an impact on your payment. Please take your time in answering, the experiment 
only continues once all participant are done. At the end, the payments for the 
decision phase will be determined and all participants are paid. 
 
Overall, the experiment will take approximately 60 minutes.  
 
 
Bucket 
 
The bucket contains 30 table tennis balls. Every table tennis ball has a colored 
sticker, which determines the color of the ball. There are 10 yellow table tennis balls. 
The other 20 table tennis balls are either blue or green. The exact number of the blue 
and green table tennis balls is unknown. However, taken together, there are exactly 
20 blue and green balls. 
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Decision phase 
 
At the end of the experiment, 4 independent draws (with replacement) will be taken 
from the bucket – one draw for each of the 4 questions, which you answer on the 
decision sheet. Your payment depends on your answers and on the result of the 
draws. 
 
On the decision sheet, you have to choice 4 times between 2 alternatives. The 
alternatives are as follows: 
 
- Alternative W: You receive a payment of 4€, if a yellow or green ball is drawn. 
- Alternative X:  You receive a payment of 4€, if a blue or green ball is drawn. 
- Alternative Y:  You receive a payment of 4€, if a yellow ball is drawn. 
- Alternative Z:  You receive a payment of 4€, if a blue ball is drawn. 
 
Questionnaire 1 
 
The decision phase is followed by questionnaire 1. Here right and wrong answers 
exist! In total, you have 10 minutes to answer all questions. For each correct answer, 
you will be paid 1€ at the end of the experiment. 
 
Questionnaire 2 
 
Questionnaire 2 collects some personal data. This information will only be used for 
the evaluation of this experiment. The answers in questionnaire 2 do have no 
influence on your payment. 
 
Draws 
 
In the end, there will be 4 draws, one for each question from the decision phase. 
After each draw, the table tennis ball will be put back into the bucket. The draws will 
be taken by a randomly chosen participant. 
 
It it happens that the first drawn ball is green for question 3 or question 4, there will 
be additional draws till the drawn ball is not green. 
 
Payment 
 
For each draw, you receive a payment if and only if the color of the drawn table 
tennis ball matches the color of the answer you marked. Additionally, you receive 1€ 
for each correctly answered question in questionnaire 1. 
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Decision Sheet          ID: _______ 
 
 
- Alternative W: You receive a payment of 4€, if a yellow or green ball is drawn. 
- Alternative X:  You receive a payment of 4€, if a blue or green ball is drawn. 
- Alternative Y:  You receive a payment of 4€, if a yellow ball is drawn. 
- Alternative Z:  You receive a payment of 4€, if a blue ball is drawn. 
 
 
Question 1 
 
What do you like more?: 
 
‪ W  ‪ X   
 
How strong is your liking for the alternative you choose? 
 
Nil ‪          ‪          ‪          ‪          ‪ Very strong 
 
Question 2 
 
What do you like more?: 
 
‪ Y  ‪ Z  
 
How strong is your liking for the alternative you choose? 
 
Nil ‪          ‪          ‪          ‪          ‪ Very strong 
 
Question 3 
 
What do you like more, if you come to know that the drawn ball is not green: 
 
‪ W  ‪ X  
 
How strong is your liking for the alternative you choose? 
 
Null ‪          ‪          ‪          ‪          ‪ Very strong 
 
Question 4 
 
What do you like more, if you come to know  that the drawn ball is not green: 
 
‪ Y  ‪ Z  
 
How strong is your liking for the alternative you choose? 
 
Null ‪          ‪          ‪          ‪          ‪ Very strong 
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Questionnaire 1          ID: _______ 
 
 
Page 1: 5 minutes maximum 
 
 
 
 
 
Please assume for all questions that dice are six-sided and fair. 
 
Answer 
Question 1: What is the probability that the number in a throw of a die is smaller 
or equal 2? 
 
 
Question 2: What  is the probability that in two throws, the number is both times 
equal to 4? 
 
 
Question 3: Look at a single throw. Assume that the result is an even number. 
What  is the probability that the number is equal to 2?  
 
 
Question 4: Assume that the number 3 was thrown 5 times in a row. What is the 
probability that the next throw will result in a 3? 
 
 
Question 5: Assume 4 dice are thrown and the numbers added. What is the total 
number on average? 
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Questionnaire 1 
 
 
Page 2: 5 minutes maximum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 6: A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than 
the ball. How much does the ball cost? 
 
 
Question 7: If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would 
it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? 
  
 
Question 8: In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles 
in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would 
it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? 
 
 
Question 9: Assume you see 4 double sided cards in front of you. Each card has 
a number on one side and a letter on the other side. Which card or cards do you 
have to turn around to test whether the following assertion is true: “If there is a 
vowel (A,E,I,O,U) on one side, there is an even number on the other side.” 
 
E K 4 7 
Card 11 Card 12 Card 13 Card 14 
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Questionnaire 2          ID: _______ 
 
 
 
The questions on this questionnaire are not payoff relevant. 
  
Question 1: Please give an estimate, how many balls are in the urn: 
 
______ blue balls  _______ yellow balls  _______ green balls 
 
 
Question 2: What is your gender? ‪ male  ‪ female 
 
 
Question 3: How tall are you?  _______ cm 
 
 
Question 5: What is your major? ________________________  ‪ not a student 
 
 
Question 6: Did you participate in a statistics course before? ‪ yes  ‪ no 
 
 
Question 7: Would you call yourself politically left wing or right wing? 
  
Left ‪               ‪               ‪               ‪               ‪ Right 
 
Question 8: Are you religious? ‪ yes  ‪ no 
 
 
Question 9: Which of the following game do you play occasionally? 
‪ Lottery 
‪ Roulette 
‪ Poker 
‪ Sports bets 
‪ Lottery scratch tickets 
‪ others: ______________________ 
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Variable Coef . Std. Err. z P > |z| 95% Conf . Interval
n
o
t
D
C
,
C
Religious -0.271 0.718 -0.38 0.705 -1.679 1.136
Male -0.802 1.058 -0.76 0.448 -2.877 1.272
Size -0.009 0.057 -0.17 0.869 -0.122 0.103
Gambling 0.127 0.467 0.27 0.786 -0.789 1.043
Cog. Ability 0.203 0.270 0.75 0.451 -0.325 0.732
Conf. loss -0.630 0.302 -2.09 0.037 -1.222 -0.038
Cons. 3.772 10.292 0.37 0.714 -16.402 23.945
D
C
,
n
o
t
C
Religious -1.055 1.203 -0.88 0.381 -3.414 1.304
Male 0.924 1.690 0.55 0.585 -2.389 4.237
Size 0.077 0.095 0.81 0.419 -0.110 0.264
Gambling 1.329 0.628 2.12 0.034 0.098 2.559
Cog. Ability 0.099 0.481 0.21 0.836 -0.843 1.042
Conf. loss -0.668 0.523 -1.28 0.201 -1.693 0.357
Cons. -15.310 17.173 -0.89 0.373 -48.970 18.349
D
C
,
C
Religious -0.548 0.843 -0.65 0.516 -2.199 1.104
Male -0.583 1.211 -0.48 0.630 -2.957 1.791
Size 0.033 0.068 0.50 0.618 -0.099 0.166
Gambling 0.473 0.515 0.92 0.359 -0.537 1.483
Cog. Ability -0.229 0.325 -0.70 0.481 -0.865 0.407
Conf. loss -1.092 0.373 -2.93 0.003 -1.823 -0.361
Cons. -3.833 12.124 -0.32 0.752 -27.595 19.929
Number of Obs. = 84
Log likelihood = -82.151742
LR χ2 (18) = 31.01
Prob > χ2 = 0.0287
Pseudo R2 = 0.1588
not DC, not C is the base outcome. Cog. Ability = avg. score in questionnaire 1.
Table 4: Multinomial Logistic Regression
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